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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines the factors that make the low-fee private school (LFPS) accessible 
to the poor. While the provision of education in developing countries has traditionally 
been regarded as the responsibility of the state, recent evidence on the growth of the 
LFPS in such contexts appears to challenge the government‟s role as the most viable 
option. The main argument of the thesis is that the poor have no real choice. The thesis 
also argues that fee-free public education only provides a partial solution to the financial 
barrier to access since there are factors other than direct costs that influence the way 
poor households respond to principles of supply and demand for education. 
The state‟s role in the provision of education is supported by the argument that it is a 
public good, and it must therefore remain the responsibility of the government to protect 
the poor and other vulnerable groups from denial of access. Nevertheless, private 
education provision is a growth enterprise in rural areas, one key reason for which is the 
perception that it provides a better quality of education than the state can offer. Given 
such expansion in an era of fee-free public education, some commentators have 
questioned whether those that send their children to an LFPS can really be described as 
poor, since school choice is clearly dependant on the ability to meet the costs.  
In order to understand how the cost and quality of education interact with school choice 
decisions, 536 households in three poor rural communities of Mfantseman District, 
Central Region, Ghana were surveyed. The data were used to examine the difference in 
cost between public and private provision, and to explore those factors associated with 
school choice and the related expenditure. In addition, to gain further insight into the 
vii 
implications of the survey‟s statistical outcomes, a number of participants with interests 
in both public and private schools were interviewed – including 38 household heads in 
the lowest income quintile, 6 head teachers, 14 teachers, 8 parents, 7 Parent Teacher 
Association (PTA) executives and 3 School Management Committee (SMC) executives 
with children in both school types.  
The findings reject the hypothesis that school choice in the communities under study 
was not affected by socio-economic factors, since the majority of households had no 
real option. In particular, the prohibitive cost of food at both types of school, but 
compulsoriness at LFPSs, had adverse consequences on the willingness of children to 
attend. However, a minority of poor households that did access LFPSs were able to do 
so due to school practices such as flexible fee schemes, teacher discipline and better 
interaction with parents, as well as through assistance obtained via social networks. In 
addition, the study also finds that private schools had a better track record in BECE 
examination than public schools in the communities under study. What is clear is that, 
this better BECE track record by LFPSs coupled with higher aspirations that some poor 
households have for their children fuelled interest in private schooling.  
The study concludes that the claim that the rural poor access LFPS in numbers has been 
exaggerated. This is because it is the relatively better-off households that enrol their 
children in private school, while a minority of the poor that access LFPSs are able to do 
so because of manipulative school practices and the nature of its interaction with 
parents. As a result, the study suggests that it would be in the interests of the poor if 
rural public schools were improved – including the provision of free school meals – 
given that greater state support to the private education sector would only benefit the 
relatively better off.  
Finally, fee-free public schooling facilitated by the capitation grant should ensure that 
schools are more accountable to the communities they serve – schools should be made 
to show how the grant was used to improve access and quality and together with the 
community set targets for improvement. Improving academic quality and teacher 
discipline would enable them to restore their image in rural communities and hence 
encourage demand for public education.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
Background to the study – my journey to the problem  
The journey to this study began in 2006, when I was employed in the National Centre 
for Research into Basic Education (NCRIBE) in the University of Education Winneba 
in Ghana. As a researcher in NCRIBE, I had the opportunity to be part of the 
Consortium for Research into Educational Access Transitions and Equity (CREATE) 
project.  During my work with CREATE, I became sensitised to the issue of low-fee 
private schooling (LFPS) for the poor in rural areas. Therefore, when I had the 
opportunity to do a doctorate degree I decided to focus on LFPS and public schools in 
poor rural areas. 
 
Operating as a fieldwork research assistant for the CREATE project, I had the 
opportunity to interact with LFPSs and public schools, and also with households that 
had enrolled their children in both types of school. During my discussions with schools 
and households, I was puzzled by the decisions of some poor families in terms of the 
school choices they made. This was because even though the local fee-free public 
school had better trained teachers and good school infrastructure, some households 
preferred the LFPS that was situated about 800 metres away from the public school.  
  
With its temporary school infrastructure, the LFPS with no trained teachers yet still 
charged an average of Gh¢12 (about US$12) per term.
1
 In a rural community where the 
main economic activities were seasonal subsistence farming and fishing, the 
establishment of an LFPS raised important questions concerning the manner in which 
such schools operated and the strategies they used in attracting parents to send their 
children to them. This marked the beginning of my attempt to understand the schooling 
decisions and choice behaviours of the poor, and how these factors related to their 
capacity to meet the cost. 
Before commencing my journey, my conjecture was that children in LFPSs came from 
relatively well-off households in the community, who behaved in a similar way to the 
more affluent urban household when faced with a similar choice between public and 
private education. However, after making some initial enquiries of household heads, it 
                                                          
1
 A term is about three months in duration. 
2 
seemed that some poor households dependent on a livelihood based on seasonal fishing 
or subsistence farming were prepared to patronise the private school. Their willingness 
to enrol their children in LFPSs seemed to suggest that further research was required in 
order to explore how the poor explained their choice of school, and also how they were 
able to meet the costs, as the answers to these questions might well have significance to 
the achievement of education for all. 
 
The more I listened to parents and observed their domestic conditions, the more I 
became puzzled and interested in enquiring further into poor households and the schools 
their children attended. In order to do this, I went on to share what I had observed of the 
LFPS and relevant households with colleagues also involved in the CREATE project in 
other rural communities of the district. Interestingly, my colleagues had also discovered 
LFPSs in the communities in which they were working, and had likewise learnt that 
some poor households were buying into them. All my observations together with those 
shared by my colleagues seemed to suggest that as far as poor households that exercised 
school choice were concerned, the abolition of fees was not a sufficient incentive to 
induce them to choose fee-free public schooling; but that choice decisions might have 
been guided by other considerations that required exploration.  
Since in the context of universal education for all (EFA), the state is mandated as the 
driving force behind the achievement of this goal, the growing low-fee private 
education sector in poor rural communities raises pertinent questions in terms of the 
lessons that the LFPS could teach the public education sector. This point is particularly 
significant in an era in which public education expansion through a fee-free policy has 
resulted in low quality public education (Tooley, 2009; Oketch and Somerset, 2010) and 
consequently has made some households look elsewhere for better education.  
Some commentators such as Gulosino and Tooley (2002), and Tooley and Dixon 
(2007a) have argued that the superior quality of private schools serving poor areas has 
encouraged their demand and growth. In Ghana, evidence suggests that, in terms of 
exam results, the perception and reality of the quality of private schools in urban and 
peri-urban areas tend to be quite well aligned due to better qualified teachers and high 
salaries, and the fact that they cream off children from better socio-economic 
backgrounds (MOESS, 2006; GSS, 2005a). However, little is known about the quality 
of the LFPS relative to its public counterpart in typical poor rural environments. 
3 
Therefore, understanding how these schools operate to attract poor households and why 
the poor respond to demand for such schools should provide significant lessons for 
policy.  
The argument in support of the role of the state as a last resort provider is based on the 
orthodox economic view that education is a public good and for this reason, the 
financing and supply of education services must in the main remain the responsibility of 
the government. Proponents of the state provision of education argue that the benefits of 
schooling do not accrue to the individual alone but society as a whole. They further 
contend that in countries in which personal income is low and extremely unequally 
distributed, and coupled with an inefficient or completely lacking system of credit, 
allowing market forces free rein in matters of education would result in substantial 
inequity as the poor would be denied full participation in education (Colclough, 1991; 
1996; Bar, 1998; Vossensteyn, 2000).  
 
Recent evidence on the growth of low-fee private schooling in developing countries in 
an era of fee-free public education (Kingdon, 1996; Srivastava, 2006; 2008; Tooley, 
2009; 2005), has rekindled interest in the need to privatise basic education as the 
solution to expanding access and improving quality. For example, Tooley and Dixon 
(2007a), and Tooley (2009; 2005) argue that privatising basic education in developing 
countries is key to expanding access, and ensuring efficiency and quality for the poor.  
Such a view is based on the neo-liberal
2
 economic argument that resource allocation is 
better determined by the market, a notion that is particularly relevant to countries in 
which public resource constraints and misallocation within the education sector fails to 
promote efficiency and equity for the poor (Plank and Sykes, 2003;  Colclough, 1991; 
1996; Hinchliffe, 1993). In addition, neo-liberal economists argue that competition 
generated by privatisation will eliminate the bureaucracy and red tape commonly 
associated with public education service delivery (Forsey et al., 2008). The emergence 
of LFPSs in poor rural communities in Ghana appears to have given credibility to these 
views.   
                                                          
2
 Neo-liberalism is a set of politico-economic practices based on the argument that human well-being can 
be improved through nurturing entrepreneurial capacity and skills within an environment in which private 
ownership of property, the free market and unfettered trade are allowed to thrive (see Forsey et al., 2008: 
12). A detailed discussion of the theory underpinning investment in basic education can be found in 
chapter two of this thesis. 
4 
However, others have argued that if the provision of education is left to the forces of 
supply and demand, as advocated by neo-liberal economists, this could lead to market 
failure emanating from, for example, externalities and an inefficient or lacking system 
of credit by means of which people could borrow to finance their children‟s schooling 
(Colclough, 1996; Barr, 1998; Vossensteyn, 2000).  
As far as households in poor areas are concerned, privatising basic education could 
result in inefficiency and deterioration in what little equity is enjoyed (Walford, 1994; 
1990), as some children would be denied access to schooling due to resource constraints 
– poor households with more than one child in school would find it difficult if not 
impossible to sustainably finance the cost of educating all their children in the private 
sector.  
Studies in developing countries have explored the impact of cost on access to education 
to some extent (Bray, 1996; Chao and Alper, 1998; Colclough et al., 2003; World Bank, 
2004; Lavy, 1996; Mingat and Tan, 1986), but little is known about the overall impact 
of costs on school choice decisions in poor rural areas. The present thesis contributes to 
the school choice debate by investigating the factors that make the LFPS accessible to 
the poor in rural areas. It examines household responses to fee-free public education and 
the growth of low-fee private schooling, and the significance this has for the 
achievement of EFA. The  thesis also  argues that fee-free education at the point of 
delivery is only a partial answer to the monetary barrier, and that other household 
education cost and non-costs considerations influence the way in which the poor 
respond to the demand for and choice of schooling in rural areas.  
The central focus of the thesis is to investigate the profile of households in rural areas 
that enrol their children in LFPSs, and what we can learn about how they meet the costs 
and perceive the value of such education in relation to public schools in the 
neighbourhood. Additionally, the study explores the manner in which rural private 
schools operate in a low-income context in order to explain why they might be growing 
in number in these areas, and whether they are likely to be sustainable in the long term.  
Specifically, the thesis addresses the following questions: 
 
1. What factors explain rural households‟ school choice decisions, especially 
amongst the poorest?  
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2. Do LFPSs in poor rural areas provide a better quality of education than public 
schools in similar environments?  
3. How do direct costs of schooling influence household school choice in poor 
rural areas? 
4. To what extent is the LFPS provision financially sustainable in the rural context? 
 
Chapter two continues with a literature review of the factors shaping household demand 
and choice of public and private schooling respectively; and ends with a description of 
the conceptual framework of the thesis. Chapter three examines the factors that affect 
access to education, using the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) and Education 
Management Information System (EMIS) data for Ghana. Chapter four discusses the 
methodology and methods employed by the study. Chapter five examines the socio-
economic profile of the district and communities under study. Chapter six examines the 
main determinants of household heads‟ school choice decisions. Chapter seven tests the 
hypothesis that LFPSs in rural areas provide a better quality of education than their 
public counterparts. Chapter eight examines the structure of household education 
expenditure, and how it relates to school choice and affordability; it also analyses LFPS 
revenue and operational overheads. Finally, chapter nine concludes; offers some lessons 
that may be learnt by public schools and the concomitant policy implications; and 
outlines areas for further research. 
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Chapter 2:   Household demand and school choice decision:  review of literature. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Ghana‟s attempt at expanding access to basic education through free and compulsory 
education dates back to the period before independence in 1957. While these fee-free 
education policies resulted in increased demand and  expanded access to schooling, 
recent evidence has revealed that the participation gap between children from 
households in lowest and highest income groups  and also between those living in rural 
and urban areas  have continued to persist in spite of fee-free educational policies 
(Akyeampong, 2009; Rolleston, 2009).  This chapter examines the factors that shape 
poor household demand for and access to schooling. It also discusses the main factors 
impacting schooling decisions, choice in education and the key factors that explain 
private school choice.   
 
The chapter begins with a definition of private education and a brief discussion of the 
growth of public and private education in Ghana. This is followed by the analysis of the 
relationship between poverty and educational participation in Ghana, and proceeds with 
discussion on the theoretical debate in investment in basic education.  The factors 
shaping household demand for schooling and the poor schooling decisions are 
discussed. This is followed by an explanation of school choice and the factors impacting 
on private school choice. Further, the conceptual framework for the study is also 
discussed. Finally, the summary highlights key factors that impact on poor household 
demand and choice of schooling.   
 
2.2 Defining private education 
Private education provision has often been associated with the church schools in the 
past in Ghana. However, the complex nature of private education provision today has 
made it difficult to define.  Kitaev (1999) in trying to define private education adapted 
the UNESCO definition of private education which defines it broadly as non-public 
education. That is „all institutions managed by bodies or individuals other than public 
authorities‟. Hence, Kitaev (1999:43) defines private education as “all formal schools 
that are not public, and may be founded, owned, managed and financed by actors other 
than the state, even in cases when the state provides most of the funding and has 
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considerable control over these schools.” Even though Kitaev‟s (1999) definition 
provides a basis for the understanding private education, it is unable to make clearer the 
essential characteristics of public education particularly in the area of funding and 
degree of control (Lewin and Sayed, 2005). 
 Private education providers are heterogeneous, numerous and country specific (Lewin 
and Sayed, 2005; Rose, 2007). They include: Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
either for profit or not-for-profits; faith based organizations; philanthropic associations 
and commercially oriented private entrepreneurs (Kitaev, 1999; Lewin and Sayed, 2005; 
Rose, 2007; Lewin, 2007a). The not for profit NGOs, Philanthropist and Faith Based 
Organizations are financed by the individual, donors or corporate sponsorship and 
missionaries in the case of the mission schools. Again, faith based organization may be 
grant aided by the state through the payment of teachers‟ salaries, while ownership and 
management remain in private hands. Commercial operators referred to as private 
entrepreneurs or „edu-entrepreneurs‟ are financed from fees and other contributions 
from parents (Rose, 2007). 
 In theory the state is supposed to have regulatory control over all non state education 
providers, but in practice, however, this control is very limited in Ghana, particularly in 
the area of fixing of fees (MOE/GES, 2001). Moreover, the growing unregistered 
private education providers have made it more difficult for government to monitor their 
activities (MOES, 2006).  
 Bangay (2007) argues that Kitaev‟s (1999) definition of private education though 
comprehensive lacks the conceptual individual framework with which to make 
comparison between schools. Bangay (2007) identifies three criteria for categorizing 
schools which enables comparisons between schools. These categories are: schools with 
high degree of financial and managerial independence; schools with significant state 
financial support but minimal government managerial intervention; and finally schools 
with predominantly non-state finance but medium levels of government managerial 
regulations (Bangay, 2007).  The first category of private schools with high degree of 
financial and managerial independence is the focus of this research in Ghana. In other 
words, private education used in the context of this research is the formal school that is 
not public, registered or unregistered, founded, owned, managed and financed by a 
private individual or group (Srivastava, 2008b:4).  
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 This thesis focuses on the Low-Fee Private (LFP) schools‟ sector in rural areas of  
Ghana. It is significant to note that, the LFPS sector in Ghana, like in many other 
developing countries, has not been officially defined by the state.  Srivastava (2008a:97) 
studying LFPSs in rural India defined it as:  
occupying a private unaided sector..... targeting disadvantage groups, 
entirely self-financing through tuition fees, and charged a monthly tuition 
fee not exceeding about one day’s earnings of a daily wage labour at the 
primary and junior levels........ 
 
In the context of this thesis and following Srivastava (2008a), LFPSs are defined as 
private schools targeting households in poor rural communities, entirely financed 
through tuition and extra class fees, and charging termly tuition fees less than 4 days‟ 
earnings of a daily wage 
3
labour at basic schooling level. 
 
2.3 The growth of public and private education in Ghana 
The development of education in Ghana dates back to the colonial times when the 
Christian missionaries established schools to facilitate their evangelism. However, 
education took a dramatic turn when in 1925, Sir Gordon Guggisberg the colonial 
governor, came out with a comprehensive policy for education development in the 
colony. The new policy gave to the state ultimate control over schools. Private 
education, mainly the church schools, was to be regulated and given subsidy by the 
state. Guggisberg argued that education cannot be compulsory and free because „free 
education without compulsory education could not be organised fairly‟ (McWilliam and 
Kwamena-Poh, 1975: 58). Clearly, making basic education free and compulsory would 
lead to expansion in enrolment, but given the inadequate supply of qualified trained 
teachers, the quality of education could be grossly compromised. Guggisberg is said to 
have stated on one occasion “that during his time the government could have afforded to 
spend three times as much as it actually did on new school buildings, but he based new 
openings firmly on the number of trained teachers available” (McWilliams and 
Kwamena-Poh, 1975: 59).  
                                                          
3
 School fees are paid termly and a term is three months. The daily wage for casual labourer in agriculture 
in the study communities is Gh ¢3 ($3)  ( price of labour is in 2008 prices ie when survey data were 
collect from study communities). 
9 
The depression of the world economies in the 1930s which affected the Gold Coast 
economy led to the reduction in education expenditure. This era also witnessed the 
development of private schools including Accra Academy established in response to 
demand for education. By the 1951, the number of „private‟ or „unofficial‟ schools was 
reported to have exceeded the approved ones (McWilliam and Kwamena-Poh, 1975). 
Thus, even before Ghana‟s independence in 1957 private education was an integral part 
of the educational system and the issue of quality and cost were key in the education 
policies and implementation.  
Prelude to Ghana‟s independence in 1957, there was mounting pressure for the 
expansion of education. This resulted in the implementation of the Accelerated 
Development Plan for Education (ADPE) in 1951. The implementation of the plan for 
the first time abolished school fees but textbooks were paid for by parents. But after 
independence, education expansion policy was driven by Nkrumah‟s socialist agenda - 
free basic education was given further impetus through the 1961 Education Act
4
 as all 
charges including fees were abolished.  
The concomitant effect of the free compulsory universal basic education was massive 
expansion in access to basic education. Hayford (1988) estimates enrolment increase in 
basic education between 1951-1966 to be about 642% and 304% for primary and 
middle schools respectively. However, this massive expansion was later accompanied 
with wide spread perception by the general public that the quality of education had 
deteriorated. Consequently, there was a re-emergence of some private providers in 
places like Accra and Kumasi (McWilliam and Kwamena-Poh, 1975).  
 An educational review committee set up to investigate the cause of general 
dissatisfaction reported in 1967 that standard of Ghana‟s education had declined since 
1957. The report defined educational standards to include: “level of academic 
achievement, quality of teaching and learning, efficiency of supervision, adequacy of 
staffing, accommodation and equipment and norms of discipline and behaviour in an 
educational institution” (McWilliam and Kwamena-Poh, 1975:166-167). The 
deterioration in educational standard was blamed on the implementation of ADPE 
without adequate qualified teachers and school supplies. The fall in educational 
standards led to a decline in enrolment after 1966 and this was more evident in the 
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 Education Act of 1961 introduced fee-free compulsory primary and middle school education 
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northern part of the country because of increase in private sector provision in the middle 
and southern sector of Ghana (McWilliam and Kwamena-Poh, 1975).  
In the early 1980s, the Ghanaian economy was in total disarray. Export earnings had 
declined drastically due to the falling world market price of cocoa, world crude oil 
prices had shot up, major infrastructure such as roads, schools, hospitals and telephone 
services were in a shambles and real income of public sector workers particularly 
teachers had slumped. As a result, many teachers migrated to neighbouring countries 
particularly to Nigeria to enjoy the prosperity that came with the oil boom. The country 
faced yet another disaster when it was hit with famine in 1983. In the same year about 
one million Ghanaians were deported from Nigeria (Adepoju, 1993).  
Difficult economic conditions compelled the Provisional National Defence Council 
(PNDC) government to accept the World Bank‟s economic package, Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1983. The SAP came with conditionalities including 
the liberalisation of the economy and removal or reduction of subsidies on essential 
public services like health and education. With a liberalised market environment, fees 
were reintroduced in all public schools. This occurred at a time when confidence in the 
value of public education was at its lowest ebb. Adepoju (1993:26) notes that “drop outs 
were better off becoming „businessmen‟ than staying at school”. Inadequate teachers in 
the classrooms, lack of teaching and learning materials and poor salaries impacted 
negatively on education as dropping out of school and absenteeism became the norm. 
The introduction of school fees due to the economic liberalisation made it more difficult 
for poor parents to enrol their children in school. While some households could not see 
the relevance and value of enrolling their children, those who could afford it enrolled 
their children in private schools. According to Addae-Mensah (2000), this served as a 
basis for social stratification as some households particularly those in the cities like 
Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi were able to enrol their children in good quality private 
schools. By 1987 the government had to embark on a comprehensive reform to improve 
education.  
The 1987 reform benefited from substantial financial investment. In total, the 1987 
educational reforms and the Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) 
reform was supported with over $500 million in US World Bank credit facilities to 
expand access and improve quality (World Bank, 2004). Although this investment has 
11 
led to some improvement in access, it is estimated that about a fifth of all children, the 
majority of whom are from the „ultra poor‟ households in Ghana are still not in school 
(MOESS, 2006). According to the Ghana‟s Education Sector Performance report, 2006, 
total national primary completion rates increased, but marginally, from 77.9% in 2003 
to 78.72 in 2004, while completion for those who started the Junior Secondary School 
(JSS) increased from 58% in 2003 to 60% in 2004. In 2005 when fee-free education 
was introduced, the completion rate rose to 81.2% but declined to 69.6% in 2006 
(MOESS, 2008). For those who complete the basic cycle, about 80% are unable to go 
beyond JSS (MOE, 1999; Addae-Mensah, 2000; MOESS, 2006).   
The question is what difference has this massive investment in basic education made on 
low income households who may lack the means to support their children at school? 
Several supply side interventions have been made by government and non-
governmental organisations in the form of food for girls‟ enrolment (Yidana, 2000), 
school feeding programme and the capitation grant policy (MOES, 2006). All these 
interventions have been aimed at expanding access to basic education. However, the 
question often asked is whether these interventions are sustainable, as they are often 
donor dependent. Another issue is whether interventions that result in the reduction or 
elimination of direct costs really lead to „propoor‟ outcomes and what effects they have 
on demand among different social groups. 
The introduction of the GH¢3 cedis ($3 US) capitation grant per child in public basic 
schools in 2005 resulted in a massive increase (17%) in enrolment in all grades. 
However, according to the MOESS (2006), the massive increase is not matched with a 
corresponding increase in the number of classrooms, teachers and teaching learning 
materials, creating difficulties for quality education delivery. According to the Ghana‟s 
Education Sector Review Report (ESRP), while some parents responded to the fee-free 
schooling policy in 2005 by moving their children from private to public school, others 
parents moved their children from public to private (MOESS, 2006). Even though it is 
not evident where the movement between the two school types were concentrated, 
clearly parents responded differently to fee-free capitation policy. More importantly, the 
use of a single allocation formula where socio-economically advantaged and 
disadvantaged districts received the same amount per child made the capitation 
regressive (Akyeampong, et. al., 2007).  
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 In summary, before Ghana‟s independence in 1957, education was mainly provided by 
the church but with regulation from the state.  The state provision of education was 
scaled up six years before independence following the implementation of accelerated 
development plan for education (ADEP) in 1951. After independence, Ghana‟s 
education policy was driven by a socialist agenda and primary and elementary education 
were made free. However, the liberalisation of the Ghanaian economy in the late 1980s 
coupled with the 1992 constitutional provision that gave individuals the right to 
establish and maintain private schools (MOE/GES, 2001) contributed to the growth of 
private schools and provided choice to those that could afford the cost of private 
education. 
 
2.4 How does poverty relate to school participation in Ghana? 
The relationship between household poverty and child school participation has been 
well documented in many studies (UNESCO, 2007; Colclough, et. al., 2003; GSS, 
2000). However, before delving into the nature of this relationship, it is worth 
examining first, how poverty is defined in international and the Ghanaian contexts.  
Generally, poverty is defined in terms of income, consumption or expenditure (Webster, 
1984; Rose and Dyer, 2006; GSS, 2007). Poverty has also been defined in the context 
of basic need measured by human poverty index which concentrates on life expectancy, 
knowledge and decent standard of living (World Bank, 1999). However, the correlation 
between basic need poverty and income poverty can be as low as 0.45, suggesting that 
each measure of poverty could produce different pattern of socio-economic composition 
of people living in poverty (UNICEF, 2000). Hence, no single measure of poverty is 
capable of capturing its multi-dimensional aspects. Harma (2009) measured poverty 
using asset, income and standard of living index and found that each of the poverty 
measure was significant and constrained poor households‟ capacity to participate in 
education. 
 The World Bank defines poverty as individuals living below $1 US per day (expressed 
in Purchasing Power Parity of 1985). This raises a pertinent question of whether a 
household that has its members earning more than a dollar per person per day, but is 
unable to enrol its children in school should be considered non poor? Understanding 
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and responding to this question would depend on the interpretation of poverty and other 
social and cultural factors that influence households‟ schooling decisions.  
In Ghana poverty has been defined in several ways at different times by the Ghana 
Statistical Service – for example, the Ghana Living Standard Survey I and II (GLSS I 
and II) defined poverty by income, while GLSS III,  IV and V define poverty in terms 
of consumption (GSS, 2005; 2008). In their estimation of poverty in Ghana, the GSS 
(2007) indicated that the overall poverty line, which captures food and non-food 
requirement of ¢900,000 cedis per equivalent adult per year in Accra in 1999 constant 
prices, represents roughly $1 dollar per day which is equal to the amount stipulated by 
the world Bank (World Bank, 1995). Thus, poverty as used in this thesis is based on 
GSS (2007) definition of a dollar per person a day. Since the cost of education 
constitutes a barrier to access to schooling in Ghana (Oduro, 2000), coupled with the 
fact that the poor in Ghana are disproportionately represented by the rural population – 
as over 80% of the poor in Ghana live in rural areas (GSS, 2008), this would impact on 
the school participation gap between the poor and non poor (Boateng et al., 1992) 
within and between rural and urban areas of the country.   
Studies have shown that poverty reduces the likelihood of basic school participation and 
that children from non-poor households have more access to education than those from 
poor households (Boateng, et. al., 1992; GSS, 2000; UNESCO, 2007). Evidence from a 
number of countries in Africa shows negative correlation between household poverty 
and primary school attendance rate (UNESCO, 2007:48), and individuals with no 
education can only receive low wages and therefore are likely to be poor (Boateng, et. 
al., 1992).  Moreover, private costs of education in the midst of poverty, as well as 
cultural and social norms impact on households‟ decision about whether or not to enrol 
a child and whether a boy or a girl should be sent to school (Harma, 2008). What is not 
clear is whether the so called poor households in the rural areas in Ghana that are 
enrolling in private fee paying schools are really poor? If they are, this could have 
implications for household expenditure patterns and also the child‟s sustained school 
attendance and completion.  
As noted earlier, the provision of private education in Ghana has often been the 
preserve of those living in urban areas like Accra and Kumasi. However, recent 
evidence in the basic education landscape in Ghana shows the upsurge of private basic 
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schools in some peri urban and rural communities (Tooley, 2009; Tooley and Dixon, 
2007a; 2007b; MOESS, 2006). Gulosino and Tooley (2002) in their study into private 
sector education serving the needs of the poor in Philippines identified five gaps in 
public education: access, coverage, internal efficiency, learning conditions and quality 
and argued that these gaps have been responsible for the flourishing low fee private 
schools. Data from the Ministry of Education indicate that the private sector of 
education has been making significant contribution to basic education enrolment 
(MOE/GES, 2001; MOESS, 2006). In 2005, private school enrolment contributed about 
one fifth (24%) of total national enrolment in basic education
5
 sub sector (MOES, 
2006).  
Current evidence suggests that the number of schools including low-fee private schools 
have been growing in an era of fee-free education. For example, studies in Ghana 
suggest a growing low fee private education sector (Tooley, 2005).  In the Ga West 
District of Ghana, Tooley and Dixon (2007a) have found that only 25 percent of the 
total 779 schools were public schools. The remaining schools were private unaided and 
unregistered (22.7%) and registered private and unaided (52%). Data from the Ghana 
Ministry of Education and Sports (2006) indicate increase in the number of private basic 
schools with percentage share of total national basic schools of 43%, 25% and 23% for 
pre-school, primary and junior secondary schools respectively in 2004.  
 
But in spite of the number of private schools in Ghana, Akyeampong‟s (2009) analysis 
indicates that private schools‟ share of enrolment of school age children is just about 17 
percent. However, this proportion of private sector enrolment might be misleading 
because data on private schooling derived from Education Management Information 
System (EMIS) actually understate the number of private schools and their enrolment 
shares in the country - unregistered private schools are not captured by the EMIS in 
Ghana  as evident in Tooley and Dixon‟s (2007a) study. Therefore, private schools‟ 
share in enrolment could well be greater than 17 percent. 
Analyses of GLSS 4 and 5 data show that between 1998/99 and 2005, poor households 
in urban and rural areas increased their participation in private schooling from about 3.5 
percent in 1991 to about 10 percent in 2005 (see chapter 3). The critical question this 
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raises is why have some poor households in rural communities chose to enrol their 
children in fee-paying private schools which have poor infrastructure and untrained 
teachers rather than in a fee-free and well resourced public schools that have 
professional teachers and much better infrastructure. It is significant to note that, Tooley 
and Dixon‟s (2007a) claim that private schools in Ga West district were performing 
better than public schools in Ga West must be taken with caution. This is because Ga 
West district is located close to the capital Accra and by virtue of its location has better 
economic opportunities than would be for a typical rural community (Rose, 2007), 
where household survival needs may depends mainly on seasonal farming and/or 
fishing. If poor households are enrolling their children in private schools, then this 
raises questions about which critical factors influence the decisions and the tradeoffs in 
terms of investment choices. The relationship between poverty and school participation 
in Ghana is depicted in figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Poverty and school participation in Ghana. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Colclough, et. al., 2003:23 
 
Poverty interacts with schooling  at the household and community levels and where 
access to the existing state provided community basic schools are of similar quality, the 
reason for the poor not to participate in education would be due to the costs and/or the 
poor quality of education (Colclough, et. al., 2003). Poor households may find that the 
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direct and opportunity costs
6
 of schooling are too high, resulting in no participation. On 
the other hand, where there exist LFPSs in communities where the publicly provided 
education is perceived to be of low quality, some poor households particularly those 
that are eager to increase their participation in education, may enrol in private schools, 
especially when they perceive them to be of superior quality and more responsive to 
their needs.   
Evidently, the above analysis of the relationship between the poor and their educational 
participation in Ghana has shown that, poverty remains a barrier to access and choice of 
schooling. Where publicly provided education is perceived to be of inferior quality 
compared to their private counterparts, some may be compelled not to enrol or find 
alternative schooling. In this thesis, I argue that truly private schools financed from fees 
cannot increase participation of the poorest since they cannot afford the costs. 
2.5 Public and private education provision and partnership in Ghana. 
The nature of public and private education provision and partnership in any country can 
be understood in terms of the relationship between the sources of funding and provision. 
Klein‟s (1984) conceptual model of modes of welfare provision and funding is useful in 
explaining the modes of education provision and partnership. Figure 2.2 shows the 
model. 
Figure 2.2: Modes of welfare provision and funding 
  Finance (funding) 
  Public Private 
Production Public 1 2 
(provision) Private 3 4 
 
Source: Klein (1984): cited in Whitty and Power (2000). 
Figure 2.2 shows that in countries where education provision is firmly controlled by the 
state cell 1 depicts the nature of education production and financing. This type of 
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provision is commonly associated with mass education systems (Whitty and Power, 
2000) where partnership does not exist because the state assumes full control of funding 
and provision of education services. This was the case in many independent African 
countries including Ghana.  In recent times, however, many governments have reformed 
their education system and therefore have allowed private sector participation through a 
number of ways including: charging fees previously paid for by the state (cell 2); 
allowing the private sector to run schools while the state pays for the services (cell 3);  
selling public services and transferring their functions to the private sector (cell 4); and 
finally embarking on liberalisation that allows the private sector to compete with the 
public sector (cell 1/4) (Whitty and Power, 2000).  
The growing private sector involvement in education is taking place in a quasi-market 
where the purchaser of education is separated from the provider, but remains highly 
regulated by the state, in terms of, new providers, curriculum, charging of fees and 
school practices. The liberalisation of the Ghanaian economy in the 1980s together with 
the constitutional provision in 1992 made it possible for individual (s) to set up and run 
their own schools at their own cost (MOE, 2001). As a result, private schools in Ghana 
are not provided with funding from government, but are in theory allowed to operate 
within a centrally determined regulatory framework including charging of fees, 
licensing of new providers and school operational policies such as corporal punishment. 
However, lack of enforcement of government regulation has resulted in the opening up 
and operation of a number of private schools contrary to the regulation, particularly, in 
the area of entry of new providers and charging of school fees.  
Patrinos, et. al. (2009) describe the type of public-private partnership (PPP) in Ghana as 
„nascent‟ PPP environment because of absence of public budgetary support to private 
schools. Thus, both public and private schools are independently responsible for 
providing school infrastructure, hiring of teachers and other related services. 
Households or parents have a choice to enrol in public or private school. This type of 
partnership does not promote equitable access due to factors such as affordability, 
school entry requirements and distance (Patrinos, et. al., 2009). This thesis will explore 
how the poor afford the cost of low fee private schools in the rural area. 
 
 
18 
2.6 What theory underpins the privatisation of education? 
From the neo-liberal economic point of view, education like physical capital must 
attract a price because investment in education and training tend to produce benefits 
beyond its cost (Psacharapolous, 1994; Woodhall, 1987). The human capital theory was 
first introduced by the classical economists including Adam Smith, but was later 
popularized by Shultz (1961), Friedman (1962) and Becker (1965) (cited in 
Psacharapolous, 1994:1). According to the neo-liberal economists, individuals and 
households that invest in education acquire the means of production which raises their 
earning potential and provides them with better job security than their counterparts who 
do not have education (Friedman, 1962). The neo-liberals further argue that the private 
rate of return on investment in education in developing countries, in terms of costs and 
benefits, on the average tend to be high (Psacharopolous, 1994). Hence, individuals who 
benefit from education should at least be made to contribute to it. Even though earlier 
rate of return analysis on schooling by Shultz (1988) indicated higher returns to basic 
education than post-basic education, recent analysis of the rate of return have revealed 
the contrary in Ghana (Palmer, et. al., 2007). 
The strength of the neo-liberal economic argument lies in the operation of the market – 
that free market education ensures efficient and equitable allocation of both public and 
private resources. Colclough (1996) identifies three key issues which he believes have 
encouraged proponents to argue for market solutions to education in developing 
countries. Firstly, governments of most developing countries are more concerned about 
winning elections than providing equitable and quality education. Secondly, insufficient 
resources available to governments makes it difficult for government to achieve general 
expansion of access at acceptable level of quality, and finally misallocation of resources 
within the education sector, where a greater proportion of government budget is 
allocated to tertiary and secondary education at the expense of basic education, widens 
inequality as those who access post-basic education, including senior secondary and 
tertiary institutions, are mainly from middle and upper class families (Addae-Mensah, 
2000; Johnston, 2002). Thus, the neo-liberals propose fee-paying and the establishment 
of more private institutions to free up public resources to support poor households and 
other vulnerable groups in the society (Colclough, 1996; Steel and Sausman, 1997; 
Lincove, 2007).  Recent evidence on the low quality of public basic education provision 
in poor districts in developing countries due to the fee-free education, appears to have 
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given credence to the neo-liberal economic argument – to privatise basic education in 
developing countries (Tooley and Dixon, 2007a; Tooley, 2005; 2009).  
It is significant to note that, in the developed countries  because the  capacity of the 
public education sector is large enough to absorb most school age children, private 
education would only serve households seeking differentiated demand (Lincove, 2007). 
But in the developing countries where there exist insufficient schooling places and 
where the perception of the quality of public education is low, private schools in poor 
rural areas could provide access to some households. Studies have shown that the 
supply of public schools impact on the quality of private schools – insufficient public 
school places leads to the growth of low quality private schools that have no 
competitive incentive to provide quality but to fill the gap (Bray, 1996; Lincove, 2007; 
Oketch, et al., 2009). But in spite of all the arguments by the neo-liberal economists, 
there still remains a place for government participation in education. This is because if 
the provision of education is left to the forces of demand and supply, that could lead to 
market failure in the society. Market failure could emanate from the external benefits of 
education, capital market imperfections, equity considerations, households decisions 
and low private demand for education (Colclough, 1996; Barr, 1998). 
External benefits of education, which are the effects of education on society other than 
what accrues to those who invest in it, could include the presumed relationship between 
education and economic growth, increased earnings and non-monetary benefits such as 
crime reduction, increased social participation and lower fertility (Barr, 1998; Rose and 
Dyer, 2006). Since households may not take into consideration these external benefits 
when deciding whether to send a child to school or not, this could lead to household 
under investment in education. Consequently, public investment could prevent such 
under investment (Barr, 1998; Akaguri, 2006). 
Societal failure which emanates from market imperfections is based on the view that 
investment in education involves risks for poor households, who are uncertain of the 
future benefits of their investment (Geske and Cohn, 1998; Chao and Alper, 1998). 
Besides, poor households are unable to access credit due to strict credit requirements by 
banks and other lending institutions. Where lending institutions are willing to provide 
credit to these households, the premium on top of the market rate of interest may serve 
as serious disincentive to household borrowing to meet educational costs. To overcome 
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the credit constraint faced by poor households, governments have intervened through 
the provision of fee-free education and other subsidies such as the school feeding 
programme and scholarships (MOESS, 2006) to enable vulnerable groups including 
poor children and girls have access to education. 
Equity consideration, which is the extent to which education does or should redistribute 
from rich to poor or between different social classes may necessitate the need for 
government intervention in education (Barr, 1998; Vossensteyn, 2000).  Equity can be 
defined in terms of lifetime position or moment of attendance (Vossensteyn, 2000). The 
lifetime position definition is based on the fact that education increases the future 
earning potential and job security of the household. Thus, those who benefit from 
education should pay for it.  Equity at the moment of attendance, however, is based on 
the principle that, all households irrespective of their social and economic background 
must be provided with equal opportunity to access education. Consequently, financial 
incentives in the form of free tuition and programmes such as free school meals and 
uniforms and textbooks targeted at the very poor have the potential for increasing 
participation in education by these vulnerable individuals and households. Where the 
price of education is raised beyond the reach of these very poor households, the likely 
effect might be under investment in education resulting in market failure in the society 
(Vossensteyn, 2000). 
The principal decision making unit about whether to send a child to school or not is the 
household, headed by parents and guardians. Households‟ decision to enrol a child in 
school is often weighed against the potential benefits and costs to the household. 
However, the rate of return to education analysis compares the return to pupil (the child) 
to cost to households. The result is that, some households are reluctant to invest in 
education, simply because what they perceive to accrue to them is not really 
commensurate with their investment, even if the economic returns are quite high 
(Colclough, 1996). Hence, some public investment will be required to reduce the effect 
of schooling costs on such households. 
Moreover, low private demand for education resulting from cultural, religious and other 
ideological beliefs could negatively impact on access to schooling of girls and certain 
population groups. The low private demand could worsen with the introduction of an 
education market in such environment. To activate demand for schooling by this 
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vulnerable group, government intervention in the form of targeted bursaries, vouchers, 
food for girls‟ enrolment and feeding programmes would be able to raise enrolment in 
among these vulnerable groups (Yidana, 2000; Colclough, 1996; Rose, 2007).  
Basic education as a right has long been recognized as a fundamental human right.  The 
convention on the right of the child states clearly that no child should be deprived of 
access to education (UN Universal Declaration of the right of the child: cited in 
Akyeampong, et al., 2007). Article 28 of the Universal declaration of human rights in 
1948 states that primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all (UDR: 
cited in MOE/GES, 2001). In Ghana, right based education was enshrined in article 8 of 
the 1992 constitution, which provides that basic education shall be made free, 
compulsory and available to all. However, the critical issue is whether right based 
approach to basic education would ensure access to all children particularly to poor 
households. This is because where poor households cannot be guaranteed with good 
quality education they might be reluctant to enrol their children in school even if it is 
free (Akeampong, et. al., 2007).   
In conclusion, privatisation of education is based on the theory of the market. The case 
for marketisation of education in developing countries has resulted from claims that 
academic quality in public education sector has deteriorated (Tooley, 2009; Tan, 1998). 
Thus, marketisation of education through growing involvement of the private sector 
would increase competition and choice (Patrinos, et. al., 2009; Whitty and Power, 
2000), leading to quality education provision and ensuring equity to the poor.  
Notwithstanding the benefits of marketisation, private sector participation in education 
could worsen the existing inequalities as schools become more selective (Ball, 1994) 
and therefore tend to draw children from better socio-economic better backgrounds 
(Harma, 2008; Walford, 1994). Besides, some schools in the market may not be in the 
position to compete on equal terms with others due to differences in resources and home 
background of children. Hence increased competition may not necessarily result in 
improved academic performance for all children (Tan, 1998). Clearly, a truly 
marketised education provision in poor rural environment could result in a two-tier 
system where those that can afford and have strong voice choose private schooling 
leaving the poorest whose voice is weak in the public sector.  This could have 
implications for equity and the achievement of the education for all. 
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2.7 What factors shape household demand for schooling? 
Studies have identified a number of factors shaping household demand for education. 
However, this review focuses on the key factors impacting on the poor demand for and 
access to schooling in Ghana. These key factors include income, household size and 
number of children in school, costs of education, occupation of household head, religion 
of household, distance to school and the quality of education. 
 
Household income  
Education could be a consumption or investment good (Colclough, et. al., 2003; Bray, 
1996). When households view education as an investment good, the decision to send a 
child to school is usually influenced by their perception of its value in relation to the 
investment (Bray and Bunly, 2005; Kitaev 1999; Bray, 1996). Some researchers have 
argued that if households perceive schooling as an investment good, then household 
income in principle should not directly affect the decision to invest in education 
(Colclough, et. al., 2003; Behrman and Knowles, 1999). In reality, the non-poor 
households are more likely to have better information about the benefits of education 
and quality of schools and therefore are more likely to take risk in investing in their 
children‟s education (Goldring and Philips, 2008; Bray and Bunly, 2005). In contrast to 
the non poor households, for poor households if sending a child to school represents a 
significant proportion of their income then that decision weighs even more heavily and 
may result in household deciding not to enrol (Lewin, 2007a; Akyeampong, et. al., 
2007), particularly when they perceive the quality and for that matter the returns to 
schooling as doubtful.  
 
 Further, where education is considered as a „normal‟ consumption good, improvement 
in household income is expected to induce demand for schooling.  Some studies have 
assessed the relationship between households‟ ownership of economic assets and 
demand for schooling. For example, Harma (2008) and Kingdon (1996) found that in 
rural and urban India respectively, household owning economic assets were more likely 
to enrol their children in private schools relative to household without such economic 
assets. Non poor households demand for child labour is relatively low compared to the 
poor. This is because the relatively high income of the non poor households gives them 
the capacity to pay for labour services or labour saving devices, and consequently 
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reduce the opportunity cost of the child‟s schooling (GSS, 2003; Glick and Sahn, 2000). 
In addition, the possession of social capital 
7
 impacts on the demand for schooling 
(Goldring and Philips, 2008). Thus in rural areas, households that have a social network 
of friends and relatives that support their children schooling are likely to be able to 
access schooling and participate in school choice. Given that, for example, the majority 
( 49%) of the rural households in the study district  of Mfantseman in the central of 
Ghana are engaged in peasant subsistence farming and fishing (GSS, 2005b), this raises 
critical concern about how these households with their subsistence and unstable income 
could afford the cost of schooling, particularly in the LFPS  sector. Clearly, income is a 
constraint to poor households‟ demand and choice of schooling and households with 
economic and social capital have better chances of participating in education than those 
without such capital.   
 
 
Household structure 
 The size of a household and the number of children from a household actually in school 
could significantly impact on household demand for schooling either positively or 
negatively (Colclough, et. al., 2003). Large household size with most being adult 
members has the advantage of raising more income and providing other support to the 
household and this has the potential of enhancing children chances of going to school. 
For example, Mason and Rozelle (1998) note that in rural Java in Indonesia, older 
siblings worked to support the education of their younger siblings. In Tanzania, Al-
Samarrai and Reilly (2000), after controlling for household size found that having more 
children in the household increases the likelihood of a household sending a child to 
school in rural than in urban areas (Colclough, et. al, 2003). What the above studies 
suggest is that, large household size in rural areas could be beneficial in ensuring school 
age children access to schooling because it allows household chores to be spread among 
children or undertaken by adult members of the household. However, a household with 
large number of school age children in school could impose costs burden on the 
households, especially for households that have fewer adults but a large number of 
children of school going age. As noted by Jocaby (1991), where a household faces 
                                                          
7
 Social capital is the ability to gain access to resources by virtue of the connections between individuals 
or membership in social networks and other socials structures (Coleman, 1988 cited in Goldring and 
Philips, 2008) 
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credit constraints, the number of children in the household affects household capacity to 
invest in education as children compete for limited pool of household resources needed 
to finance education. Given that the poor tend to have more children than the non-poor 
(Harma, 2008), the number of children a poor household have in school could impact on 
their demand and school choice.  
 
Furthermore, the birth order of a child and the relative age of siblings influence the 
demand and decision of who goes and to which type of school (Colclough, et. al., 
2003). Recent studies by Rolleston (2009) in Ghana and Harma (2008) in rural Uttar 
Pradesh in India indicate that birth order influenced the pattern of household demand for 
schooling. Children with siblings and earlier in the birth order have the greater 
likelihood of being enrolled in school (Harma, 2009; Al-Samarrai and Peasgood, 1998). 
However, others have argued that, in developing countries, when substitutes for child 
labour such as adult siblings are available in the household, it releases children from 
household chores and this enable them to access schooling (Glick and Sahn, 2000; Al-
Samarrai and Peasgood, 1998; Chernichovsky, 1985). Given that in rural areas, some 
households prefer large family size, this could impact on household demand for 
schooling. 
 
The costs of education  
The household‟s costs of education are of two types:  direct and opportunity costs. The 
direct costs of education are the explicit costs such as school fees, books, uniforms, 
food at school, transport and extra classes a household incurs when it enrols a child in 
school. However, the other type of cost, opportunity cost, when used in economics 
refers to the alternative item forgone that the same amount of resource could have been 
used to attain (Begg, et. al., 1997).  When applied in the field of education, the 
opportunity cost of schooling is the household‟s income or child‟s labour that the 
household loses when he or she attends school rather than undertaking productive 
economic activities. In general, total costs (direct and opportunity costs) of schooling is 
lowest for small children and increases as they advance in age, but at latter stage the 
opportunity cost is greater for girls than boys because girls are needed to take care of 
younger siblings and other household chores (Rolleston, 2009; Akyeampong, et. al, 
2007; Bray and Bunly, 2005; Colclough, et. al, 2003; Al-Samarrai and Peasgood, 
1998).  
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It is significant to note that the concept of opportunity cost is complex and difficult to 
estimate (Bray, 1996). The complexity of estimating the opportunity cost of schooling 
coupled with the absence of data in most developing countries, particularly in Africa 
have led studies that estimated the opportunity cost of schooling to employ proxies such 
as the opportunity wage of the child or cost of parents time as a measure of the 
opportunity cost of schooling to the household (Colclough, et. al., 2003; Mason and 
Rozelle, 1998; Tansel, 1997; Gertler and Glewwe, 1989). Unfortunately, using a proxy 
has produced conflicting results. For example in La Cote d‟Ivoire, Tansel (1997) found 
statistically significant positive relationship between the opportunity wage of the child 
and demand for primary schooling, while in Ghana the relationship was negative but 
not statistically significant.  
Wang (2001) as cited in Bray, et. al. (2004) identifies two types of opportunity costs 
that impact on the poor‟s demand for schooling (Cohn and Geske, 1990; Bray and 
Bunly, 2005). The first type of opportunity cost is the loss of income resulting from the 
child being enrolled in school. Since the child had to be at school or travel to and from 
school, it is not possible for the child to engage in other productive activities. This type 
of opportunity cost depends on the hours the child devotes to schooling, the labour 
market and the nature of home production (Bray, et. al., 2004; Colclough, et. al., 2003). 
For example, where a household engages in petty trading or requires child care, the 
opportunity cost of sending a child to school could be very high. Besides, as children 
get older, the value of their labour services increase and this is particularly relevant in 
poor rural areas, where menial work is a key factor of production in the subsistence 
economy. The second type of opportunity cost relates to household loss of satisfaction 
when they enrol a child in school – this comes about when household incurs 
expenditure on fees and other school related expenditures rather than on meeting 
household consumption needs or even for investment. The latter type of opportunity 
cost reflects the value households place on education when they choose to invest in 
human capital rather than in consumption or physical capital (Bray, et. al., 2004; 
Colclough, et. al, 2003;  Glewwe and Patrinos, 1999) 
Educational costs constitute well known barrier to access to basic education in low 
income countries. In Zambia and Uganda, studies indicate that before the introduction 
of fee-free education about one third of household expenditure went to education 
(Boyle, et al., 2002 cited in UNESCO, 2007:152). Studies in Ghana have shown that 
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direct and opportunity costs continue to prevent many children from going to school 
(Oduro, 2000; Boateng, 2005; GNECC, 2005). Some of the less well acknowledged 
costs barriers include cost of providing food, clothing (uniforms) and transport. Starting 
in the 1951, the government of Ghana has introduced policies that will make going to 
school less of a problem of cost to all households, but these policies have not ensured 
that all children go to and complete basic education. Even though the new government 
policy in 2005 sought to absorb „full cost‟ through the introduction of the capitation 
grant and school feeding in some selected schools (World Bank, 2009), parents and 
guardians still incur considerable cost in sending their children to school (World Bank, 
2009; Nishimura, et. al., 2006; GNECC, 2005; GSS,2000). Thus, direct subsidies to 
schools, in the form of capitation, have not made basic education free of costs to poor 
families in Ghana.  
Studies have shown that school fees usually represent a small proportion of the overall 
household costs of sending a child to school. In Tanzania for example, a study revealed 
that school fees constituted only a fifth of total direct costs of primary schooling 
(Colclough, et. al., 2003; Mason and Khandker, 1997). Thus, there is the argument that 
increase in fees may have a relatively small impact on the total cost of sending a child 
to school (Colclough et al., 2003). This suggest that making basic education fee free, as 
it exists in Ghana today, may not necessarily induce demand for some households 
particularly among the poor due to a large  non-discretionary  expenditure including 
uniforms, books and food incurred by households. Even though direct and opportunity 
cost reinforce each other to produce the critical barrier for the poor access to schooling 
in rural areas (Bray and Bunly, 2005; Watkins, 2004), the impact of the direct cost 
could have a significant impact on household demand for education. 
 
Occupation of household head 
Analysis of the Ghana‟s GLSS data by Rolleston (2009) revealed that household heads 
who are formal public sectors workers were 5% to 12% more likely to enrol a child in 
school than household heads not in employment, while household heads employed in 
private formal sector of the economy were 3% to 11% more likely to enrol a child in 
school. This result is consistent with findings from earlier studies in Ghana which 
showed that the occupation of a household head affects the likelihood of a child being 
enrolled in school. For example, Lloyd and Gage-Brandon (1993) indicate that rural 
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children, both boys and girls whose parents are engaged in agriculture are 
disadvantaged in terms of access to schooling. Similar studies by Chao and Alper 
(1998) also found that household heads working in agricultural sectors are more likely 
to delay the enrolment of young children between ages 5-9 in school. Given that the 
main occupation of household heads in rural areas in Ghana is farming or fishing, this 
could impact on the demand for schooling. 
  
Religion of household head 
Even though in the United States, studies have found religion to significantly influence 
the demand and choice of schooling by households (Cohen-Zada, 2009; Long and 
Toma, 1988), studies in Africa that have examined the impact of religion on household 
demand for schooling appear to have produced inconsistent results (Colclough, et. al., 
2003). Nevertheless, Moslem households tended to have lower demand for schooling 
than Christian households. In Ghana and Tanzania, Chao and Alper (1998) and Al-
Samarrai and Peasgood (1998) respectively found that Moslem girls were more 
disadvantaged than boys in terms of access to education. Therefore, the religion of the 
household head could impact on the demand for education.   
 
Distance to and from school  
The distance a child had to travel from home to school and back influences household 
demand for schooling. This is because the further away the school is from the home the 
higher the cost household incurs when a child is enrolled in school, if all other factors 
are held constant (Colclough, et al, 2003). Even though in Tanzania, Al-Samarrai and 
Reilly (2000) found the impact of the distance on demand for primary schooling to be 
small and statistically insignificant, other studies  have shown that when the travel 
distance to school is reduced, it increases the chances of children, in particular those in 
primary school to be enrolled in school (Colclough, et. al., 2003). For example, Chao 
and Alper (1998) found in Ghana that reducing the school distance by a mile to a 
primary school increases the likelihood of a child being sent to school by 1.4 percentage 
points. However, in spite of the massive investment into school buildings and 
infrastructure in basic education in Ghana (Rolleston, 2009; World Bank, 2004), in 
remote rural areas particularly those with dispersed settlements, the problem of distance 
to school could remain an important factor on the poor demand for schooling.  
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The quality of education  
Quality is an attribute and its use in education is generally subject to socio-cultural 
valuation. Mitter and Schifer (1991): (cited in Bergamann, 1996) define quality 
education narrowly in terms of cognitive results.  However, others (UNESCO, 2005; 
UNICEF, 2000) have focused on a number of dimensions of education that relate to the 
learners, their learning environments, contents, processes and outcomes. But these 
dimensions of quality may impact differently on households demand for education due 
to differences in social and cultural values. Bergamann (1996: 590) argues that:  
certain dimensions of the quality of education influence the demand for 
education, although only aspects "visible" to the relevant actors come into 
play. Where they lack the professional criteria to assess output and process 
quality, they refer to simple output indicators, such as pass rates, and to 
efficiency indicators such as repetition, as proxies for output, or to the 
quality of the factors used in the process - school building, furniture, 
equipment, school books, teacher discipline and pupil behaviour, with the 
underlying assumption that input quality determines output quality.  
 
Therefore, different categories of actors in education (eg urban households /rural 
households, teachers) perceive quality education differently. For households in poor 
rural communities quality of education would be based on the information available to 
them about their schools (Bergamann, 1996). School quality influences attitudes of the 
poor towards demand and choice of education. In Ghana, the main reason that accounts 
for the growth of private schooling is the perception that they produce better 
examination and tests outcomes compared to public schools (MOESS, 2006; GSS, 
2005a). Since some rural households have no education or very low education, their 
indices of quality would be based mainly on their observation of teacher and school 
pupil behaviour in the communities and the perception of schools‟ performance in 
examinations (Bergamann, 1996). However, many of the private schools that perform 
so well in examinations in Ghana are located in urban and peri urban areas and many 
are selective and high cost. Besides, the urban private schools have better trained 
teachers due to the attractive salaries they pay and also have good infrastructure and 
teaching learning materials.  Therefore, the perception and reality of quality education 
may be quite aligned in the urban setting.   
 
 In contrast to the urban private schools, the LFPSs in rural areas pay relatively low 
salaries when compared to their public schools counterparts (Tooley and Dixon, 2007a). 
The LFPSs in rural Ghana do not have quality inputs such as trained teachers, adequate 
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teaching and learning materials and infrastructure when compared to public schools in 
similar environment. Besides, where LFPSs in rural areas are satellites of urban private 
schools, parents are unable to differentiate the results of the urban private school from 
the rural private school. Thus, the perception and reality may not be aligned like it is  in 
the urban environment. As a result, the poor rural households‟ indices of quality 
education may differ from those in the urban settings - thus households that access the 
LFPSs may be feeding into a reality that is existing in urban environments and a 
promise of quality by the LFPSs.  Perhaps with time, when poor households realise that 
is not the case, the market for the LFPS will change. Moreover, if LFP schools are 
unable to provide significantly better quality than public schools then their future may 
be uncertain.  
 
Studies in the United States have shown, for example, that lower public school tests 
scores in elementary school increases the probability of parents choosing to send their 
children to private school (Lankford and Wyckoff, 1992). This is because the quality of 
schooling affects the child‟s labour market productivity, grade repetition and the cost of 
attaining a particular level of schooling. Since school quality is one of the measures of 
„productivity‟ of education, improvement in the quality of basic education would result 
in positive returns to schooling and hence higher educational attainment (Mason and 
Rozelle, 1998).   
 
Even though poor households might not make mathematical calculation of the costs and 
benefit of an educational investment, some households may undertake what Bray and 
Bunly (2005:84) term „informal impressionistic analysis of the costs and the benefits‟ 
measured by quality and household expectation. For example, if households cannot 
perceive that the quality of education in their communities would enable their children 
to go beyond the threshold of education with which they can secure employment to 
recoup their investment, they may be reluctant to invest in education (Ibid). Studies in 
rural Ghana have shown that, the demand for basic schooling is influenced by parents‟ 
perception of the school‟s quality and their children‟s capacity to access post-basic 
education (Pryor and Ampiah, 2003; Lavy, 1996). Since the total costs of schooling for 
children in poor  households in remote rural areas is more likely to be greater than those 
in peri- urban and urban areas (Bray and Bunly, 2005), if households perceive the 
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quality of schooling to be lower, they would have double reasons not to demand 
education.  
 
Further, studies have established a positive relationship between quality of education 
and household demand for schooling. For example, Glewwe (1992) found that repairing 
classrooms improved cognitive achievement more than constructing more classrooms. 
Glewwe and Jacoby (1994) found in Ghana that improving the quality of school 
building results in higher test scores, while in Cote d‟Ivoire, Montgomery, et al. (1995) 
found that improved availability of textbooks in the community primary schools led to 
significant improvement in educational attainment. Therefore, the availability of quality 
educational inputs such as adequate textbooks, trained and motivated teachers with 
strong commitment to teaching should significantly impact on poor household demand 
for schooling (World Bank, 2004; Chao and Alper, 1998).  Reviews of research on the 
impact of school quality on performance based on over 100 studies in developing 
countries, found little evidence of teacher-pupil ratio or teacher salaries to be positively 
and significantly associated with student performance (Hunushek, 1995). However, the 
study found a significant positive association of teachers‟ education and school facilities 
with student performance. What the evidence suggests is that in developing countries 
spending on school facilities  might play a significant role in improving student 
performance and hence the demand for schooling. 
 
The quality of schooling could also be linked to teacher‟s regular school attendance and 
the contact time in the classroom. In Botswana, Dune, Leach et. al. (2005) found that 
the key factor for low performing schools is low professionalism of teachers in such 
schools- teacher absenteeism, lateness and refusal to teach even when the teachers are in 
school. Moreover, even though students are generally expected to be engaged in 
learning during the entire time they are in the classroom, time in the classroom, in 
reality is often not efficiently utilized due to poor teacher knowledge in the subject 
matter, inadequate teaching resources (Abadzi, 2009) and ineffective management of 
teachers (Alhassan and Adzali-Mensah, 2010; Akyeampong, et. al., 2007). In the 
Gambia and Burkina Fasso, Dia (2003) reports that scarcity of textbooks led teachers to 
spend considerable time writing lessons and problems on the board. Furthermore,  
contact time in the classroom means that students must be engaged in the prescribed 
curriculum while in class– as this is a better predictor of learning outcome than any 
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learning activity (Vocknell, 2006: cited in Abadzi, 2009: 274-276). In Ghana, the 
EARC (2003) report indicated that several teachers in rural schools did not follow the 
schools‟ prescribed teaching time table. Earlier studies in Ghana found instructional 
time lost due to teacher absenteeism and lateness to have resulted in students being 
taught only two out of ten subjects in a day (Fobi, et al,1999: cited in Akyeampong et. 
al., 2007). Time lost to teaching due to teacher absenteeism and lateness is a more 
common occurrence in rural than urban schools and could significantly shape household 
school choice decisions and demand for education. The quality of public and private 
schooling will be explored using some proxy indicators of quality such as training of 
teacher, pupil-teacher ratio, school infrastructure, exams and tests results. 
 
2.8 Schooling decision of the poor – what are the key factors?  
The decision by a poor household to enrol a child in school is based on a number of 
complex and interrelated individual, household and community factors. However, three 
key variables: benefits, costs and economic constraints feature prominently in the 
literature of household school choice decisions particularly in poor rural areas (Mason 
& Rozelle, 1998; Mason and Khandker, 1997; Sawada and Lukshin, 2001). This section 
examines these three factors and briefly discusses the salient factors that underpin 
household choice of private schooling. 
 
 
Benefits of schooling  
In deciding to enrol a child in school, households take into consideration the expected 
benefits. Given the relative scarcity of household economic resources, household would 
invest in education if they anticipate the benefits to exceed costs, given the constraints 
faced by the household (Becker, 1981; Psacharopolous and Woodhall, 1985; Shultz, 
1988).   In their study in Cambodia, Bray and Bunly (2005:3) noted that:  
when households undertake informal cost-benefit analyses to decide 
whether or not to send a child to school, they are in effect balancing other 
priorities against education. 
 Evidence from developing countries indicates that the benefit of schooling especially at 
the secondary level is greater than at the basic level (Mason and Khandker, 1997; 
Mason and Rozelle, 1998).  Earlier studies in Ghana found the benefits of primary 
schooling to be high relative to senior secondary (Canagarajah and Coulombe, 1997; 
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Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002). However, recent studies by Palmer et. al. (2007) 
indicate higher private and social benefit of senior secondary schooling compared to 
primary schooling. The implication is that, school choice decision by the poor in rural 
Ghana would be influenced by perceived and real benefits of education and the ability 
of the children to access post- basic education (Pryor and Ampiah, 2003; Lavy, 1996).  
Moreover, while the estimates of the benefits of schooling tend to capture the average 
returns to schooling, they fail to recognize the variations in expected returns at the local 
level.  Rosenzweig (1995) indicates that the returns to schooling in agriculture are 
higher in environments where there is application of high technology compared to 
settings that rely on traditional farming methods (Mason and Rozelle, 1998). This 
suggests that when households rely on traditional agriculture for their livelihood, the 
motivation to enrol a child in school and choice of school type may not necessarily be 
related to the child returning to agriculture, but rather to other productive sectors such as 
public service and industry. Clearly, for the poor in rural areas, if fee-free education 
cannot be perceived to provide their children opportunities better than what their 
subsistence agricultural sector offers, they may decide not to enrol, or may choose a fee-
paying option that they perceive to offer them value for their money.  In a baseline 
report Ampiah (2007) found that in a predominantly poor rural Mfantseman district, 
households have occupational aspirations other than agriculture for their children. Since 
most rural communities in Ghana are engaged in subsistence agriculture, this would 
suggest that the benefits of education in an agricultural rural community would be 
relatively low. Consequently, this could impact significantly on these rural households‟ 
school choice decisions. 
 
Costs of schooling 
While the impact of cost on household demand for schooling has been discussed in 
detail earlier on in this chapter (see page 24), poor households‟ decision about whether 
or not to send a child to school, and whether to a public or a private school would be 
influenced by cost of schooling (Mason and Rozelle, 1998).  The direct cost such as 
school fees, extra classes fees, food at school, uniforms and stationery increase as 
children progress to higher grades (GSS, 2000; Mason and Rozelle, 1998). Thus, poor 
households with two or more children in school may find the direct cost of schooling a 
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burden on the household. However, poor households desiring to enrol their children in 
private school, but unable to afford the cost for all of them, may choose to enrol in 
public and at least one child in private school (Glewwe and Patrinos, 1999). Even 
though the introduction of the capitation policy in Ghana in 2005 made public basic 
school fee „free‟, other explicit direct costs such as feeding at school and uniforms 
continue to constitute a barrier to access to schooling to poor households (GSS, 2008: 
29). Consequently, poor rural households that decide to enrol their children in school 
incur considerably high economic burden of educational expenditure relative to the non 
poor. In addition, households that choose to send their children to private school would 
incur other direct costs in addition to school fees.  The implication is that poor 
households that choose private school over fee-free public basic school would incur a 
considerably higher economic burden of educational expenditure relative to their 
counterparts who enrol in public school.  Since the poor households pay lower fees than 
households in higher income group, this might suggest that they receive lower quality 
education compared with the higher income groups (Mason and Rozelle, 1998). Clearly, 
in rural areas households among the higher income group may enrol in low-fee private 
school if they perceive the fee-free public school to be of inferior quality. 
 
Moreover, the opportunity cost of schooling does influence household schooling 
decisions (Mason and Rozelle, 1998). In rural communities where the major economic 
activity is subsistence agriculture, the opportunity cost of schooling to households 
would relate to lost earning from child‟s labour in agriculture or in home productive 
activities (Bray, 1996). This type of cost increases with age and gender of the child. 
Older siblings are more likely to be made to work to support younger siblings, while 
girls are more likely to be made to take care of younger siblings or support parents in 
household chores than boys and so have lower opportunity costs (Mason and Rozelle, 
1998; Sawada and Lockshin, 2001). Besides, understanding the nature of children‟s 
time, not just its value, but the alternative use of their time is significant to their 
schooling decisions-particularly when school activities (class time) clashes with major 
economic activity that is important to the household survival. For example, in the 
fishing rural communities in Ghana, it is not uncommon for children to absent 
themselves from school due to bumper fish harvest.  Mason and Rozelle (1998) and 
Mason and Khandker (1997) have respectively noted that, in rural Java and Tanzania, 
the opportunity cost of schooling in both primary and secondary was significantly 
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higher than the direct cost of schooling and thus impacted strongly on household 
schooling decisions. 
 
Economic constraints 
Economic constraints such as lack of access to credit impact on households schooling 
decisions. In the presence of a perfect credit market the capacity to borrow exists for 
households. Thus, with easy access to credit the schooling decision can be easily 
reached. However, in the real world, lack of economic assets owned by poor rural 
households impose a barrier to access to credit as evidenced by a number of studies in 
developing countries (Harma, 2009). Glewwe (1991) notes that credit constraints can 
impede the poor from investing in education. Therefore, if household face significant 
borrowing constraints, their current level of income and assets would be crucial to their 
school choice decisions. In rural Java for instance, Mason and Rozelle (1998) indicate 
that, households allow older siblings to enter the labour market to generate income to 
support their younger but brighter siblings‟ education. Clearly, household are 
minimizing losses and maximizing their gains by investing in brighter children.  While 
the above factors have examined household schooling decisions in general, the next 
section briefly discusses school choice in the developing country context and the factors 
that underpin private school choice.  
 
 
2.9 Understanding school choice in a developing country context 
The word „choice‟ according to English Thesaurus Dictionary means option, alternative, 
selection or variety. However, when used in education – school choice, it connotes 
choice between schools.  Goldhaber (1999) defines school choice as „any policy that is 
designed to reduce the constraints that current school configuration place on schools 
and students‟ (pg. 16). Goldhaber was writing in the context of developed countries like 
the United States and United Kingdom where catchment area restriction prevented some 
households to access schools of their choice. Further, Goldhaber notes that school 
choice takes several forms including choice among public schools within a particular 
district, choice across districts and public-private school choice. But as Srivastava 
(2008b) notes, catchment area restriction does not apply in developing countries in Asia 
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and Africa as parents are free to choose any school within and across districts. 
Nevertheless, choice could still be constrained by other factors including distance and 
cost. Again, unlike in the US or Chile , for example, where increased school choice was 
the result of  the provision of vouchers (Patrinos, et. al, 2009; Levin, 1991) to poor 
households, increased choice in  developing countries resulted from increased private 
provision (Srivastava, 2008b).  As result, to be able to understand the school choice 
environment in developing countries, particularly in poor areas of Africa, it needs to be 
examined within a distinct choice system.  
 
Tooley (1997) makes a distinction between two types of school choice - choice within a 
state regulated and publicly funded schooling system and choice in the market where 
the state is not a monopoly supplier and funder of education. The school choice market 
in Ghana is characterised by growing range of private schools entirely self funded 
through tuition charges, often owned by a sole proprietor, and are operated and 
managed  through a set of informal rules and regulations set by owner (s) of the school. 
In urban or peri-urban environments, households with economic resources have the 
leverage to enrol in a school of their choice. However, in a typical poor rural 
environment, this might not be the case for the majority of households due to poverty.  
 
School choice has to do with affordability expressed in terms of the proportion of 
household income that is expended on education. Lewin (2007b) notes that household 
survey has shown that the poor usually allocate about 5 percent and rarely more than 10 
percent of household expenditure to education of a single child in public secondary 
school. Therefore, if household educational expenditure per child goes beyond 10 
percent of their income, this would have serious implications on household expenditure 
patterns. As a result, Harma (2008) argues that real school choice has to do with a 
household‟s ability to pay school fees and related expenses without cutting back on 
basic household needs such as food, medical care and other household essentials. Thus, 
the mere decision to enrol in a fee- paying private school does not connote real choice, 
especially if households have to spend significant proportion of their income on just one 
child (Harma, 2008). Therefore, when Tooley (2005; 2009) argues that the poor 
households are choosing low-fee private schools, this seems to be confusing the issue 
about school choice because the majority of the poor in rural settings still have no real 
choice. Nevertheless, the school choice environment relating to this thesis is analysed in 
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terms of Tooley‟s choice in the privatised market. As Carnoy (2000) observes, „when 
choice is about privatisation, we need to know much more about how such an 
educational system would look like‟ (pg. 15).  Therefore, this research explores how 
and why the poor exercise this choice and the factors which enable them do so. 
 
 
2.9.1 What key factors shape private school choice? 
 
Evidence in the school choice literature indicates that household school choice is based 
on certain priorities such as the quality measured by performance, convenience and 
safety , religious affiliations of schools and socio-economic background of parents 
(Goldring and Philips, 2008; Lankford and Wyckoff, 1992).   
Kleitz, et. al. (2000) indicates that parents who choose schools often cited academic 
performance judged in terms of the number of pupils that pass a standardized test scores 
as their main priority. Other studies have also shown that households that placed 
priority on academic achievement were more likely to choose private schools because of 
their better performance in examinations and test scores (Kingdon, 1996; Jimenez, et. 
al., 1991; and Cox and Jimenez, 1991). Jimenez, et. al. (1991) after controlling for 
measureable school characteristics, found that private schools‟ ability to adopt better 
management practices including teacher supervision and accountability to parents was 
significant in improving performance. In the United States Coleman et. al.  (1966, cited 
in Betts, 1999) found that, the most significant determinant of student performance was 
the family background, while the differences in school resources accounted little for 
differences in performance. However, other studies such as Fuller and Heyneman 
(1989) found that schools were more important in poor countries.  Research in 
developing countries has revealed that households choosing private schooling often cite 
better performance of private schools in test scores and examinations (Tooley, 2009; 
2005; Tooley and Dixon, 2007a; Kingdon, 1996).  
Further, household choice of private schooling may be influenced by the safety and 
convenience of schools to their children.  Where the location of a public school is far 
away from a child‟s home or where the school is considered by a household to be 
unsafe for children, they are more likely to enrol in the nearest and safe school even if 
such a choice would imposed heavy cost burden on the household. In developing 
countries, children in remote areas sometimes have to travel long distances to the 
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nearest public school. In China, Tooley (2009) indicates that households in remote areas 
prefer to enrol their children in private school because of the distance and danger of 
travelling to the nearest public school. In Ghana, Chao and Alper (1998) conclude that 
the absence of primary schools in some communities constitutes a barrier to access to 
schooling. Consequently, households would have no option but to enrol their children in 
the only available fee paying private school in their communities. 
The socio-economic differences of household and household heads or parents impact on 
their school choice. Household income or assets which are normally proxy for 
household resources are also positively related to educational choice (Shneider, et. al., 
1996).  Higher income raises the household‟s capacity to afford the cost of private 
education. In the US, studies have shown that higher income households were more 
likely to enrol their children in private school compared with their low income 
households (Smrekar and Goldring, 1999; Schneider, et. al., 1996) because of the 
superior quality education private schools provide.  
Similarly, in developing countries, high and middle class households with their 
relatively high income enrol their children in expensive private schools (Oketch and 
Ngware, 2010; Addae-Mensah, 2000). These are children mainly from better socio-
economic background and therefore enter private school taking along their home 
advantage. However, in poor rural environment where majority of the households lack 
social and economic capital, private schools might not be adding that value or making 
much progress in students‟ achievements. In rural areas of Ghana, households that are 
relatively better off including those that have social network of friends and relatives that 
provide them with resources for education may enrol in fee paying private schools.  
 Studies have shown that parental education, household income and occupation are 
positively related to school choice (Goldring and Philips, 2008; Colclough, et. al., 
2003).  Parents or household heads with higher educational attainment levels tend to 
place more value on education and this is reflected in their interests and attitude shown 
in education. Besides, the level of educational attainment enables parents to seek 
relevant information about schools and thus able to make more informed decisions on 
educational choice (Goldring and Philips, 2008). Even though the literature on reasons 
for private school choice is based mainly on studies in developed countries, it 
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nevertheless also applies to developing countries. The next section discusses the 
conceptual framework of the thesis.  
 
2.10 Household schooling decisions: toward a conceptual framework  
Households‟ decision regarding whether or not to send a child to school and to a 
particular school type is influenced by the complex interaction of social, economic and 
cultural factors working through power relations within the household (Al-Samarrai and 
Peasgood, 1998). In the literature, household production function has been widely 
employed to provide explanation to households schooling decisions (Al-Samarrai and 
Peasgood, 1998; Tansel, 1997; Chernichovsky, 1985).  
 
The household production function model assumes that, there is an optiomal level at 
which households equate costs to benefits. When households view education as an 
investment good then the demand for education will continue as long as marginal 
benefits are greater or equal to the marginal costs of schooling assuming no liquidity 
constraints. Households incur both direct and opportunity cost for the period the child is 
enrolled in school. If households perceive the opportunity costs as significant, the 
decision to access the type of provision does not become a simple straightforward 
matter – tradeoffs and perceived value become important considerations.  The 
perception of the quality of education and the importance households attach to 
education may influence their choice decision. Where households cannot perceive 
education to be of any good value, they may decide not to enrol altogether. Again, the 
benefits of education to the household may be influenced by transfers they expect to 
receive from their children after completing school, this depends on their children‟s 
chances of finding a job (Al-Samarrai and Peasgood, 1998).  
 
Further, while some households may be able to attain an optimal level of investment in 
education, others might be constrained by lack of resources including credit facilities 
with which the household can borrow to finance education. The extent to which the 
household would be constrained depend on a number of factors including the number of 
school going children in the household, education of the household head and the 
existence of social network. Besides, resource constraint in the household affects which 
child of a particular gender goes to school. For example being a first born child and also 
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a boy increase the chances of being sent to schools in the face of constraints (Harma, 
2008). Changes in the earning in the households that favours mothers or aunts may 
strengthen their position in influencing who goes to school and to which type. 
 
When a household views education as a consumption good, the decision to send a child 
to school will be based on the satisfaction educated children brings to it, which in turn 
will be related to the level of education of the household head or the child‟s parents. In 
addition, preference for boys and girls schooling is informed by social and cultural 
norms and tend to have different effects on children in terms of gender (Harma, 2008; 
Al-Samarrai and Peasgood, 1998) 
 
Generally, it is expected that household school choice decisions will be made by either a 
parent or both. But earlier research in the USA has suggested that the decision to enrol, 
and where, resides with the household head (Becker, 1981).  In the household 
production function it is assumed that household satisfaction is maximised and resource 
allocation decisions are efficiently made through the household head (Al-Samarrai and 
Peasgood, 1998). However, Haddad et al., (1994) examining evidence from both 
developed and developing countries argued that the household head is often not the sole 
decision maker, and that other members play an equally important role.  
Anthropological literature show that in West African countries including Ghana, 
household resources are not pooled as women and men do not make expenditure 
decisions jointly (Munachonga, 1988; Fapohunda, 1988: all cited in Hadad, et. al, 
1994). In la Cote d‟Ivoire, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) found that household 
expenditure differed in accordance with the share of total household income earned by 
women.  
In this case, households‟ resource allocation decisions are made based on bargaining 
among members and the stronger the bargaining power of a household member, the 
greater his or her influence over resource allocations. This means bargaining power 
depends on the individual characteristics of household members including the 
household head (Haddad, et al, 1994; Thomas, 1994). In effect, the question of enrolling 
ceases to be simply a decision resting with the household head, other household 
characteristics become important. Therefore, following Glick and Sahan (2000), this 
study is based on the household production function model and maintains the notion of 
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non-unified preferences and bargaining over resources within the household – this 
framework would be significant in the interpretations of results of the study. 
 
2.11 Summary 
The literature review has clearly identified the salient factors that shape poor household 
demand and choice of schooling. These are household income, costs of schooling, the 
quality of education and the socio-economic characteristics of households. Clearly, in 
poor rural environments, whether or not households would be induced to enrol their 
children in school and in a particular type of school depends on their social and 
economic characteristics and their perception of the value of education.  
The review shows that the costs of education to the household remain a key barrier to 
access to both public and private schools. Nevertheless, the literature also indicates that 
some poor households are choosing LFPSs. Since school choice has to do affordability, 
this thesis would explore how the poor can afford to make that choice.  
When the government of Ghana introduced capitation fee-free schooling in 2005, the 
expectation was that it will absorb the „full cost‟. However, evidence from the fee-free 
schooling policies have shown that it tends to leave out large proportion of non-
discretionary expenditure such as food at school, school uniforms and stationery. As a 
result, poor households still incur considerable costs on education.  Given that private 
school fees constitute a small percentage of household total direct costs of schooling 
(UNESCO, 2007; Mason and Khankher, 1997), if the poor perceives LFPSs to offer 
better quality, they might opt for private schooling. Thus, the costs of education and 
how it interacts with household school choice would be examined by this thesis. 
Quality education is important to school choice because it is the differences in quality 
that make households look for alternative schooling. As demonstrated by the literature, 
there is evidence to suggest that the perception of quality drives interest in private 
schooling. However, in Ghana the evidence of better quality private schools 
performance is based on schools mainly in urban settings.  As a result, the perception of 
private school quality is aligned with reality due to factors such as creaming of students 
and better school inputs. But much is still not known about the quality of LFPSs and 
public schools in poor rural areas. This will be explored later to establish whether 
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household choice of private schooling based on the perception of better quality is 
aligned with the reality and how that might influence schooling decisions of the poor.   
Finally, in some developing countries such as Chile and Colombia school choice was 
promoted through the provision of vouchers (Patrinos, et. al., 2009). As a result, poor 
households that received vouchers were able to submit them to schools of their choice – 
thus providing poor households with a real choice. However, in a country like Ghana, 
there are no vouchers or grants with which the very poor households can access schools 
of their choice. Thus, when the poor households choose fee paying private school, it 
raises questions about how they explain their choices and what factors enable them to 
make that choice and pay for it. These factors will be explored in detail in chapters 6 to 
8. 
 The next chapter examines the factors impacting on access to basic education in Ghana 
using national data – the GLSS, EMIS and BECE examinations results. 
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Chapter 3: What factors impact on access to basic education in Ghana? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the factors impacting on access to schooling in Ghana. It first 
examines the pattern and allocation of government expenditure to education. Second, the 
relationship between household income and educational expenditure of poor households in 
rural areas is explored to determine household affordability of schooling in the fee-free 
education context. Finally, educational inputs and outcomes measured by the Basic Education 
Certificate of Examination (BECE) results of public and private schools in 53 educationally 
deprived 
8
districts of Ghana are examined for differences in performance.  A summary of the 
chapter pulls together the significant factors that might impact on access to schooling in 
Ghana. 
 
3.2 How does government education expenditure allocation impact access? 
Access to education in many developing countries is disproportionately represented by 
children of middle and upper class families (Johnstone, 2001). In Ghana, Addae-Mensah 
(2000) indicated that over 70 percent or more of the students who enter universities in Ghana 
are from middle and upper income families. These are children whose parents have invested 
heavily in their education by enrolling them in expensive private schools and attend top 
secondary schools in the country. This clearly suggests that, if public resource is to be 
equitably distributed, a greater proportion of it would have to be allocated to the basic 
education sector where the majority of the poor are still struggling for access (Akyeamong, 
2009).  
 
There are certain norms that are supposed to guide and ensure equitable and efficient public 
resource allocation to education. UNESCO, for example, specifies that for equitable and 
efficient allocation of public resources to education, the proportion of a country‟s GDP 
allocated to education should be in the range of 4% and 6%, with less than 20% of this 
amount going to tertiary education (MOESS, 2008). Data from the Ghana Ministry of 
                                                          
8
 There is a distinction between educationally deprived district and a deprived district. While the former is 
defined  by the GES based on criteria including  the percentage of children having desk, pupil-teacher ratio, 
percentage of teachers untrained, availability of potable water, building made from cement block, etc., the later is 
determined by the Ghana Statistical Service using household income , assets or expenditure. Therefore, 
educationally deprived districts in Ghana are also more likely to be deprived. 
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Education shows that public expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP in Ghana has 
been growing steadily – rising from 6.2% in 2003 to 9.1% in 2007 (Table 3.1).  However, 
allocating a significant proportion of a country‟s GDP to education might be necessary but 
would not be sufficient to raise access for the poor, unless government‟s allocation to 
education targets poor and deprived areas of the country. Since in Ghana the cost of schooling 
is a barrier to the poor having access to basic schooling (Oduro, 2000; Chao and Alper, 1998), 
any allocation to the education sector skewed in favour of basic education of the poor is likely 
to result in fairer redistribution of public resources and hence create opportunities for poor 
households to access basic education.  Unfortunately, government expenditure on education 
between 2003 - 2007 shows that spending was skewed in favour of tertiary and senior 
secondary education compared with basic education. 
 
Table 3.1: Government recurrent expenditure on education in Ghana, 2003-2007  
     (Real 2005 Price)  
Year GDP Total Education Expenditure  Education Expenditure as 
a % of GDP 
2003 23,269,628.50 1,452,700.21 6.2 
2004 27,675,960.90 2,028,525.06 7.3 
2005 34,592,455.30 2,594,072.95 7.5 
2006 40,969,550.02 3,348,157.31 8.2 
2007 49,827,369.32 4,540,895.26 9.1 
Source: Author‟s calculation is from data derived from MOESS, 2008.  
  
 Table 3.2 shows that government expenditure on tertiary education reached 21% of total 
education expenditure in 2004, declined marginally in 2005 and then rose to 22.5% in 2006 
and 23% in 2007 - these percentage growth rates are more than the 20% less recommended by 
UNESCO. During the same period (2003-2007), allocation to primary education declined 
steadily from 40% in 2003 to 27.6% in 2006 (see Table 3.2).  Public expenditure on pre-
school also fluctuated over the period, averaging around 3.5% of total government spending 
on education, while expenditure on junior high school (JHS) also fluctuated but experienced 
steady decline starting from 2005 to 2007.  This suggest that to be able to achieve education 
for all by 2015, government might have to re-examine its allocation within the education 
subsectors and priority given to basic education sector.  
Table 3.2 shows the trend in government expenditure in education by level from 2003 to 
2007. Even though government‟s expenditure to basic education in the form of
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 Table 3.2: Trend in government education expenditure by level, 2003-2007(Amount in Ghana Cedis)   
SOURCES 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
GH¢ % GH¢ % GH¢ % GH¢ % GH¢ % 
Pre-School 9,886,200 2 23,176,164 4 25,029,905 3.4 37,144,800 3.9 42,797,283 3.4 
Primary 163,533,900 40.0 183,091,696 31.6 220,115,936 29.9 262,627,200 27.6 445,933,605 35.0 
JHS 91,035,300 22 92,704,656 16.0 131,038,919 17.8 159,921,600 16.8 206,990,933 16.3 
SHS 63,024,400 15 115,301,416 19.9 153,124,131 20.8 150,382,800 15.8 160,788,917 12.6 
TVET 4,531,200 1 6,373,445 1.1 8,834,084 1.2 8,599,900 0.9 8,236,942 0.6 
SPED 1,647,700 0 2,317,616 0.4 2,944,695 0.4 3,835,600 0.4 3,894,322 0.3 
NFED 3,707,300 1 9,270,466 1.6 13,987,300 1.9 6,736,900 0.7 5,709,015 0.4 
Teacher 
Education 
16,477,000 4 21,437,952 3.7 28,710,774 3.9 33,119,000 3.5 33,132,980 2.6 
Tertiary 57,257,500 14 121,674,900 21.0 144,290,045 19.6 214,564,500 22.5 292,931,474 23 
Management and 
Subvented 
411,900 0 2,897,021 0.5 7,361,737 1 73,438,400 7.7 70,339,643 5.5 
HIV-AIDS 411,900 0 1,158,808 0.2 736,174 0.1 2,474,300 0.3 2,784,370 0.2 
Source: MOESS, 2008:115 
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  capitation grants to schools in 2005 was intended to reduce the cost burden on the poor 
to enable them to access basic education, it appears that participation in private 
schooling among the poor has increased.  The next section uses GLSS3 and GLSS5 to 
explore the participation of the poor households in public and private schooling, 
focusing on rural households. 
 
3.3 What proportion of the poor in Ghana participates in private education?  
Analysis of the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) data (GLSS3 in 1991/92) and 
(GLSS 5 in 2005) on household educational participation by school type and status of 
poverty shows that between 1991/92 and 1995/96 poor households in Ghana increased 
their participation in private schooling.    
 
Table 3.3:  School type attended by household poverty status – All Ghana /rural 
Ghana, 1991/2 (aged 6-17) 
All Ghana School Type 
 No School Public Private Total 
Poverty Status     
Extremely Poor 1042       1741 73 2856  
% 36.48       60.96 2.56 100.00  
Poor 328        742 39 1109  
% 29.58       66.91 3.52 100.00  
Non-Poor 651       1904 347 2902  
% 22.43       65.61 11.96 100.00  
Total 2021       4387 459 6867  
% 29.43       63.89 6.68 100.00 
  
Rural Ghana No School Public Private Total 
Poverty Status     
Extremely Poor 915             1,473 39 2427  
% 37.70       60.69        1.61 100.00  
Poor 246                545   4 795  
% 30.94       68.55        0.50 100.00  
Non-Poor 356                962   74 1392  
% 25.57       69.11        5.32 100.00  
Total 1,517       2,980        117 4614  
% 32.88    64.59        2.54 100.00 
Source:  Computed from GLSS 3 
Table 3.3 shows that, of the total national representative sample of 4,614 rural 
households in 1991/92 only 2.54% choose private schooling compared to 64.59% public 
schooling. However, analysis of participation in terms of the household poverty status 
indicated that, of the 2,856 households that were extremely poor, 2.56% choose private 
schooling, with 60.96% choosing public schooling.  Households that were classified as 
poor had 3.52% and 66.91% choosing private and public respectively. In rural Ghana, 
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the data shows that of the 4,614 sampled households only 2.54% compared to 6.68% 
nationwide choose private schooling. Evidently, a significant proportion (64.59%) of 
the households in rural Ghana chose public schooling.  
 
Generally, it appears that poor households in 1991/92 - before the advent of education 
fee-free capitation policy in Ghana, preferred public to private schooling. However, the 
question is whether the fee-free education really succeeded in making public school a 
more preferred option for the poor. Table 3.4 shows household school participation in 
2005/6. 
 
Table 3.4:  School type attended by household poverty status – All Ghana/rural 
Ghana 2005/6 (aged 6-17) 
All Ghana Schooling Type 
Poverty Status No School Public Private Total 
Extremely Poor 1596       2563         223 4382  
% 36.42       58.49        5.09 100.00  
Poor 265               910   144 1319  
% 20.09       68.99       10.92 100.00  
Non-Poor 801       3660       1623 6084  
% 13.17      60.16       26.68 100.00  
Total 2662       7133       1990 11785  
% 22.59       60.53       16.89 100.00 
  
Rural Ghana No School Public Private Total 
Poverty Status     
Extremely Poor 1519      2324         192 4035 
% 37.65       57.60        4.76 100.0 
Poor 232         743        113 1088 
% 21.32       68.29       10.39 100.0 
Non-Poor 454           1896     479 2829 
% 16.05       67.02       16.93 100.0 
Total 2205       4963         784 7592 
% 27.73       62.41        9.86 100.0 
Source:  Computed from GLSS 
 
The analysis of GLSS5 data shows that private school participation by poor households, 
especially those in rural Ghana experienced increases. Of the total sample of 11,785 
poor households in Ghana, 16.89% and 60.53% enrolled in private and public schools 
respectively. Compared with the GLSS3 in 1991, data from GLSS5 shows about 10% 
increase in poor households‟ participation in private schooling. Again, private school 
participation in terms of the depth of poverty indicated that the extremely poor and poor 
households in Ghana also experienced increased private school participation, rising 
from 2.5% in 1991/92 to 5.09% in 2005/6 and 3.52% in 1991 to 10.92% in 2005 
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respectively for the extremely poor and poor households. In rural Ghana, similar 
patterns of participation were experienced – the poor household private school 
participation rose from 2.54% in 1991 to 9.86% in 2005, with extremely poor and poor 
rural households increasing their participation from 1.61% to 4.76% and 0.5% to 
10.39% between 1991 and 2005 respectively. 
 
The evidence demonstrates that poor households‟ participation in private schooling 
generally and in rural areas in particular increased over the two GLSS. This is an 
indication of the poor‟s interest in private schooling.  This interest shown by the poor in 
private schooling needs to be taken seriously in order to find out why there is an 
increase. The other issue is, given the increase in private school participation by the 
poor, how can it be understood in line with the structure of household educational 
expenditure. This is analysed in the next section.  
 
3.4 What is the structure of household education expenditure in Ghana? 
Since the cost of education is one of the main barriers to access to schooling, 
particularly to the poor in Ghana (GNECC, 2005; Oduro, 2000; Chao and Alper, 1998), 
examination of the structure of household educational expenses would help identify key 
elements of cost in household educational expenditure. Table 3.5 shows the average 
household educational expenditure per child in 1998 and the percentages are of total 
educational expenditure. The data shows that at the primary level, expenditure on food, 
boarding and lodging at school remains most significant expenditure item to households 
- constituting 40.3% of household total expenditure per child in a primary school. In 
contrast, household expenses on food, boarding and lodging in Junior High  and Senior 
High schools was second most important item constituting about a fifth of households‟ 
educational expenditure. It is important to note that in Ghana primary and JHS are 
normally not boarding, even though there are a few boarding schools mainly in the 
private sector. As a result, when the GLSS estimates put together boarding and lodging 
cost with food cost, it tends to obscure the actual contribution of food to the cost of 
education. 
 
 The most significant expenditure item at the JHS and SHS levels was the school and 
registration fees, which constituted a significant proportion of household average 
schooling expenditure - 50.0% at JHS and 51.2% at SSS levels. Even though 
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expenditure on uniform and sports clothes represented just about 5% of household 
educational expenditure for JHS and SHS levels of schooling, it represented 10% of 
total schooling expenditure per child at the primary level.  A possible explanation for 
this could be that, households have more children in primary schools than in JHS and 
SHS.  
 
Clearly, expenditure on food, boarding and lodging and uniform as far back as 1998/99 
were the most significant schooling expenditure items at the primary school level rather 
than school and registration fees. Thus, making public school fee-free still leaves the 
poor households with considerable cost burden of enrolling a child in primary school. 
 
Table 3.5: Average amount cedis paid per person in basic school in the last 12  
        months by level of school 
 
 
Item 
Primary Junior Secondary 
School (JSS) 
Senior Secondary 
School (SSS) 
Amount % Amount % 
 
Amount % 
School/Registration Fees 34,911 28.6 215,404 50.9 325 51.2 
Contribution to PTA 1,819 1.5 5,805 1.4 5,750 0.9 
Uniforms/Sports Clothes 12,482 10.2 20,362 4.8 20,970 3.3 
Books/School Supplies 9,027 7.4 33,059 7.8 66,691 10.5 
Transportation to/from School 4,973 4.1 21,253 5.0 38,642 6.1 
Food/Board/Lodging at School 49,184 40.3 94,787 22.4 135,045 21.2   
Other Expenses (Clubs, extra 
classes 
7,564 6.2 21,032 5.0 27,473 4.3 
Other in-kind expenses 2,046 1.7 11,220 2.7 15,393 2.4 
Total 122,006 100 422,922 100 635,693 100 
Source: GSS,2000 ( GLSS4, 1998/99) Amount in 1998/99 Ghana  Cedis. 
 
Again, with a significant proportion of household expenditure on education (about 51%) 
devoted to school and registration fees at the JHS level, this could constitute a barrier to 
the poor‟s access to Junior high school which is an integral part of the basic education in 
Ghana.  
 
It is important to note that in a typical private school in an urban setting, households‟ 
educational expenses will be different from the general pattern of educational expenses 
provided by GSS (2000). For example, Frimpong (2000) as cited by GSS (2005) 
indicated that in a typical urban private school, miscellaneous cost such as extra classes, 
food and transport to school was greater than the annual fees paid by parents, with little 
variation in the levels of total costs of schooling  at different grades (see Table 3.6).  
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Table 3.6: Costs per child of a typical private basic school (Amount in 2000)  
Class Annual Basic 
Fees 
Annual Miscellaneous 
Costs 
Annual 
Total Cost 
Annual Total Cost in 
1999 constant prices 
Primary 1 663,000 1,125,000 1,788,000 2,272,496 
Primary 2 678,000 1,125,000 1,803,000 2,291,561 
Primary 3 678,000 1,125,000 1,803,000 2,291,561 
Primary 4 711,750 1,150,000 1,861,750 2,366,230 
Primary 5 715, 500 1,150,000 1,865,500 2,370,996 
Primary 6 715, 500 1,150,000 1,865,500 2,370,996 
JSS 1 795,750 1,200,000 1,995,750 2,536,540 
JSS 2 795,750 1,200,000 1,995,750 2,536,540 
JSS 3 773,250 1,200,000 1,973,250 2,507,944 
Source: Frimpong, 2000 cited by GSS, 2005.  Average exchange rate = ¢4500 cedis to 
US$1 
 
The level of fees paid in the urban private school shows that only rich households could 
afford the cost of such schools. A comparative analysis of the cost per child in the urban 
private school in 2000 and household educational expenditure per child by welfare 
quintile in 1999 prices (Table 3.7) indicate that, this type of urban private school is not 
for the poor.  This is because even urban households in quintile 3 had their schooling 
expenditure per child  (Gh¢  635,001) representing just about a quarter of the cost per 
child in primary 1 in private school - only households in quintile 5 have their 
expenditure per child close to the range incurred in the private schools studied by 
Frimpong in 2000. However, this is not to say that only households in the highest 
income group access private schooling. This is because in urban, peri-urban and  rural 
areas there are private schools that charge low fees and this has enabled some 
households in the  lowest income group to patronise private schooling for their children. 
 
Table 3.7: Expenditure on schooling by households according to welfare quintile        
    and rural/urban location in 1999 Cedis (Accra level of purchasing power).    
Quintiles 
of welfare 
Locality   
Rural Urban Total 
1 150,601 186,798 153,188 
2 287,599 505,713 327,803 
3 420,777 635,001 485,014 
4 671,884 963,851 850,193 
5 1,139,361 1,567,532 1,491,615 
Source: Author‟s calculation from GLSS 5 
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The GLSS data (GSS, 2005) show that, food, boarding and lodging and uniform were 
the main items of households‟ educational expenditure, which raises doubts about 
whether the elimination of school fees completely removes cost barriers to the poor‟s 
access to education. The analysis also suggests that, the poor that chose private 
schooling must be accessing low-fee private schools – almost all the households in the 
quintile groups, except the highest quintile groups, would not be able to afford high fee 
private school in an urban environment like Accra. It is significant to note that, this 
analysis of household educational expenditure is based on aggregated data that 
combines household educational expenditure in private and public schools. The sections 
that follow disaggregate households schooling expenses by school type and location 
using GLSS5 data to explore the schooling expenditure differences and what it means 
for the poor to access education. 
3.4.1 Educational expenses by school type, level and location in Ghana 
It is important to note that the GSS (2000) data on household educational expenditure is 
an aggregate of household educational expenditure of all school types irrespective of 
location (Table 3.5). Therefore, a more nuanced understanding of the structure of 
household educational expenses can be gained by disaggregating household schooling 
expenses by school type and location using the latest GLSS 5 data. Figure 3.1 shows 
total annual household educational expenditure per child in 2005 Ghana prices 
(GSS,GLSS 5, 2005).  Since schooling expenditure was incurred in the period of fee-
free public schooling, comparing rural public and private primary schools and JHS 
would be significant in explaining the variations in school cost of the various school 
types. For rural public primary school the mean total expenditure on schooling per child 
was about 200,000 cedis, while the public JHS had mean household educational 
expenditure slightly higher (about 300,000 cedis).  The household educational 
expenditure had an interquartile range of 50,000-650,000 cedis for primary school 
compared to JHS which was 150- 800,000 cedis.  
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Figure 3.1: Total annual expenditure per child in school on schooling by school  
         type(2005/6)  (using probability weights) (in 2005/6 Cedis) 
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Source: Author‟s calculation from GLSS5. 
In rural private primary and junior high school levels, however, the pattern of 
expenditure is different. The mean education expenditure (about 500,000 cedis) at the 
primary level in private school was greater than mean expenditure (about 190,000 cedis) 
at the public JHS. For private schools, the difference in educational expenditure 
between primary and junior high schools was much greater than in public schools as 
indicated by mean expenditure of about 1,200,000 cedis in private junior high school. 
Also, the interquartile range is larger than for public schools indicating greater 
variations in expenditure on private schooling. Rural households‟ educational 
expenditure in private school has an interquartile range of about 200,000 to 1,100,000 
cedis at the primary level and 800,000 to 1,900,000 cedis at the junior high school level. 
Similar pattern of expenditure but at higher levels in urban public and private schools is 
observed. What might explain the big difference in educational expenditure between 
public and private schools could be the effect of the fee-free capitation policy which 
removed the payment of some school expenditure items such as parent teachers 
association dues, extra classes fee and examination fees. In addition, income could also 
be a major factor because spending on private education rise substantially with income.  
Figure 3.1 shows that, total education expenditure per child in a year in rural public 
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school ranged between 50,000 – 800,000 cedis compared to the rural private school 
which had total expenditure range per child of 200,000 – 1,900,000 cedis. This 
expenditure in rural private school on average is about twice the expenditure in public 
schools and has implications for affordability of schooling by poor households in rural 
areas.  
To determine the poor households‟ affordability of the cost of private schooling, the 
proportion of income of households in the lowest income group expended on private 
education is estimated. Table 3.8 shows the mean annual household income by quintile 
of Ghana in 2005 prices. Comparative analysis of rural households‟ total expenditure 
per child in private education in relation to the income of households in quintile 1 shows 
that, the expenditure on  a child in rural private primary (500,000 cedis) and junior high 
(1,200,000 cedis) schools constituted 6.9% and 16.5% of the income of  households in 
the lowest income group in their respective  levels of schooling – the interquartile range 
of expenditure of  50, 000-1,400,000 cedis at the primary school and 200,000-1,900,000  
cedis for junior high school suggest that, the proportion of household income expended 
on private schooling would increase according to the fees charged and other payments 
required by a particular private school. Clearly, spending about 17% of the poor income 
on just one child in private JHS would constitute a great burden to the household. 
Table 3.8: Mean annual household income by quintile group in Ghana in 2005.  
Quintile Mean annual household income (Amount in cedis) 
       I 7,280,000 
      II 10,200,000 
      III 10,980,000 
      IV 12,630,000 
      V 15,440,000 
Source: GSS, 2008. 
What the evidence suggests is that, for households in the lowest income group that 
decide to enrol in private school, a very high proportion of household income would be 
spent on schooling.  Therefore, the question this raises is, when the poor access low-fee 
private schools, how are they able to afford the costs? This is explored in chapter eight 
of the thesis. 
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3.4.2 Household schooling expenditure per child by expenditure type 
A disaggregation of households‟ schooling expenses by the type of expenditure would 
provide in-depth understanding of the contributions of the key household expenditure 
items to schooling expenditure and their likely impact on access to schooling.  Figures 
3.2 and 3.3 show household annual educational expenditure by item. 
Figure 3.2: Annual expenditure per child in school on schooling by expenditure 
                    type  (2005/6) primary (in 2005/6 Cedis) 
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Source: Author‟s calculation from GLSS 5 
 
Figure 3.2 shows that household expenditure on school uniform was relatively small 
(about 80,000 cedis at the mean) in both public and private rural primary schools 
compared to other expenditure items such as  food, boarding and lodging and school 
and registration fees. The mean expenditure on food in public rural school was about 
100,000 cedis but with an interquartile expenditure range of 0-700,000 annually.  In the 
rural private primary school, however, food and registration fees were the major 
expenditure items. Even though the mean registration fee was about 100,000 cedis, 
household expense per child on registration at the interquartile range was 0 -250,000 
cedis. Again, the mean expenditure on food in rural private primary school was about 
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200,000 cedis – this is about twice the expenditure per child in rural public primary 
schools. Since the interquartile range of expenditure on food per child falls between 
Gh¢ 0 - 490,000, it would suggests that for poor households providing the child with 
food at school could constitute a barrier to access to primary school. In urban schools, 
the pattern of schooling expenditure by item appears to be the same for both public and 
private schools, with registration and extra classes fees constituting the most significant 
expenditure items compared to other schooling expenditure items.  
 
Analysis of household expenditure at the JHS level reveals that, whether in rural or 
urban or private or public, food and lodging constitutes most significant portion of 
household schooling expenditure, except registration fees in urban private schools 
which  constituted the major educational expenditure (see Figure 3.3) 
Figure 3.3: Annual expenditure per child in school on schooling by expenditure  
                    type (2005/6) Secondary (no probability weights) (in 2005/6 Cedis) 
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Source: Author‟s calculation from GLSS 5. 
Household educational expenditure per child in urban private junior high school 
averaged about Gh¢ 600,000 annually, but the interquartile range of expenditure was 
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between Gh¢ 100,000 and 1,200,000. For rural private JHS, registration fee was second 
highest household expenditure after food, boarding and lodging.  
 
 In conclusion, the issue about schooling expenses is not simply about school fees. This 
is because if one looks at the structure of household educational expenditure per child, it 
is the food cost item that remains a key element of educational expenditure. Given that 
in public schools, the purchase of food in school is not obligatory, as it is in some 
private schools, this thesis would explore the effects of food cost on access to  
schooling.  
 
3.5 Do educational inputs and outcomes vary by school type in educationally 
      deprived districts? 
Naturally it would be expected that the quality and quantity of inputs of a school relates 
to its outcomes. This section explores the assertion that low-fee private schools produce 
better outcomes in the form of exam results than public schools. The analysis begins by 
first examining the pupil teacher ratio and quality of training of teachers in the various 
school types.  Second,  the Basic Education Certificate of Examinations
9
 (BECE) results 
of public and private schools in 53 educationally deprived
10
 districts of Ghana from 
2005-2008 is examined using descriptive statistics. Since language and numeracy are 
key goals of the basic education policy, a t- test is conducted to determine the difference 
in aggregate score and grade scores in English language and mathematics for public and 
private schools. 
 
3.5.1 How do inputs in public and private deprived schools compare? 
 
The number of pupils to a teacher in class is an important determinant of how much a 
child could benefit from teaching in school. Figure 3.4 shows that of the 53 
educationally deprived districts 31 had pupil teacher ratio (PTR) beyond the norm set by 
the Ghana Education Service - 35 and 25 for primary and junior high schools 
respectively. Indeed, PTRs in private schools were generally within the GES norm of a 
manageable class size due to low enrolment in rural areas. However, in six of the 
                                                          
9
 The BECE examination is conducted by the West African Examinations Council (WAEC) 
10
 Educational deprivation is based on a number of criteria set by the Ghana Education Service in 2000. 
These include percentage of children having desk, pupil teacher ratio, percentage of teachers untrained, 
availability of potable water, building made from cement block, etc 
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educationally deprived districts the PTR private primary schools were far beyond the 
norm –ranging between 44 and 108 pupils per class. This has implications for the 
provision of quality education in such districts. 
 
Figure 3.4: Pupil-teacher ratio of public and private schools in deprived districts, 
2009.  
 
 
 
Source: MOESS (EMIS data), 2009 
 
Another important indicator of quality of education is whether the teacher is 
professionally trained. Using the EMIS data on teachers in public and private schools in 
deprived districts in 2009, the quality of teachers is compared. Figure 3.5 shows the 
proportion of trained teachers to untrained in educationally deprived districts. Almost 
half of the teachers in public schools in educationally deprived districts were trained. 
However, of the 49 districts that had private schools, 18 had no trained teacher – only 
one district had 44% of its teachers trained, 2 districts had 20% trained and the 
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remaining districts had less than 20% trained teachers. Thus, even though public schools 
in the district had just about 50% trained teachers, private schools had only about 10% 
trained teachers. 
Figure 3.5: Proportion of trained/untrained teachers in deprived districts, 2009 
 
 
 
The EMIS coverage does not include unregistered private schools. However, it is not 
likely that, for example, unregistered low-fee private schools would have trained 
teachers because of the relatively low salary compared to the public sector. The 
implication is that low fee registered and unregistered private schools may end up 
having mainly untrained teachers.  
In short, the analyses of inputs of public and private schools in the deprived districts 
clearly show that schooling inputs are generally inadequate in the various schools types.  
A significant proportion of teachers in public school (about 50%) are not trained. The 
picture of the quality of teachers in private is worse - as less than 10% of their teachers 
were trained. Apart from one district that had about 44% of teachers in private school 
trained, the rest of the district had about 10% trained or no trained teachers at all.  
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The PTR in some districts at the primary level was far beyond the stipulated enrolment 
norm of 35 pupils per teacher in primary in both public and private schools. Given that a 
significant proportion of teachers in both public (about 50%) and private (over 90%) are 
not trained, coupled with high pupil teacher ratios, the quality of education in these 
districted could be greatly affected.  
There is the general perception that private schools do better in examinations than their 
public schools counterparts.  For example, studies conducted in poor peri-urban area of 
Ga District of Ghana concluded that the private schools were doing better than public 
schools, in terms of examination results (Tooley and Dixon, 2007a). The next section 
examines this claim using BECE results of public and private schools in the 
educationally deprived schools in peri-urban districts of Ghana.  
3.5.2 Do examination results of public and private schools compare? 
This section analyzes the BECE examination results of public and private schools in 
educationally deprived districts from 2005 – 2008.  The West African Examinations 
Council grades
11
 each subject from 1 to 9. The lower the grade score the better the 
results. Total aggregate score for selection into post basic education is based on six best 
subjects out of a total of 10 including mathematics, English language and General 
Science. Therefore, the best results would have a lower aggregate of 6, while the worst 
will be aggregate 59.  
 
The section begins with descriptive analysis - by comparing the means and standard 
deviations of aggregate scores, English Language and mathematics scores for the years 
under consideration in public and private schools to determine which school type as a 
whole is doing better in examinations. A bar graph showing the 10th percentile of 
results is used to deepen understanding of the differences in performance.  Finally, two 
sample t-tests are conducted to determine whether statistically significant differences 
exist in the performance of public and private basic schools in the educationally 
deprived districts. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Grade 1 = excellent, Grade 2 = very good, Grade 3 = good, Grade 4 = fairly good, Grade 5 = fair, 
Grade 6 =  credit,  Grades 7 and 8 =  pass, and Grade 9 is fail. Until 2010, the qualifying aggregate to post 
basic education was not exceeding aggregate 30 and must include a credit pass in  Mathematics, English 
Language, General Science and Social Studies. 
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Descriptive analyses of BECE results, 2005-2008. 
In order to have insight into the performance of public and private schools in the 
deprived districts, the mean aggregate score and the mean and modal grade for English 
language and Mathematics for the various school types were estimated. Table 3.10 
shows the results. 
 
Table 3.9: Mean and modal scores in BECE exams in educationally deprived 
schools. 
 
Mean aggregate of BECE results of schools in deprived districts, 2005-2008 
 
 Public Private 
Year N Mean Sd N Mean Sd 
2005 23,310 30.88 8.96 7,910 27.96 9.53 
2006 51,748 31.55 9.30 10,653 25.57 10.30 
2007* 10,512 31.54 9.09 2,984 26.84 10.00 
2008 52,988 32.15 8.77 12,544 25.96 9.91 
 
Mean grade in English Language in deprived schools, 2005-2008 
 
Year N Mean Sd N Mean Sd 
2005 23,034 5.60 1.59 7,820 5.00 1.58 
2006 50,987 5.97 1.62 10,457 4.81 1.68 
2007* 10,397 5.78 1.60 2,930 4.77 1.58 
2008 52,579 6.02 1.59 12,419 4.83 1.73 
 
Mean grade in Mathematics in deprived schools, 2005-2008 
 
Year N Mean Sd N Mean Sd 
2005 23,036 5.48 1.67 7,816 5.12 1.77 
2006 50,830 5.48 1.82 10,438 4.58 1.81 
2007 10,386 5.59 1.79 2,928 5.02 1.92 
2008 52,571 5.59 1.67 12,421 4.86 1.84 
 
Modal grade in BECE English Language of  deprived schools , 2005-2008 
 
Year English Language 
 Public School Private School 
2005 5 5 
2006 6 5 
2007 5 5 
2008 5 5 
 
Modal grade in BECE Mathematics of  deprived schools , 2005-2008 
 
2005 5 5 
2006 5 5 
2007 5 5 
2008 5 5 
2007*= Many schools have their results cancelled because of exam malpractices. 
Source: Author‟s calculation from WAEC BECE results, 2010 
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The mean aggregate results for the various school types between 2005-2008 shows that 
private schools did much better than public schools. Since the cut off point for 
qualification into post basic education in Ghana until the year 2010 was aggregate 30 – 
this invariably suggests that pupils from public basic schools on the average failed to 
meet the minimum aggregate score to transit to post basic education. However, the 
mean aggregate scores were examined in relation to their standard deviations for the 
various years in order understand how aggregate performance in public and private falls 
above and below their mean aggregates. The results suggest that children from private 
schools stood a better chance of accessing post basic education than those from public 
schools, all other things being equal
12
. Since the number of public schools represents 
about five times the number of private schools in the educationally deprived districts, 
this might be indicative that private schools are catering for the richest 20%.  
Since reading, writing and numeracy are the key goals of the basic education policy, the 
mean grade scores in English language and Mathematics are also compared.  On the 
whole, the mean grade in English in public schools was 6 compared to grade 5 in 
private schools. Even though the mean grade in English language in private schools is 
the same as their modal score (grade 5), public schools also had a modal score in 
English language of grade 5 throughout the period under consideration except in 2006 
where it rose to grade 6 as indicated in Table 3.9 This suggests that in terms of 
performance in English language, most pupils in both public and private schools had the 
same modal grade score of 5. Since candidates are expected to at least score a credit in 
English language and mathematics to qualify to access post-basic education, these 
scores indicates that both public and private schools have almost the same chances of 
satisfying this requirement to access post-basic education. 
 
With regards to mathematics performance, the mean grade score in public schools in 
2005 and 2006 was 5 in the respective years, while in 2007 and 2008 the mean grade 
was 6 respectively, compared to the private schools that had grade 5 throughout 2005 to 
2008. The modal score in mathematics for the two school types indicate that, from 
2005-2008 most pupils scored grade 5 in mathematics in both public and private schools 
                                                          
12
 If it is assumed that pupils scoring aggregate 30 or less have passed their English language, 
Mathematics and General Science subjects with at least grade 6.  
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(see table 3.9).  Considering the fact that the schools in peri-urban areas are high cost 
private schools, this result is quite surprising.  
 
Comparative analyses of public and private schools‟ BECE results using percentile 
estimates provided further insights into the examination performance of the two school 
types. Figure 3.6 shows that 10% of public school candidates scored aggregate 20 or 
less in 2005, 2006 and 2007. However, in 2008 the aggregate rose to 23. Compared with 
public school,  10% or less of the candidates in private schools had aggregate 16 or less 
in 2005, aggregate 13 or less in 2006 , aggregate 15 or less in 2007 and aggregate 14 or 
less in 2008. Therefore in terms of overall performance of the 10th percentile of the 
candidates, private schools performed better than public schools.  This is really not 
Figure 3.6: Tenth percentile of BECE results, 2005-2008 
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NB: 1=Public, 2= Private 
surprising given that the private schools in peri-urban environment are high cost and 
selective. Mathematics results indicate that 10% of candidates in both public and private 
school had grade 3 or less throughout the years, except in 2006 when private schools 
improved to grade 2 or less. However, private schools did better in English language 
than public schools – 10% of private school candidates had grade 3 or less in English 
compared to grade 4 or less by public schools throughout the period. Clearly, while 
62 
there is a big difference in public and private schools‟ mean aggregate score, their 
percentile and modal scores in English language and mathematics did not show that big 
difference. This marginal but better performance by private schools might be an 
indication that private schools are not performing that better in English language and 
mathematics than their public school counterparts in similar peri urban environments.  
Generally, the descriptive evidence has shown that, on the average private schools‟ 
grade scores were better than public schools. However, there was not much difference 
in their modal scores in mathematics and English language, suggesting that both public 
and private school have a better chance of meeting the basic requirement of a credit pass 
in two of the core subjects. The evidence also suggests that  the top 10 percent of 
candidates in private schools performed better in the BECE than their counterparts in 
public school. This is actually not surprising given that these are mainly selective high 
cost private schools.  However, in spite  of what has emerged from the descriptive 
analyses, it is does not show whether or not the difference exam results between private  
and public school is statistically significant. The next section present this analysis. 
 
3.5.3 Is there a statistical significant difference in BECE results of basic schools in  
        the educationally deprived districts? 
 
The descriptive analyses so far have demonstrated that the private schools have better 
results than public schools. However, it is not clear whether the difference in 
performance in examinations in public and private is statistically significant. Therefore, 
a two sample t-test of difference in aggregate examination results of schools in 
educationally deprived district of Ghana from 2005-2008 was conducted. In addition, 
two sample t-tests of differences in English language and mathematic results were also 
conducted. Table 3.15 shows the t-test results of aggregate BECE results.  The results 
reject the hypothesis of no difference in examination performance, indicating that 
nationally private schools in educationally deprived districts perform better than their 
public schools counterparts in the BECE.   Public schools candidates that wrote the 
BECE examination had a mean aggregate of 31.66, compared with the mean aggregate 
of 26.38 for private school candidates.  
 
 
 
 
63 
Table 3.10: : Two sample t-tests comparing aggregate BECE results of public and 
         private schools in educationally deprived districts, 2005-2008 
School type   N              Mean                   Std. Err.      Std. Dev.          [95% Conf. Interval] 
 Public         138558       31.66                     0.02           9.04                     31.62202     31.71725 
 Private        34091        26.38                      0.05          10.00                    26.27779     26.49021 
combined    172649       30.62                     0.02           9.47                     30.58124     30.67065 
    diff                              5.28                       0.05                                      5.176132     5.39513 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                   t =  94.6103 
    Ho: diff = 0                                        df=   172647 
    Ha: diff < 0                                        Ha: diff != 0                                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000                                 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000                    Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
Further, t-test analyses comparing public and private schools‟ BECE results in English 
language and Mathematics for each separate year in the period under consideration 
(2005 to 2008) also rejected the hypothesis of no significant difference in their 
performance (see Appendix 1). 
The evidence from the t-test results indicates that the mean difference of 5 in terms of 
aggregate performance between public and private is statistically significant.  What 
might account for these results could be due to selectivity in student admission, in-
school support strategies such as the provision of extra teaching or tuition and school 
level quality inputs in private schools. These strategies will be explored in-depth in 
three rural communities selected for this study. Again, analysis of English Language 
results indicate that private schools‟ mean score was significantly better than public 
schools, but the modal grade scores in English Language for pupils in both public and 
private schools were the same (Grade 5). Therefore, in spite of the private schools‟ 
superior means score in the BECE, both public and private schools scored grade 5 in 
English language.  
One major criticism of this national data on BECE results from educationally deprived 
districts is that it does not present the typical examination results of schools in rural 
areas. This is because the data includes high cost peri-urban private schools in deprived 
districts and rural schools. Therefore, the data does not present the true picture of a 
typical poor rural environment.  The evidence from this analysis is, however, consistent 
with Tooley and Dixon‟s (2007a) findings in peri-urban Ga Wes district of Ghana 
which is very atypical of Ghana. However, what is not known is how examination 
performance compares in a typical rural setting.  As a result, this thesis examines the 
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BECE results and tests performance of public and low-fee private schools in a typical 
poor rural environment.    
 
3.6 Summary  
A number of factors impact on the poor‟s access to schooling in Ghana. The analyses 
show that even though government expenditure on education as a proportion of its GDP 
in real 2005 prices has been increasing from 2003 to 2007, allocation of expenditure 
within the education sub sectors does not go to basic education where the majority of 
the poor children in Ghana are still struggling for access. This is because a significant 
proportion of the education budget is allocated to the tertiary and secondary education 
relative to basic education. This has implications for quality provision at the basic 
education level.   
 
National data shows that between GLSS3 and GLSS5 private school participation in 
Ghana increased. For poor households in rural areas, this increase represented about 
10%. Therefore, there is the need to understand from the perspective of the poor what 
factors have been influencing this interest and growing participation.  
 
Costs of education continue to pose a barrier to access by the poor households and with 
about 16% of the poor household income spent on just one child in private JHS, this 
could have implications for household expenditure patterns and affordability. In public 
schools, government has absorbed the „full direct cost‟ through fee-free policy, but food 
cost remains an important issue to the poor in both public and private schools. Given 
that the purchase of food in public schools is not obligatory, it is quite interesting to find 
that the cost of food remains the most significant cost item of household educational 
expenditure. Therefore, this thesis explores the significance of food cost to access and 
choice of schooling in poor rural areas.  
 
Input indicators of schools in educationally deprived districts show that public schools 
have better and more inputs than private schools. However, analysis of the BECE 
results of schools in educationally deprived districts show that, the private schools get 
better exam results than public schools given their intake of pupils.  These are results 
derived from data on schools in peri-urban districts that have high cost private schools. 
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The literature on school quality in Ghana clearly shows that, private schools‟ exam and 
test scores have consistently been better than public schools. But this evidence is 
derived from private schools that are in the urban and peri-urban districts. These private 
schools attract the best candidates generally from better socio-economic backgrounds – 
these are children from households who apart from their capacity to afford the cost of 
schooling, also show great interest and do provide personal support in their children‟s 
schooling. Therefore, the perception of quality and reality are quite aligned.  
 
What is not known is whether in a typical poor rural environment where the majority of 
the parents have never enrolled in school, the perception of quality private schools 
compared to public would be borne by the reality. This issue is explored later in Chapter 
seven. The next chapter discusses the methodology and methods of the study.  
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Chapter 4:  Methodology and methods      
 
4.1 Introduction 
The issue of school choice for poor rural households and its interaction with cost and 
quality appears to have gained considerable research attention recently, as demonstrated 
by the literature. However, as noted earlier – with a few exceptions, e.g. Harma (2008) – 
most studies concerned with the choice between public and private schooling have been 
carried out in urban and peri-urban settings, using either quantitative or qualitative 
research approaches or both (Srivastava, 2006; Tooley, 2005; Kingdon, 1996).  
 
This thesis employs a mixed methods approach in which qualitative information is 
nested in quantitative data collection and analyses. The chapter begins with the 
philosophical and methodological stance of the study. This is followed by discussion of 
my identity as a researcher. The discussion proceeds with the sampling procedures, the 
research process, and methods of data collection and analyses. It then discusses how 
ethical issues were confronted in the field. Finally, a summary of the philosophical and 
methodological issues is provided.  
 
4.2 Philosophical and methodological stance: the rationale for a mix methods 
approach 
Mixed methods research is increasingly being employed as an alternative to the 
traditional mono-method – quantitative or qualitative (Jang et al., 2008; Brewer and 
Hunter, 2006; Creswell, 1994); although some commentators have questioned the 
paradigmatic integrity of mixed methods research design (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; 
Smith, 1983). The paradigm debate, which centres on the conflict between the 
competing scientific worldviews of positivism and constructivism on philosophical and 
methodological issues, is well known (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003;  Howe, 1988). 
For example, Guba and Lincoln (1989), and Smith (1983) argue that knowledge claims 
cannot be mixed due to fundamental differences in paradigms, and incompatible 
assumptions about the world and human nature. However, researchers including Brewer 
and Hunter (2006), and Tashakkori and Teddlie (2003) argue that the paradigm debate 
has been over emphasised, thus making dialogue less productive. Consequently, some 
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researchers have suggested that these philosophical differences may be reconciled 
through a new guiding paradigm: pragmatism, which embraces and promotes the 
mixing of methods (Jang et al., 2008; Morgan, 2007; Johnson et al., 2007; Tashakkori 
and Teddlie, 2003; Greene and Caracelli, 2003; Howe, 1988). 
 
Therefore, pragmatists focus on the research problem rather than the research method, 
stressing that epistemological issues exist in a continuum rather than at two opposing 
poles as argued by positivists and constructivists (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; 
Creswell, 2007; Cherryholmes, 1992). This is because at some point in the research 
process, direct interaction between the researcher and the participants might not be 
desirable; while, at other times, a highly interactive relationship could be required in 
order to construct knowledge relating to a complex research question. Thus, pragmatic 
epistemology recognises both the objective and subjective relationships that exist 
between the knower and the known, and addresses these differences using pluralistic 
data sources and interpretation phases of knowledge generation in the analysis (Teddlie 
and Tashakkori, 2009). 
 
Ontologically, pragmatists, like critical realists, recognise that reality is independent of 
human consciousness (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; 1998; Cherryholmes, 1992); but 
at the same time, they agree that there are locally co-constructed realities that emanate 
from human intellect, and which change as those involved in the „construction‟ change 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Creswell, 2003). Pragmatists are sceptical of the 
positivist claim that truth about reality can be determined – because to the pragmatist, 
truth is what works at the time but is not based on the dualism of the mind or on reality 
independent of the mind (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009; Creswell, 2003; Cherryholmes, 
1992). The present thesis employs both quantitative and qualitative data to provide a 
better understanding of the research problem – the factors that make low-fee private 
schools accessible to the poor in rural areas.  
 
By employing pragmatists‟ epistemology and ontology, I have not privileged any one 
type of relationship between the researcher and the participant – objective or subjective 
reality; but rather, draw on assumptions underlying both positivism and constructivism. 
As a result, this study has been designed to employ mixed methods whereby any claim 
to knowledge is underpinned by pragmatic epistemology and ontology. The selection of 
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mixed methods for the study is most suitable as it allows the researcher to focus on the 
research problem, and then employ pluralistic methods of data collection and analysis to 
generate knowledge about the problem. 
 
The concurrent nested mixed methods procedure (see Figure 4.1) was adopted for this 
study because it involves converging quantitative and qualitative data such that they are 
able to provide an in-depth and comprehensive understanding of issues surrounding the 
response of poor households to fee-free public education and the growth of low-fee  
 
Figure 4.1: Concurrent nested strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Creswell (2003: 214). 
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gain a deeper understanding of school choice decisions and survival strategies through 
in-depth interviews with household heads whose children are in both public and low-fee 
private schools. Therefore, the study was able to produce results that were more valid 
and reliable than would have been the case if a mono-method epistemological and 
ontological position had been assumed. 
 
In the course of the interviews, participants in the study were given the opportunity to 
voice their opinions on household investment and exercise of school choice. Given the 
subjective understanding of the value households placed on education, and their 
variation in choice and attitude to schooling, the study gave greater importance to the 
meaning of participants‟ lived experiences, social interactions, and processes through 
which attitudes and the exercise of school choice decisions were constructed (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1999; Powell, 1997). Interpretive schemes led to the understanding of 
human nature, which was achieved through the use of „double hermeneutics‟ whereby 
the researcher and the researched became interpreters (Scott and Usher, 1996; Bryman, 
1988).  
 
The qualitative aspect of the study employed a subjective/interpretive approach in order 
to gain a contextualised understanding of school choice decisions, the practices of low-
fee private schools, and the interaction between parents and teachers in the various types 
of school. Such contextualised knowledge of what informs school choice in the 
community; the nature of the interaction between school and parents; practices in low-
fee private schools; and the processes by which household decisions are reached with 
regard to enrolling children in a public school, low-fee private, or both, is required to 
reach an understanding of the factors that make low-fee private schools accessible to the 
poor in rural communities.   
 
4.3 Confronting my identity as a researcher in the field 
I have lived all my life in an urban setting and therefore my presence in a typical 
Ghanaian rural community immediately placed me in the position of an outsider. 
However, my experience working in the research area for CREATE project in 2006/07 
provided me with insider status, as I was already familiar with the conditions of some 
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households and knew some people in the communities who would become key 
informants.  
 
I have also lived all my life amongst the Fante, studied their history at school, and am 
fluent in the language. My considerable understanding of Fante tradition and culture 
took on considerable significance in negotiation for access to the communities, as I was 
able to observe customary greetings and mode of communication with village elders 
and carefully ensured that my behaviour conformed to cultural and traditional values.  
 
During data collection, I was very much aware of my insider and outsider position, and 
ensured that it had no influence on my perception and understanding of participants‟ 
views by engaging in constant reflexivity on my own position in the research process. 
For example, I entered the field bearing in mind the general perception that rural 
dwellers place less value on education, and ensured that I was constantly reminded of 
my own biases and assumptions.  
 
Additionally, I have always taken it for granted that if rural households were poor and 
education costs constituted a burden to them, then, naturally, making schooling fee free 
would enable them to send all their children to school. On the contrary, my interaction 
with the study communities revealed that poor households‟ schooling decisions were 
determined by complex thought processes, suggesting that mere fee-free education, and 
quantification of costs and benefits would still leave the question of schooling decisions 
unanswered.  
 
My interaction with parents and teachers in the study communities suggests that the 
critical realist stance which emphasises that social phenomena exist in the objective 
world and can be known probabilistically (Guba and Lincoln, 2005) was not appropriate 
for determining the reality. Rather, I became convinced that understanding household 
schooling decisions and choices required gathering all the relevant data by focusing on 
the research problem and then combining all this information to address it (Jang et al., 
2008).  
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4.4 Sampling: finding households to study 
The sample for this study was selected from two of the eight education circuits
13
 in 
Mfantseman district in southern Ghana. These circuits were Narkwa and Dominase, 
which are among the poorest in the district (GSS, 2007; MDA, 2006). The selection of 
study sites was made strategically, one community being located in a coastal area, while 
the other two were situated in forest areas; therefore, together, they were quite 
representative of activities both on the coast and in the forest. Figure 4.2 is a map of 
Mfantseman district indicating the study locations. 
Figure 4.2: Map of Mfantseman district 
 
Source: MDA, 2006 
                                                          
13
 Educational circuits are geographic areas in a district named for administrative purposes. 
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 The selection of education circuits was followed by the identification of communities 
in them to be studied. The criteria for the selection of communities were firstly 
influenced by the fact that they were research sites for the CREATE project. According 
to Ampiah (2007), the criteria for selecting CREATE research sites were based on 
accessibility to communities, their relatively high economic deprivation, and whether 
they exhibited occupational activities that had the potential to impede children‟s access 
to schooling. Figure 4.3 shows the relative locations of the communities and schools
14
 
under study. 
 
 
Figure: 4.3: Relative locations of communities and schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author‟s construct, 2010 
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Secondly, given that the communities in the two circuits were scattered, coupled with 
difficulty of access due to bad roads or the lack of accessible roads at all in some 
instances, only three out of the six communities in the two circuits could realistically be 
selected for the study.        
Thirdly, although these circuits were among the most rural in the district, their 
communities hosted both public and low-fee private schools within a range of 500 to 
900 metres; the close proximity of these school was required for exploring the factors 
that made low-fee private schools accessible to the poor in rural environments.  
The distance between the communities of Domaa and Kokodo was about 2 km and 
there were children from Kokodo who attended the LFPS in Domaa.  
My experience as a research assistant on the CREATE project in 2006/7 made it easy to 
identify schools for selection as I was already familiar with them. Only two schools 
were selected from Eku community in Narkwa circuit – one public school and one low-
fee private basic school that served about three neighbouring communities. Two 
communities were selected from Dominase circuit: Domaa and Kokodo. Domaa hosted 
a total of four schools, three being selected for the study – one public school and two 
private schools, one of which was unregistered. Kokodo community hosted a total of 
four schools, from which one public and one private were selected.  
 
The household survey constituted those households with children in the selected 
schools, which enabled me to retrospectively explore the choices made by this group. 
Thus, unlike the Ghana Living Standards Survey, which draws a representative sample 
of households from the whole country, the population used in this study does not 
represent a typical household survey, and might therefore lessen the representativeness 
of the sample. However, as an independent researcher, I had neither the resources nor 
the time to travel around all the hamlets and conduct household enumeration. 
Nevertheless, the number of households (536) I covered was a comparatively large 
sample considering that the total number in the three communities combined was only 
about 2000. As a result, the approach I adopted for selecting households led to some 
clear conclusions.    
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4.5 The research processes 
4.5.1 Conducting the household survey 
Given that the main unit of analysis in this study is the household,
15
 data were collected 
through a survey of those families with children in public and/or private school between 
the months of May and August 2008. Eight basic school teachers had been previously 
trained in household data collection by CREATE. The class registers of three public and 
four low-fee private schools were used to generate the sampling frame.  
 
Since households with children in school were the focus of this study, grades were 
stratified in each school on the basis of initial entry and exit. Accordingly, households 
were identified for the survey from strata of children at four educational stages: grade 1 
(primary school beginners); grade 4 (mid-primary school); grade 6 (end of primary 
cycle); and grade 7 (transition to junior secondary school). Grades 1 and 7 were selected 
because they represented entry and exit phases respectively with regard to basic school, 
and potentially signalled the stages at which the issue of cost of schooling to households 
became acute.  
 
Even though my initial intention was to draw a random sample of households to be 
surveyed from the class list, ultimately, the population of each class was taken to 
constitute the population of households for the study. This was because drawing a 
random sample rather the population would have resulted in a smaller sample of 
households with children in LFPSs, making inferential statistical analysis impossible. 
Thus, the population of the class constituted the population of households for the 
survey. The name of each school and the population of the households under study are 
indicated in Table 4.1.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15
 In this thesis, a household refers to family members who lived under the same roof or in a single 
compound, shared common meals and a resource pool, and had slept in the compound for at least 15 
nights during the previous month. 
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Table 4.1: School type by grade/class and sample size 
Class/grade  1 4 6 7 Total 
pupils 
Households 
surveyed 
School Name Number of pupils per class 
 
Fremo Private  36 29 14 20 99 63 
Shamo Private 13 19 7 8 47 45 
Holomo Private 17 17 20 12 66 54 
Shambu Private 24 20 16 20 80 41 
Domino Public 29 20 34 25 108 77 
Kyoto Public 39 54 42 25 160 80 
Medico Public 65 59 56 63 243 176 
Total 223 218 189 173 803 536 
Note: the relative locations of the schools can be seen in figure 4.3. 
Source: The author (field data, 2008).  
 
It is important to note that once the survey was underway, it was realised that some 
households had more than one child in school, or in different grades and/or school 
types. Therefore, pupils from the same family but in different schools or grades were 
captured under one household. In all, only 9 households could not be reached due to 
relocation; thus, the final number of households surveyed totalled 536 (see Table 4.1). 
However, by identifying households for the survey in starting with children who were in 
school, I was able to gather the relevant data.  
 
4.5.2 Selection of participants: finding my interviewees 
The selection of different categories of household members and teachers for interview 
was made in August 2008 and January 2010. Firstly, in 2008, three categories of 
household member within the lowest income quintile were selected for interview. These 
were household heads who had children in public school only, private school only, or 
both. For example, if a public school pupil had a sibling in private school, then this 
constituted one category of household to be interviewed; while pupils in public or 
private school but with no sibling in either constituted the other two types of household. 
Therefore, I requested from each school details of those children in these three 
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categories, generating a list of 101 households of which 41 were within the lowest 
income group.  
 
In total, 38 household heads agreed to be interviewed, a figure comprising 14 who had 
enrolled all their children in public school only; 13 who had enrolled them in private 
school only; and 11 who had opted for a mixture of public and private schooling. In 
addition, 12 household heads were selected and interviewed on the basis of their 
survival and management strategies. Therefore, these 38 households represented a 
carefully selected sample intended to facilitate an exploration of schooling decisions 
and survival strategies. Thus, the selection of such categories of household head was not 
intended to indicate representativeness of a population sample (Merriam, 1998; 
Bryman, 1988), but to explore criteria informing schooling decisions and survival 
strategies that were implemented.  
 
The second group of interviewees was selected in January 2010. This group comprised 
head teachers, teachers, parents, School Management Committee (SMC) members and 
Parent Teacher Association (PTA) executives. Table 4.2 represents a breakdown of 
participants interviewed. 
 
Table 4.2: The non-random sample of participants  
Type of participant Number of participants 
Public 
Only 
Private 
only 
 
Public & private Total 
 
August 2008 
Household heads in the lowest income group with 
children in school  
14 13 11 38 
 January 2010 
Head teachers 3 3 - 6 
Teachers 7 7 - 14 
Parents not household heads 4 2 2 8 
SMC executives 3 - - 3 
PTA executives 3 3 1 7 
Total 34 28 14 76 
Source: The author (field data, 2008/10). 
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Furthermore, to explore how households related to their schools of choice, parents, and 
PTA and SMC executives were purposively sampled. The use of such sampling was 
required in order to discover the detailed views of parents and teachers on how their 
relationship with the school influenced decisions in matters of education. It was also 
intended to determine what LFPS practices attracted some poor households. Finally, 
four low-fee private school teachers were also purposefully selected for interview in 
order to explore their working conditions and how they perceived the future 
development of their schools. Thus, the use of purposeful sampling enabled me to learn 
more about those issues most significant to the study (Boeije, 2010).   
 
4.5.3 Conducting classroom observation  
Four schools were selected for observation of teacher contact time. In Eku, one public 
and one low-fee private school were selected, being the only schools in the locality. 
However, in Domaa, there were four schools clustered in the same area and one public 
and one private school were selected from these. Teaching timetables of schools 
selected for observation were collected from class teachers.  
 
The first week was devoted to familiarising myself with the schools, teachers and 
pupils. I also used this time to create an atmosphere of trust and a less tense 
environment for observation (May, 1997). This was carried out after first informing the 
head teacher and then the teachers of my intention to observe school life and the 
interaction of the children in the classroom. In the second week – when the actual 
classroom observation was conducted – using the school teaching timetable as an 
observation protocol, grades 1, 4 and 6 were observed to ascertain the extent of contact 
time utilisation, noting the amount of time the teacher spent on activities in the 
classroom.  
 
During this period, a number of activities – including rehearsals for Independence Day 
celebrations – interrupted the normal school day. This setback notwithstanding, data 
derived from classroom observation were significant in understanding time utilisation in 
public and private rural basic schools, a point that is discussed further in chapter 7. 
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4.6 Methods of data collection  
A number of data collection tools were employed, which comprised the survey 
questionnaire, the interview and classroom observation. A detailed discussion of the 
methods of data collection is contained in the following three sections. 
 
4.6.1 The household survey 
The survey design was adopted from the CREATE research project (Akyeampong et al., 
2007). I used the project‟s household questionnaire, which had already been validated 
and contained both open and closed questions, to gather my own data. The 
questionnaire, which had four main sections, was administered by the researcher and 
research assistants in the form of an interview (see Appendix 2). Section 1 provided a 
roster of household resident members, and captured demographic and basic education 
details. Section 2 contained questions relating to household schooling expenses for 
children between the ages of 4 and 16 years. All schooling expenses data were reported 
for all children in the household who were enrolled in school.  
 
Trained research assistants interviewed household heads to estimate the direct daily, 
weekly and monthly school expenses for each child in public or private school in the 
same household. In collating data on the direct cost of schooling, all such household 
expenses for each child were grouped into those appertaining to public or private 
school. Households that had children in both public and private school had their 
expenses placed under the school type that the child attended; for example, in a 
household in which there was one child in public and one child in private school, the 
expenses for each were recorded separately. Thus, the direct household cost of 
schooling was divided into public and private. 
 
Section 3 contained questions on household dwelling, and services such as type of 
housing and ownership; source of and distance to water sources; sanitation; and type of 
energy/fuel used. Section 4 had two subsections that contained questions intended to 
examine household assets ownership, and sources of livelihood and non-employment 
income respectively. However, with regard to income, using the local dialect (Fante), 
the researcher and research assistants helped interviewees estimate how much each 
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adult member contributed. The monetary value of productive outputs such as the harvest 
from the farm and other household productive activities was added to the total to obtain 
the estimated yearly household income. Households were also asked to provide 
information on support received from social networks (friends and relatives) towards 
meeting the education expenses of their children. 
 
4.6.2 Gathering school data: revenue, costs and input 
School revenue, costs and input data were gathered using questionnaires (see 
Appendices 8-12) designed by the researcher during the first quarter of 2010. The 
questionnaire was given to head teachers after explaining what it was about and asking 
whether they would be willing to provide the required data. In all, three public schools 
and three low-fee private schools provided data, with one low-fee private school 
declining. 
 
For all the public schools under study, head teachers were each given a questionnaire to 
elicit data on teacher salaries and school inputs. Three of the four head teachers of the 
low-fee private schools under study willingly agreed to respond to the questionnaire. It 
took about a week to complete and return it; but while two of the low-fee private 
schools returned the completed form within a week, it took one school about a month to 
complete and return theirs. Questions included the previous term‟s school fees per 
pupil, extra class fees, and total enrolment by grade. For the sake of validation, some 
household heads were also asked to provide information on a few items such as extra 
classes and PTA contributions. Generally, with the exception of one household head, 
responses tended to be consistent with those of the schools. 
 
Finally, additional data on standardised test scores in English and Mathematics – 
conducted by CREATE in 2007 and 2008 in four low-fee private schools and six public 
schools in the study circuit – were collected for analysis. The level of the tests was 
grade 3 and they were administered to pupils of grades 3, 6 and 7. 
 
4.6.3 Gathering qualitative data: interviews and classroom observation 
With support from my research assistants, from July to August 2008 and January to 
March 2010, I identified and selected for interview suitable households in each of the 
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communities under study (see Appendix 3 for interview guide). Generally, in each of 
the qualitative interviews, a similar procedure was followed for collecting data: the 
researcher and research assistants contacted prospective participants, explained to them 
the purpose of the interview, and asked if they would be willing to participate. On some 
occasions, respondents set specific times for their interviews.  
 
The semi-structured interview guide allowed the researcher some latitude in probing 
beyond initial answers (May, 1997; Marshall and Rossman, 1999). All interviews were 
audiotaped, with the exception of one with four low-fee private school teachers that 
solicited information on their working conditions and professional future plans; the 
reason being to allay any fears of the details being kept on file and to encourage them to 
provide true and accurate information.   
 
Almost all the interviews were conducted in Fante and transcribed into English the same 
day. Even though I am not a Fante, I have lived and schooled with them and speak 
fluent Fante. My understanding of the local language made it possible to probe allusions 
that were significant to an understanding of the context in which they perceived the 
value of education and the school choice decisions they made. For example, one 
interviewee commented that, „Elders say that if you like cheap things, you will end up 
eating worms.‟ Further elaboration elicited the notion that fee-free education without 
good quality teaching would result in worthless investment on the part of the household.  
 
Interview questions were pilot tested in one of the communities in Mfantseman district. 
The goal of this exercise was to practise interviewing techniques, and to determine 
whether the questions were clear and effective in getting responses. The pilot test of the 
interview guide also enabled me to select Fante words and phrases that successfully 
elicited sought-after information, for example, views on the „value‟ of education. 
 
Teacher contact time data collection started a week before actual classroom observation. 
Head teachers and teachers were informed of a limited objective for the observation – 
the manner in which teachers and pupils interacted inside and outside school. This was 
necessary because if I were to have informed the teachers of the exact reason, they 
would have behaved differently and thus biased the data. As Gans (1962) argues:  
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If the researcher is completely honest with people about his activities, they 
will try to hide actions and attitudes they consider undesirable, and so will 
be dishonest. Consequently, the researcher must be dishonest to get honest 
data (cited in Bryman, 2008: 116).  
 
Even though I was open and honest with participants throughout the research process, in 
order to ensure the collection of candid data on the attitudes of teachers towards time 
management in the classroom, the exact reason for classroom observation was not made 
known them.  
 
In each school, the teaching timetable was employed as an observation protocol. 
Teachers‟ time management in the classroom in respect of three grades/classes (1, 4 and 
6) was gauged against the school‟s teaching timetable (see appendix 7 for teaching 
timetable) in order to determine how much time was actually spent teaching in public 
and private schools respectively. 
 
 
4.7 Data analysis 
As this study was designed to employ a concurrent nested strategy with quantitative 
data dominance, firstly, household survey data were analysed using stata version 10.0, 
which generated descriptive statistics such as frequencies, percentages, quintile 
estimates, and averages. This was necessary because it enabled my familiarisation with 
the data, and also allowed exploration of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
communities under study and the patterns that emerged from the data. An average cost 
estimate was used to establish principal schooling expenses and the percentage of total 
household income they represented. Furthermore, a mean deviation t-test analysis was 
conducted to determine whether the direct costs of public and private schooling 
differed.  
 
The descriptive analysis was followed by a regression analysis of household school 
choice using multinomial logistic analysis. With the assertion that the poor access low-
fee private education in rural areas, the regression analysis tested the hypothesis that 
socio-economic factors do not affect household school choice in the poor rural 
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communities under study. Harma (2008) notes that school choice can be examined at 
the child level or the household level. Since the household is where schooling decisions 
are made and it is also the main unit wherein life chances are affected by poverty 
(Alderman et al., 1995; Harma, 2008), school choice in the rural communities of 
Mfantseman was examined at this level.  
 
Three household school choice options were identified: public only, private only and a 
mixture of both (the combined option). Two hundred and seventy-nine households 
opted for public school only, 135 chose private school, while 111 settled on the 
combined option (see Table 8.3). Nine households only could not be contacted due to 
relocation. As a result, the outcome variable for household school choice in this analysis 
is represented by trichotomous variables dependent on whether a household chooses 
public school, private school or the combined option (coded 0 for public, 1 for private, 
and 2 for combined option), which is regressed by household head, household and child 
characteristics (see Appendix 4 for a description of variables). Kingdon (1996) used a 
similar analysis to explain school choice in urban India. In Vietnam, Glewwe and 
Patrinos (1999) also used multinomial logistic analysis to explain school choice, 
employing nationwide standard-of-living survey data and most of the same explanatory 
variables.  
 
Moreover, in order to explain patterns of household education expenditure, a standard 
regression analysis was conducted by regressing the outcome variable (the log of total 
education expenditure per child) by household head, and household  characteristics, and 
the type of school the child attended (see Appendix 5 for description of variables). 
Glewwe and Patrinos (1999) used standard regression analysis to explain household 
education expenditure using similar explanatory variables.  
 
To address the question of the extent to which the growth of the low-fee private school 
is sustainable, analysis of the ability of households to meet the cost of private schooling 
examining the proportion of household income expended on education per child. It also 
used data on pupil enrolment and fee payment for the previous school term to analyse 
household ability to afford the cost. Accordingly, expected fee revenue, fee arrears, and 
total fee arrears as a percentage of total fee income were estimated. Total school 
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revenue was also estimated by adding fee income to the estimated income generated 
from extra classes.  
 
In addition, the operational costs of three low-fee private schools were modelled, and 
estimates of salary cost and non-salary cost were made and compared with total school 
revenue (see Table 8.13). Teacher turnover in low-fee private schools from 2007 to 
2009 was estimated. The mean, median and mode of teachers‟ monthly salaries in both 
public and low-fee private schools were estimated and compared on the basis of data 
provided in the school questionnaire. Four LFPS teachers were also interviewed in order 
to understand their working conditions and how they perceived their professional 
development in the low-fee private education sector. 
 
In determining whether the quality of education in LFPSs was higher than that of their 
public counterparts in similar rural environments, input data such as teacher training, 
pupil to teacher ratio, and examination results of low fee private and public school in 
the study communities were examined. Firstly, teacher qualifications and other inputs 
such as school infrastructure were compared. Secondly, low-fee private school BECE 
results in rural Mfantseman from 2007 to 2009 were compared with those of public 
schools in a similar environment. Finally, a regression analysis (using OLS) was 
conducted to determine the performance and progress in English and Mathematics tests 
of private and public schools respectively. Subsequently, the outcome variable (English 
and Mathematics test results) was regressed by the background characteristics of pupils 
and the schools (primary and junior high) that took the tests (see Appendix 6 for 
description of variables). 
 
Qualitative in-depth interview data analysis involved the construction of themes and 
sub-themes through the use of constant comparative method (Merriam, 1998; Creswell, 
2003). Units of data or pieces of information – including words or phrases that revealed 
knowledge relevant to the research questions such as what informed household school 
choice decisions, and the nature of the interaction between parents and schools – were 
placed in groups that had characteristics in common. These units of data were then 
compared for recurring regularities and patterns (Boeije, 2010; Merriam, 1998). Themes 
that emerged from the data constituted the basis for analysis and quotations from 
respondents were used to support the themes. 
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4.8 Confronting ethical issues 
The mixed methods design adopted by this study means that not only quantitative 
survey data were gathered but qualitative interviews and classroom observations were 
also conducted. Since these data are derived from the field, they ultimately have 
attendant ethical issues that need to be confronted. Firstly, my own perception, which 
has been shaped by living in urban environments all my life, could have conflicted with 
my role as a researcher in the interpretation of social phenomena. For example, I 
subscribe to the general perception that rural dwellers did not value education. As a 
result, I needed to constantly remind myself of my dual role as an insider and outsider in 
the research process, thus ensuring that my perception did not influence my 
interpretation of rural people 
 
An issue that deserves important ethical consideration is the nature of data appertaining 
to household income and the operational costs of schools. This is sensitive information 
that requires a good deal of patience and tact to collect. For example, in rural 
agricultural communities, determining household income is not a straightforward task. 
Instead of directly asking people how much they earned, it was necessary to engage 
them in conversation, enquiring what crops were cultivated the previous year and how 
much was harvested before adding a value estimate of this input to their total output. 
Some households used this as an opportunity to stress their poverty and therefore 
provided the information as evidence of their challenges. Clearly, not asking households 
directly but using an estimation of the previous year‟s output made the process of 
calculating income laborious and it took several hours, but there was no way round it.  
 
A further issue is that since this study gathered data on income from both registered and 
unregistered private rural schools, the fear of being reported to the education authorities 
or assessed for tax payment could have resulted in non-disclosure, while those who did 
acquiesce could have provided inaccurate information. The sensitive nature of such 
information could have made some households and head teachers reluctant to 
participate, particularly if they realised that “assurance of confidentiality is weak, vague 
and not understood” (Cohen et al., 2000: 62). However, I was generally able to gain the 
trust of participants through a number of school visits intended to establish a rapport 
with them (May, 1997; Villiamy et al., 1990).  
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Before I embarked on this study, I had already undertaken a number of regular trips to 
the site, which meant that access to prospective respondents was made easier. All 
research participants, including those involved in the household survey and interviews, 
were personally asked whether or not they were willing to take part in a study of their 
children‟s basic education; and all those contacted wholeheartedly agreed to participate. 
This was because their children‟s education was an emotional topic and there was 
therefore general interest in talking about it. 
 
In addition, school heads and teachers were assured in writing of the researcher‟s 
commitment to utmost confidentiality and anonymity. Many of the household 
interviewees were illiterate but in all instances, I obtained participants‟ informed 
consent by explaining to them the purpose of the study, and verbally assuring them of 
confidentiality and anonymity (Bryman, 2004; Nichmias and Nichmias, (1996).  
 
The fact that the study sites were farming and fishing communities meant that I was 
likely to intrude on the daily routines of my respondents. Thus, I ensured respect for 
their livelihood activities and lifestyle by arranging convenient times for interviews. 
This led me to meet interviewees on specific days – for example, on Sundays after 
church; Wednesdays, when some households refrained from farming; and also on 
Tuesdays, when they did not engage in fishing activities since it was considered 
culturally taboo to do so. 
 
Finally, I asked for permission to audiotape interviews, a request that none of the 
respondents refused. Moreover, utmost care was taken in storing data in computer files, 
and households and schools were given pseudonyms to ensure confidentiality during the 
analysis (Bryman, 2004). Throughout the study, ethical considerations continued to 
remain significant in order to protect and ensure the dignity of all participants. 
 
4.9 Summary 
This study employed a mixed methods approach – the concurrent nested strategy, which 
involves the combination of quantitative and qualitative data – allowing the various 
questions (qualitative and quantitative) and hypotheses relating to the key research 
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questions exploring the factors that made low-fee private schools accessible to the poor 
to be addressed. Therefore, the survey of households that had already made the decision 
and actually had children in school, and interview and classroom observation data were 
used to explore the various aspects of the study that could not be fully addressed by 
using either type of data exclusively.  
 
The household survey sample was drawn from those communities in the circuit that 
hosted both public and private schools, and which were also proximate to each other. 
Thus, households containing a purposively stratified sample of children in grades 1, 4, 6 
and 7, in three public and four private schools in the communities under study were 
surveyed. Even though this was not a comprehensive household survey, it clearly 
represented those households that had already chosen a school for their children. In 
addition, epistemological and ontological considerations, as well as my identity as a 
researcher and the concomitant ethical issues were carefully thought through. Therefore, 
the study provided a fair representation of issues related to information derived from the 
data. The next chapter examines the socio-economic profiles of households in the 
communities under study, using data derived from the household survey in order to 
understand how the poor might respond to private schooling in a rural environment. 
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Chapter 5: Socio-economic profile of the study rural communities. 
5.1 Introduction 
Generally, households in rural Mfantseman are poor. However, within that poor 
environment there are variations in the socio-economic conditions of households that 
live there. Also, within different rural localities there are characteristics of that 
community that can influence the choices they make. This chapter sets the scene for the 
study of rural communities in the Mfantseman District. It provides a detailed picture of 
the socio-economic profile of households with children in school in the three rural 
communities. The goal is to provide an accurate picture of the extent of poverty in these 
areas and the extent to which the socio-economic conditions might contribute to levels 
of access to schooling and particularly their response to private schooling.  Finally, key 
issues in this chapter are summarised to provide a clearer picture of the study sites and 
also to provide a solid basis for the analysis in the next three chapters. However, before 
analysing the survey results, a brief discussion of the overall socio-economic and geo-
political context of Mfantseman is provided. 
 
 
5.2 Context 
The Mfantseman District is located in the Central Region of Ghana and is one of 138 
administrative districts in the country. It has a total population of 152,264 constituting 
about 7% of the total population of the region (GSS, 2005a). Even though not 
considered as one of the 40 deprived districts, it is located in the fourth poorest region 
of the country (GSS, 2000). Of the 12 administrative districts in the Central region, the 
Mfantseman district has been identified as one of the poorest with about 60% of its total 
population considered to be living below the poverty line of a dollar per day (GSS, 
2007; MDA, 2006; GSS, 2000). The major economic activities are farming and fishing 
with about half (49.4%) of the adult population engaged in agricultural, animal 
husbandary and forestry (GSS, 2005a).  Farming activities are rain fed and with the 
perennial erratic rainfall patterns and improper farming practices, many farmers can 
only produce at the subsistence level. School attendance is low- gross enrolment at 
primary and Junior high school levels stand at 70.1% and 67.6% respectively (GSS, 
2000). Only 37.9% are literate in English and one Ghanaian language. About 33% of 
the total population are never enrolled, with 16.6% of these between the ages 6-14 years 
(GSS, 2005). Compared to the other districts in the region, Mfantseman has the greatest 
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proportion of school age children who are never enrolled (GSS, 2005a). Thus, this is a 
district where one could describe as poor, with its rural communities facing various 
deprivations including unreliable sources of livelihoods and access to education. 
5.3 Geo-political and administrative profile  
Mfantseman lies along the Atlantic Coastline and extends from latitude 5
0
 7′ to 50 20′ 
North of the Equator and Longitude 0
0
 44′ to 10 11′ West of the Greenwich Meridian 
and stretches about 21 kilometres along the coastline with about 13 kilometres inland. 
In terms of land area, the district covers an area of 612 Square Kilometres which is 
bounded to the West and Northwest by Abura-Asebu-Kwamankese District to the North 
by Ajumako Enyan Essiam District and Assin South District, to the East by Gomoa 
District and to the South by the Atlantic Ocean (see figure 4.2). The district is a low 
lying area with an elevation lower than 60 metres above sea level and has a number of 
rivers and lagoons which run into the sea (MDA, 2006). However, these rivers such as 
Otchi and Narkwa have been polluted by human activities such as washing, bathing and 
dumping of solid and liquid waste.  
 
Again, with its proximity to the Atlantic Ocean, the district has a relatively mild 
temperature that ranges between 24
o
C and 28
o
C, but with a relatively high (70%) 
humidity.  The Mfantseman district can be classified into two zones: Coastal Savanna 
and Interior Forest Zone. These two zones experience different rainfall patterns. The 
Coastal Savanna tends to have relatively lower rain fall and has an annual rainfall  
between 90cm and 110cm compared to the Interior Forest Zone where annual rainfall 
ranges between 110cm and 160cm. According to the MDA (2006), the Mfantseman 
District was once a forest area, but bad environmental practices such as bush burning 
and cutting of timber contributed significantly in destroying the forest. For example, in 
the interior areas of Akobima, Dominase, Kyeakor and the neighbouring rural 
communities, there is evidence that valuable timber have been cut, creating devastating 
effect on farmlands.  However, there are still pockets of relatively dense forest areas in 
the hinterland. The long coast line and pockets of forest areas in the district have 
enabled both fishing and farming activities to thrive.  The cultivation of crops like 
cocoa, cocoa yam, oil palm, pineapples and plantain has been made possible due to 
favourable conditions in the forest areas. Further, the district is endowed with 
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significant deposits of natural resources such as kaolin, ceramic material and oil which 
when exploited could expand the economic opportunities of the district. 
 
There are 168 settlements in the district with only about 24% of its population living in 
urban areas making Mfantseman a rural district (GSS, 2005a).  For ease of political 
administration, the district has been divided into four functional administrative 
hierarchies with the district capital Saltpond as the first level, Mankessim at the second 
level; Anomabo, the third level; and fourth level is Yamoransa. Even though Saltpond is 
the district capital, it is not as densely populated as Mankessim which acccounts for 
about 16.7% of the total population. Mankessim is a commercial centre and acts as a 
central point for all commercial activities in the district.  Table 5.1 indicates the top 
twenty settlements in the district. 
 
Table 5.1: Population of top twenty settlements in the Mfantseman District 
TOWN 
 
TOTAL 
POPULATION 
MALE  
POPULATION 
FEMALE 
POPULATION 
Mankessim 25, 481 11, 511 13, 970 
Saltpond 16, 212 7, 302 8, 910 
Anomabo 9, 437 4, 290 5, 147 
Biriwa  7, 737 3, 696 4, 041 
Kormantse  6, 296 2, 947 3, 347 
Narkwa 5, 859 2, 721 3, 138 
Otuam (Tantum) 5, 093 2,523 2, 570 
Asaafa 4, 273 1, 941 2, 332 
Abandze 3, 354 1, 636 1, 718 
Baifikrom 2, 805 1, 336 1, 461 
Kyeakor 2, 231 1, 023 1, 208 
Dominase 2, 193 1, 005 1, 188 
Yamoransa 2, 080 1, 038 1, 042 
Immuna 1, 784 753 1, 031 
Ekumpoano 1,779 777 1, 002 
Essarkyir 1, 682 740 942 
Abor 1, 556 714 842 
Eyisam 1, 452 612 840 
Essuehyia 1, 429 645 784 
Ekrawfo 1, 367 593 774 
Source: GSS, 2000 
 
 In terms of educational administration, the district has been divided into eight 
educational circuits: Saltpond, Mankessim, Eyisam, Yamoransa, Essarkyir, Dominase, 
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Anomabo and Ekumfi Narkwa. (refer to page 71 to see a map of the Mfantseman 
District)  
Apart from Dominase Circuit, all the educational circuits are partly coastal areas. In 
terms of number of basic schools, available data indicate a total of 288 public basic 
schools excluding senior secondary and vocational schools, while private basic schools 
totalled 113 in the district (MDA, 2006). This makes the ratio of the number of public 
basic schools to private about 3:1 compared to an enrolment ratio of 5:1 in the district. 
Since the number of private schools reported in MDA (2006) are those officially 
recognized, this ratio could well increase for private schools if all unregistered private 
schools are considered. This study focused on public and private basic schools in two 
rural educational circuits: Dominase and Narkwa. Two public and three private schools 
were chosen from Dominase circuit, while the only two schools in Narkwa , one public 
and one private school were selected from Narkwa circuit. Clearly, the total sample of 
schools is very small. However, the reason guiding the selection of schools was not 
simply a question of the number of schools, but rather the study was interested in 
looking at public and private schools in clearly defined communities that were 
proximate to each other. This was required to understand the complexities of 
households‟ schooling decisions within the communities.  Table 5.2 indicates number of 
schools by circuit in 2005/2006.  
 
Table 5.2: Number of basic schools by circuit, 2005/2006 
Public Schools 
Circuit Nursery Primary JHS Total 
Saltpond 12 16 13 44 
Anomabo 17 18 17 54 
Mankessim 13 16 15 45 
Dominase 9 9 7 25 
Narkwa 9 12 10 31 
Essarkyir 13 13 11 37 
Yamoransa 8 8 4 20 
Eyisam 12 16 10 38 
Total 93 108 87 288 
 Private Schools Total 
Saltpond 4 5 3 12 
Anomabo 7 7 4 18 
Mankessim 16 15 9 40 
Dominase 3 3 2 8 
Narkwa 6 6 2 14 
Essarkyir 3 3 3 9 
Yamoransa 3 3 1 7 
Eyisam 2 2 1 5 
Total 44 44 25 113 
Source: Mfantseman District Assembly (MDA), 2006. 
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In short, as a rural district, Mfantseman is faced with economic and social deprivation 
(GSS, 2005b), with the extent of deprivation severe among the interior rural 
communities that depend on seasonal subsistence farming and fishing. Narkwa and 
Dominase educational circuits are examples of such communities, which have relatively 
low ratios of public to low fee private schools and some households are having the 
opportunity to choose between these school types. Since the costs of education 
constitute a barrier to the poor households‟ access to education in Ghana (Oduro, 2000; 
Boateng, 2005; GNECC, 2005), it raises the issue of whether or not the poor in these 
study communities have real choice, and if they do, how are they able to afford the costs 
of schooling. The next section provides a socio-economic profile of the study 
communities using the survey data on households that have children in school in order 
to understand how households respond to the demand for private schooling.   
 
5.4 Mapping the households 
The discussions on Mfantseman so far have focused on macro indicators to provide its 
socio-economic, geo-political and administrative characteristics. However, a much 
deeper analysis focusing on micro level data on the demographic, social and economics 
characteristics of households is required to explain the extent to which characteristics of 
geographical communities in these rural areas might interact to impact on access to 
schooling (see Figure 4.3 for relative location of study communities). Thus, three 
interior rural communities: Eku in Narkwa circuit; and Domaa and Kokodo in 
Dominase circuit were selected for in-depth micro analysis. Thus, the analyses that 
follow represent the socio-economic profile of households that have enrolled their 
children in school in the study communities. 
 
5.4.1 Household composition by sex and status 
A typical Ghanaian household is made up of the head, spouse, children, other relatives 
and non-relatives (GSS, et al., 2004). Table 5.3 shows the composition of household 
members in study rural communities. Household head constitutes about a fifth (19.6%) 
of household members. In terms of gender, male heads are about a fifth (22.6%) of the 
total number of males in the household compared to female heads representing 16.6% 
of total female members. Male heads appeared not to live with their spouses in the same 
household compared to female heads. Across communities there are more female 
household members in Eku and Domaa (50.5% and 51.7% respectively), but with a 
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greater proportion of male household members (52.2%) in Kokodo. The large 
proportion of male household heads in Kokodo could be explained by it being a 
predominantly Moslem community where men are often the household heads, while the 
large proportion of female household members in Eku might be explained by large 
number of men embarking on migrant fishing. However, it is not too clear what might 
explain that of Domaa. Probably with the route to Kumasi 
16
 passing through the 
community, men looking for better opportunities migrate to the big city. Informal 
interviews with school heads reveal that some parents who migrate with their children 
do return with the children to re-enrol at school, while others do not when they find a 
better employment opportunity elsewhere. Consequently, in the fishing community, 
lack of sustained attendance and seasonal school dropout appears to be a common 
phenomenon.  
 
Among the children in the households that were not married (unmarried children), 
biological children of household heads constitute almost about half (47.3%) the total 
household members with a greater proportion being males. Unmarried children fostered 
(2%) or adopted (0.1%) constitute an insignificant proportion of number of children in 
the household. This observation is not surprising because the practice of fostering out of 
rural area to urban area is more common phenomenon than vice versa and is consistent 
with similar findings in Ghana by Glewwe and Jacoby in 1994. However, the number of 
grand children is proportionately higher (about 7%) than the combined number of 
fostered and adopted (2.1%) children in the households. A cursory observation of 
households in the communities indicate that most of these grandparents are either too 
old or weak to provide the kind of support children need, consequently children under 
such caregivers might run the risk of irregular school attendance or dropping out of 
school. Other relatives and non-relatives of household heads constitute less than 6% of 
household members.  In the rural areas where there used to be a significant proportion 
of household members other than the biological children of the household heads (GSS, 
2005a), the proportion of other relatives and non-relatives (6%) is clearly an indication 
of the changing dynamics of the family system. 
 
 
                                                          
16
 Kumasi is the second largest city in Ghana 
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Table: 5.3: Percentage of household composition by relationship to household  
       head, sex  and community 
Household composition Male Female Total 
Household head 22.6 16.6 19.6 
Spouse 3.1 17.2 10.2 
Married child 9.6 6.7 8.2 
Unmarried child (biological) 49.4 45.1 47.3 
Unmarried child (fostered or cared 
for) 
 
2.5 
 
1.4 
 
2.0 
Unmarried child (adopted) 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Grand child 8.4 5.4 6.9 
Father/Mother 1.7 4.4 3.1 
Father in-law/Mother in-law 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Brother/Sister 1.0 1.1 1.1 
Brother in-law/sister in-law/other 
relatives 
 
0.6 
 
1.0 
 
0.8 
Servants/employee/ other non-
relative 
 
0.6 
 
0.3 
 
0.4 
 
Total 
N 
 
100 
1,368 
 
100 
1,380 
 
100 
2,748 
 
Community 
   
Eku  49.5 50.5 100 
Domaa  48.3 51.7 100 
Kokodo 52.2 47.8 100 
    
N=2,748, Missing cases=12 
Source: Field Data, 2008   
 
However, it is important to note that, even though children constitute more than half the 
total household members, each household has a mean of two children actually in school 
(Table 5.4). Generally, about a quarter of the households (26%) have two children in 
school, and about a fifth with one and three in school. Households with four children 
constitute 16.5%, and about one of every ten households has five children in school. A 
larger proportion of children in school per household is more evident in Domaa and 
Kokodo. As can be seen, in Domaa one out of every ten households has five children in 
school, while in Kokodo almost a fifth (17.9%) of the households have five children in 
school. The large proportion of children in school per household in Kokodo could be 
attributed to the large proportion of Moslem household heads that tend to favour large 
family sizes.  
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Table 5.4: Percentage of the children in household actually in school 
 Source: Field Data, 2008 
 
Even though the mean child in school per household is two, it is evident that across 
communities, Domaa and Kokodo tend to have more children per household in school 
than in Eku. Clearly, the size of the household and the number of children that are in 
school could influence how household respond to the demand and choice of schooling 
(Colclough, et. al., 2003). 
 
5.4.2 Household head characteristics 
The household head whether male or female assumes the role of a manager of the 
household. Thus, to understand micro issues such as resource allocation decisions and 
choices within a community, particularly in the rural areas, the household head is 
considered key.  
Table 5.5 shows the percentage of household head by sex, religion and schooling 
decision. As noted earlier, there are more male heads (58.6%) than female heads 
(41.4%).  Eku and Domaa communities have more than half of the household heads 
being males, while Kokodo has more than two thirds of the heads being males. The 
large proportion of male heads in Kokodo (72%) could be due to greater proportion of 
Moslem households compared to the other communities. 
 
 
 
Household characteristics 
 
  
Community 
(%) 
Eku Domaa Kokodo Total 
Children in school 
            one 
            two 
           three 
           four 
           five 
           six 
           seven 
Total 
 
Overall Total                                  
Mean 
 
36.8 
25.4 
20.6 
9.6 
4.8 
2.2 
0.4 
100 
 
466 
 2 
 
17.4 
30.5 
24.2 
17.4 
10.5 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
 
519 
2.7 
 
9.4 
19.7 
23.9 
26.5 
17.9 
2.6 
0.0 
100 
 
283 
2.4 
 
23.9 
26.0 
22.9 
16.5 
9.7 
1.5 
0.2 
100 
 
1,268 
2.4 
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Table 5.5: Percentage of household head by sex, religion and schooling decision maker 
 Source: Field Data, 2008 
 
Generally, four out of every five households head are Christian (82.9%), Moslems 
constitute just 13.6%, representing about one tenth of households. Traditional and other 
religions constitute less than 4%. While studies of the impact of religion on household 
demand for schooling in developing countries have shown inconsistent results 
(Colclough, et al., 2003), the large proportion of Christian household heads (83%) could 
impact on household schooling decisions and choices. To the question who takes the 
decision to enrol a child in school, almost all household heads (99.6%) indicated that 
they were responsible for that decision. Even though male heads were in the majority 
(59%), but there were about 41% female household heads some of whom  owned 
relatively large farms or undertook food processing and petty businesses. These are 
women with economic capital who could therefore influence the schooling decision of 
children in the household (Al-Samarai and Peasgood, 1998). Only 1.3% in Eku reported 
that members other than the household head were responsible for deciding on whether 
or not the child goes to school. This suggests that in the study communities household 
heads are the key factor on household schooling decisions.  
 
 
 
 
Household characteristics 
 
 
Community 
(%) 
Eku 
 
Domaa 
 
Kokodo Total 
Sex  of household head 
     Male 
     Female 
Total 
 
 
51.1 
48.9 
100 
 
59.4 
40.6 
100 
 
72.0 
28.0 
100 
 
58.6 
41.4 
100 
Religion of  household head 
     Christianity 
     Islam 
     Traditional 
     Other 
Total 
 
86.1 
7.4 
5.6 
0.9 
100 
 
97.3 
1.1 
1.6 
0.0 
100 
 
54.2 
45.0 
0.8 
0.0 
100 
 
82.9 
13.6 
3.2 
0.4 
100 
 
Decision to enrol a child in school 
     Household head 
     Other (Aunt/Uncle) 
Total 
 
 
98.7 
1.3 
100 
 
 
100 
00 
100 
 
 
100 
0.0 
100 
 
 
99.6 
0.4 
100 
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5.4.3 Marital Status of household head 
Table 5.6 shows that a greater proportion of the households (64.6%) are headed by 
currently married persons, followed by never married persons who constitute almost a 
fifth (17.7%) of household heads. Widowed and divorced household heads put together 
constitute almost a fifth (17.8%) of household heads, but with more female head 
widowed or divorced than male heads across communities. The large proportion of 
female head either widowed or divorced could be explained by the higher remarriages 
among men after the death of a spouse. This finding is consistent with the GSS (2005a; 
2005b) where it has been argued that probably more young women marry older men 
who die and leave them widowed.    
 
Table 5.6: Percentage of household head marital status 
 Source: Field Data, 2008 
 
Moreover, being a polygamous society, a household head with more than one wife may 
not be considered widowed even if one of his wives dies. But considering that most 
women‟s economic survival depends on their men‟s harvest from the farm or sea, 
female household heads widowed, divorced or separated are likely to encounter 
economic hardships and hence this could affect their ability to support their children‟s 
schooling and the type of school they choose.  The likely impact of the gender of 
household head on school choice and educational expenditure of the household will  be 
explored in later analyses. 
 
 
 
 
Marital status of household 
head 
 
 
Community (%) 
Eku 
 
Male     Female 
Domaa 
 
Male     Female 
Kokodo 
 
Male     Female 
 
 
Total 
Never married 
Currently married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Separated 
N/A 
Total 
N 
24.1           19.4 
67.2           46.3 
6.0             20.4 
0.9             13.0 
0.9             0.9 
0.9             0.0 
100           100 
116           108 
3.6            3.9 
86.5         31.6 
0.9           17.1 
3.6           21.1 
5.4           26.3 
0.0           0.0 
100         100 
111         76 
2.4           12.1 
92.9        45.5 
3.6          15.2 
0.0          24.2 
0.0           0.0 
1.2          3.0 
100         100 
84            33 
17.7 
64.6 
9.7 
8.1 
5.3 
0.6 
100 
528 
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5.4.4 Housing  
The type of dwelling, number of living rooms and facilities a dwelling has could 
provide a basis for understanding households‟ economic status. Households with fewer 
living rooms compared to the number of occupants could be a source of spread of 
communicable diseases. In addition, absence or inadequate sanitary facilities including 
toilets pose health hazards to household members. Table 5.7 indicates that most 
dwellings (44.9%) are semi-detached and about a third are separate houses mostly made 
from mud. Again, almost one out of every ten households lives in a hut or tent. Those 
living in huts and tents are most likely to be households in the lowest income group in 
the rural communities. Moreover, the number of living rooms each household has 
ranges from 1-20, with about a quarter (24%) of the households having two living 
rooms and almost a fifth with just a single room. Generally, the number of living rooms 
ranging between 1-2, constitute about a third of all the households in the rural 
communities, while a quarter of the households had between 3-4 living rooms. Across 
communities, over half (58.5%) of households in Eku have between 1-2 living rooms, 
while Domaa and Kokodo have  a quarter and a third of the households respectively 
with  1-2 living rooms. It is important to note that most living rooms serve dual 
purposes of sleeping and  living, and according to GSS (2005b) over half (54.9%) of the 
total population of the Mfantseman District have just a sleeping room. Clearly, these 
housing conditions reflect the relatively low economic status of most households and 
would be used to explain later analysis. 
 
 In terms of ownership of dwellings, majority (57%) of the households owned their 
houses. This is a common phenomenon in rural areas probably because most of these 
buildings are made from mud or thatch, and may not be too costly compared with a 
cement block buildings. But even where a household does not own the house, the 
extended family provides rooms for members who have no houses of their own and this 
is evidence by about a third (31.3%) of the households living in family property. Only 
about one out of every ten households (11.7%) in these rural communities rent their 
house. Since renting a house is not a common practice among indigenous people in rural 
communities in Ghana, it is most probable that those renting are either migrant workers 
or government sector workers including teachers and community health workers. 
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Table 5.7: Housing characteristics of rural communities 
 
Source: Field Data, 2008.     N=526, Missing cases =10 
 
Again, in the rural areas, houses are built often without the basic facilities such as 
toilets. Table 5.7 indicates that almost all the houses were built without toilet facilities. 
A greater proportion of households in these three rural communities used pit latrine 
(38%), the fields and beaches (37.8%), with almost a fifth (18.4 %) using the Kumasi 
Ventilated Improved Pit (KVIP). Only about 2% of all the households use flush toilets. 
Across communities, a greater proportion (76.9%) of households in farming and fishing 
Percentage distribution of households by household characteristics and communities 
 
Household characteristics 
 
 
Housing 
Dwelling of rural Community (%) 
 
Eku Domaa Kokodo Total 
Type of Dwelling 
     Separate house 
     Semi-detached 
     Flat/Apartment 
     Hut 
     Tent 
     Living quarters attached to office/shop 
     Compound 
Total 
 
30.1 
45.9 
5.7 
12.6 
0.9 
0.0 
4.8 
100 
 
39.8 
31.2 
12.9 
7.0 
0.0 
1.6 
7.5 
100 
 
31.6 
65.0 
1.7 
0.9 
0.0 
0.9 
0.0 
100 
 
33.8 
44.9 
7.3 
8.1 
0.4 
0.8 
4.7 
100 
Number of living rooms in the dwelling 
     One 
     Two 
     Three 
     Four 
     Five 
     Six 
     Seven 
     Eight 
     Nine 
     Ten-Twenty 
Total  
 
26.2 
32.3 
15.3 
8.3 
3.1 
4.8 
1.7 
2.6 
0.9 
4.8 
100 
 
10.2 
16.7 
13.4 
15.6 
7.5 
7.5 
8.6 
4.8 
4.3 
11.4 
100 
 
14.0 
19.3 
19.3 
13.2 
7.9 
6.1 
4.4 
4.4 
0.0 
11.4 
100 
 
18.0 
24.0 
15.5 
11.9 
5.7 
6.0 
4.7 
3.8 
1.9 
8.5 
100 
 
House ownership 
     Owns it fully 
     Rents it 
     Family property 
Total 
 
46.7 
8.3 
45.0 
100 
 
54.3 
17.2 
28.5 
100 
 
81.7 
9.6 
8.7 
100 
 
57.0 
11.7 
31.3 
100 
 
 Toilet used by household 
     Flush toilet 
     Pit latrine 
     KVIP 
     Bucket                                                       
      Fields/Beach 
 Total 
 
1.3 
2.6 
11.8 
7.4 
7. 
100 
 
4.3 
73.1 
16.1 
1.1 
 
100 
 
0.9 
51.3 
35.0 
0.0 
12.8 
100 
 
2.3 
38.0 
18.4 
3.6 
3.100 
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community (Eku) use the fields and beach as toilets, while Domaa and Kokodo, which 
are mainly farming communities use the pit latrine constituting 73.1% and 51.3% 
respectively of the households. Indiscriminate defecating at the beach or the bush poses 
health hazards to the community as it could lead to the outbreak of diseases including 
cholera and dysentery. A baseline report from the Mfantseman district corroborates this 
observation-malaria, stomach upset, and bilharzia were found to be common health 
problems impacting children‟s school attendance and performance (Ampiah, 2007).  
Clearly, the analyses show that in the study communities, lack of basic human needs 
such as clean water and quality physical environment such as housing and toilet 
facilities is a common place. According to the World Health Organisation (2010) these 
are all indicators of the level of poverty and the housing profile in rural Mfantseman fits 
this classification. However, within the communities there are some who have good 
housing facilities and could represent the small percentage of households that have the 
capacity to make a school choice. 
 
5.4.5 Energy source and use  
 As part of its strategy to promote rural development, the government of Ghana over the 
years embarked on rural electrification projects. Even though not all rural communities 
today have access to electricity, the three rural communities involved in this study are 
connected to the national electricity grid. However, not all the households have 
electricity in their homes. Table 5.8 indicates that generally in all the communities, three 
out of every five households use electricity (60.6%). Across communities, only about a 
third (36%) of households in Kokodo use electricity compared to more than two thirds 
in Eku and Domaa. The commonly used cooking fuel in rural communities is wood. 
The proportion of households using wood for cooking is significantly high within and 
across communities. The use of Liquified Petroleum Gas (LP Gas) which is more 
environmentally friendly is rather negligible within and across communities. None of 
the households reported using electricity for cooking. The low use of LPG and 
electricity could be attributed to the relatively high cost involved in purchasing gas and 
using of electricity for cooking. 
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Table 5.8: Energy use by households 
 Source: Field Data, 2008; N=526, Figures are column percentages 
 
 
Generally, the housing characteristics indicate about a third of households are living in 
inappropriate housing conditions which is a clear reflection of their deprivation. 
However, within this deprivation, there are some households (60%) that use electricity. 
A clear indication that not all are very poor and therefore may have the capacity to 
undertake school choice.  
 
5.4.6 Sources and access to water supply 
The provision and access to potable water supply is a prerequisite for reducing water 
borne disease among members of households particularly children. Whether households 
would be able to avoid water borne diseases such as bilharzia, cholera, diarrhoea, guinea 
worm and typhoid depend on the extent to which households can access potable water. 
A greater proportion (65.5%) of people having access to pipe borne water in 
Mfantseman lives in urban areas (GSS, 2005). Since the majority of about 76% of the 
populations in Mfantseman live in rural areas, it stands to reason that a greater 
proportion of the population may not have access to potable drinking water.  Table 5.9 
indicates households‟ sources and distance to water supply. The main source of water 
supply in these rural communities is from borehole (50.9%), but across communities 
households in mainly farming communities (Domaa and Kokodo) have about 72% and 
83.8% of households respectively having borehole as their main sources of water. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Household housing characteristics Community (%) 
 
 Eku Domaa  Kokodo  Total 
Electricity 
     Yes 
     No 
Total 
 
60.2 
39.8 
100 
 
76.2 
23.8 
100 
 
36.0 
64.0 
100 
 
60.6 
39.4 
100 
Fuel for cooking 
     Wood 
     Charcoal 
     Gas 
     Wood and charcoal 
Total 
 
87.4 
6.1 
1.3 
5.2 
100 
 
77.4 
7.5 
1.1 
14.0 
100 
 
98.3 
0.9 
0.0 
0.9 
100 
 
86.3 
5.5 
0.9 
7.3 
100 
101 
 
 
Table 5.9: Sources and distance to water supply 
 Source: Field Data, 2008; N=531 
 
In Eku where fishing and farming are major economic activities, just a little below a 
fifth of the households (17.3%) derive their water from borehole. The main sources of 
water supply of households in Eku are unprotected well and rain water, constituting 
21.6% and 19.9% respectively. In all, about one out of ten households (11%) use 
unprotected well as its sources of water supply. 
 
To the question of whether drinking water comes from the same sources as bathing and 
washing water, the data revealed that more than two thirds (72%) of all the households 
mostly used the same source of water for drinking, washing and bathing, while about a 
quarter of the households (24.2%) used water from different sources to meet the 
 
Percentage distribution of households by household characteristics and communities 
Household Housing characteristics 
 
Water  
Community (%) 
 
Eku Domaa  Kokodo Total 
Source of water most often used in this 
household for drinking  
Piped into dwelling or compound 
Borehole 
Protected Well 
Unprotected Well 
Rain water 
River/lake/pond/stream 
Vendor/truck/sachet 
Rain and unprotected well 
Piped into dwelling/rain water 
Protected well and rain water 
Total 
 
 
4.8 
17.3 
16.0 
21.6 
19.9 
3.0 
0.4 
12.1 
4.3 
0.4 
100 
 
 
2.7 
72.0 
11.3 
4.3 
2.2 
6.5 
0.0 
0.0 
1.1 
0.0 
100 
 
 
0.9 
83.8 
12.0 
0.9 
0.0 
2.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100 
 
 
3.2 
50.9 
13.5 
11.0 
9.4 
4.1 
0.2 
5.2 
2.2 
0.2 
100 
Water used for drinking come from the same 
source as the water used for bathing and 
washing 
Mostly yes 
Sometimes 
Mostly no 
N/A 
Total 
 
 
 
40.9 
3.5 
54.8 
0.9 
100 
 
 
 
94.6 
4.3 
1.1 
0.0 
100 
 
 
 
97.4 
1.7 
0.9 
0.0 
100 
 
 
 
72.0 
3.4 
24.2 
0.4 
100 
Distance ( metres ) to fetch water (one way) 
Less than 20m 
20m – less than 100m 
100m – less than 500m 
500m – less than 1km 
1km – less than 3km 
3km – more than 3km 
N/A 
Total 
 
15.7 
13.1 
41.9 
16.2 
12.2 
0.4 
0.4 
100 
 
45.9 
23.2 
21.1 
6.5 
2.7 
0.5 
0.0 
100 
 
52.1 
30.8 
6.8 
7.7 
1.7 
0.9 
0.0 
100 
 
34.3 
20.5 
26.9 
10.9 
6.6 
0.6 
0.2 
100 
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household‟s water needs. Across communities, two out of every five households  
(40.9%) in Eku used same source of water for all household needs, while four out of 
every five households in Domaa and Kokodo use the same sources of water for all 
domestic needs. Eku appears to be facing more difficulty in accessing potable water 
supply and thus tends to depend on three main sources of water supply: borehole, 
unprotected well and rain water. With about a quarter of households in Eku depending 
on unprotected sources of water, it could have serious health implications for 
households and children school attendance (Ampiah, 2007).  
 
Distance from household to water sources also deserves mention because of its potential 
impact on children‟s regular school attendance and completion. In all, a third of 
households (34.3%) travel less than twenty metres to fetch water, constituting 15.7%, 
45.9% and 52.1% of households across Eku, Domaa and Kokodo respectively.  A fifth 
(20.5%) of households travel between 20 metres and 100 metres, while a quarter 
(26.9%) of all households with majority (41.9%) from Eku travels between 100 metres 
and 500 metres. One out of every ten households in Kokodo travels between 1kilometre 
and less than three kilometres. In all, 7.4% of households travel between 1 kilometre 
and 6 kilometres. While this proportion (7.4%) appears to be small, long distances to 
water sites away from home could impact negatively on children‟s schooling.  
 
In short, almost 10% of households live in hut or tents, while those living in houses 
have an average of two living rooms per household most of which have no toilet 
facilities. In addition, about 10% of households consume water from unprotected wells. 
Health hazards due to poor sanitation and lack of potable water could subsequently 
impact on household income earning and children‟s ability to attend school regularly 
and active participation in classroom activities (Ampiah, 2007). Lack of potable water, 
poor housing and absence of toilet facilities are all indicators of poverty and this profile 
fits in well with the study communities. Thus, households with the above housing 
characteristics are most likely to be the poorest and this has implications for the 
decisions and choices they would make with regards to schooling.  
  
5.4.7 Educational attainment of household members 
Education is well known for raising economic opportunities, enhanced understanding 
and better appreciation of issues in the society. This link between education and 
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development has been well documented (Psacharopoulos and Woodhall, 1985; Rose 
and Dyer, 2006). Therefore, in the rural communities, all other things being equal, the 
higher the educational attainment of its members, the better economic opportunities the 
community will have. In addition, a well informed community will be able to make 
more rational decisions and choices concerning their lives including schooling 
decisions. Table 5.10 shows the percentage of household members‟ educational 
attainment by sex, grade, age and community. A significant proportion of household 
members have never enrolled at school. 
 
 In Eku, about two thirds (62%) of household members have never been to school 
compared to about a third (32%) in Domaa and about a fifth (19.8%) in Kokodo. The 
proportion of household members in Domaa that have completed schooling is 16.6%, 
while Kokodo which has the least proportion of never enrolled has only 3.4% of its 
members with completed schooling.  Evidently, being a predominantly fishing and 
farming community, Eku has its members with the least educational attainment, with 
about two thirds of households members never enrolled and 5.2% completed schooling. 
Kokodo with the least never enrolled had the least school completers (3.4%), this could 
be the result of drop out as children progress through the grades.  
 
 Of the 68 male household members who have completed schooling, a greater 
proportion (45.6%) is within the ages of 41-90 years, compared to 56 females with a 
majority of completers (37.5%) within the age group 26-40 years. Therefore, among the 
age groups, females complete schooling at a younger age than males, but have overall 
lower school completion than males. This could be probably explained by the age of 
entry - it appears boys enter schooling later than girls, but once enrolled boys are more 
likely to stay on till completion.  This pattern of school completion could influence 
schooling decisions and choices of boys and girls.  
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Table 5.10: Percentage of household Members’ Highest Educational Attainment by Sex, Age, Grade and Community 
Age No 
education 
Pre-
school 
Primary 
/grade 1 
Primary 
/grade 2 
Primary 
/grade 3 
Primary 
/grade 4 
Primary 
/grade 5 
Primary 
/grade 6 
JSH 
/grade 
7 
JHS 
/grade 
8 
JHS 
/grade 
9 
completed N/A Total 
Male               
1-3 9.4 8.6 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 10.5 3.0 
4-5 6.3 27.4 NA 0.9 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 2.6 4.8 
6-15 18.8 59.4 84.1 67.5 37.7 70.9 53.3 44.8 21.9 23.1 10.6 NA 47.4 43.8 
16-18 3.1 1.7 4.3 16.7 22.1 8.9 33.3 33.3 26.0 25.6 8.5 7.4 10.5 12.1 
19-25 4.9 0.6 1.2 2.6 8.2 5.1 4.4 4.6 9.6 25.6 6.4 13.2 0.0 5.2 
26-40 16.1 0.0 4.3 4.4 12.3 6.3 2.2 8.0 16.4 7.7 24.5 33.8 5.3 10.5 
41-90 41.5 2.3 6.1 7.9 19.7 8.9 6.7 9.2 26.0 17.9 50.0 45.6 23.7 20.5 
Total 
N 
100 
224 
100 
175 
100 
164 
100 
114 
100 
122 
100 
79 
100 
45 
100 
87 
100 
73 
100 
39 
100 
94 
100 
68 
100 
38 
100 
1,322 
 
Female 
              
1-3 5.4 5.8 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 5.7 2.4 
4-5 1.1 27.6 0.8 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.8 3.7 
6-15 9.7 56.4 79.7 60.2 35.9 68.8 69.2 45.8 37.7 29.8 8.6 `14.3 24.5 37.9 
16-18 1.9 0.0 0.8 9.7 23.1 10.4 13.5 22.9 14.8 29.8 14.3 5.4 9.4 8.4 
19-25 2.7 2.6 2.3 4.3 9.0 3.9 9.6 6.3 13.1 4.3 5.7 28.6 3.8 5.5 
26-40 32.9 4.5 7.0 17.2 19.2 10.4 3.8 16.7 21.3 27.7 38.6 37.5 32.1 21.4 
41-90 46.4 3.2 9.4 8.6 12.8 6.5 3.8 8.3 13.1 8.5 32.9 14.3 20.8 20.6 
Total 
N 
100 
371 
100 
156 
100 
128 
100 
93 
100 
78 
100 
77 
100 
52 
100 
96 
100 
61 
100 
47 
100 
70 
100 
56 
100 
53 
100 
1338 
Community               
Eku  62.0 0.4 3.5 7.4 11.4 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.7 1.7 0.4 5.2 4.4 100 
Domaa  32.0 1.1 5.0 1.1 5.0 2.2 0.6 6.6 2.8 3.3 21.0 16.6 2.8 100 
Kokodo 19.8 3.4 16.4 1.7 1.7 6.9 0.9 7.8 8.6 5.2 22.4 3.4 1.7 100 
N=526, Number of household members=2,659, Missing cases=10 
NA= Not Applicable 
 
Source: Field Data, 2008 
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There are more never enrolled female (351) household members than males (224). 
However the proportion of never enrolled school age children between ages 4-15 years 
is represented by more males (25.1%) than females (9.8%). Also, the proportion of  
household members by gender who have attained grade 6 is almost the same for male 
(44.8%) and female (45.8%). However beyond grade 6, this proportion declines for both 
male and female.  
 
This pattern of educational attainment where fewer household members progress 
through to higher grades has a potential disincentive to a household‟s investment in 
education. This is because recurring poor educational attainment could lower the 
interest of some households in education and thus favour to opt out of schooling or a 
search for alternative providers of education.  
 
Besides, if household members continue to have lower educational attainment, this may 
lead to lower aspirations particularly among children due to lack of school completers in 
their communities who could serve as role models. Given that the private schools are 
generally perceived as providing better quality education (Addae-Mensah, 2000), if the 
lower attainment in the study communities comes from mainly public school children, 
this might fuel even the poor‟s interest in private provision. 
 
 Among the school going age children (4-15years), the proportion of never enrolled is 
greater among males (25.1%) than females (10.8%). However, with the varying but 
significant proportion of never enrolled household members across communities, the 
large proportion of females with higher educational attainment relative to males is 
striking as it contradicts findings in Ghana. The GSS (2005a) found that more males 
(25%) than females (21.7%) completed Middle/Junior High School in the district. But 
the fact still remains that in the three communities, achieving „meaningful‟ access still 
appears be a far off cry as a significant proportion of children of schooling age 4-15 
years (about 17%) are still not in school, while the majority have failed to complete the 
nine year basic education. This study will explore the considerations of household 
school choice decisions.  
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5.4.8 Educational attainment by main occupational activity of household members 
The level of social and economic development of a particular area hinges on the quality 
of the labour force. Thus, a society characterized by a large proportion of people with 
no education, or with a small proportion with formal education is often associated with 
a limited skilled labour force (GSS, 2005b). Since progress and innovation in society is 
achieved with a well educated skilled labour force, comparing educational attainment by 
household members in the rural communities with their main occupation is a step 
towards understanding the role education plays in locating household members into 
different occupations. Table 5.11 shows educational attainment by occupation of 
economically active members of the household. The professional groups are mainly 
those with post-basic (e.g. Senior High school) and tertiary education and are mainly 
teachers and nurses. However, some basic education graduates teach in pre-schools in 
rural areas. Due to the relatively high level of educational attainment required to enter 
the professional occupational group, only a few constituting about 2% and 1% of males 
and females respectively are professionals in the study communities. Clearly, this is a 
reflection of fewer job opportunities in these areas which require higher level of 
qualification.  
 
Generally, a greater proportion of males (23.1%) and females (36.8%) of the 
economically active members of the households is engaged in elementary unskilled 
labour such as agriculture and petty trading activities. Among those with no education, 
over two thirds (70.4%) of females are unskilled labourers, while a little over half 
(51.8%) are males. Surprisingly, elementary unskilled economic activities continue to 
constitute the major occupation even with household members who have completed 
education. About half of males (55.4%) and about 39.2% of females who have 
completed basic and elementary schooling are engaged in elementary unskilled labour 
activities. These groups of males and females might have completed schooling but 
probably do not have the requisite skills in numeracy and verbal abilities to enter the 
secondary or tertiary sectors of the economy. Indeed, if it is argued that educational 
attainment is supposed to equip individuals to engage in skilled labour activities, then 
the large proportion of school completers in elementary unskilled occupation in these 
rural communities could serve as a great disincentive to poor households that intend to 
invest in education with the view of entering into professional skilled occupation.
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Table 5.11: Educational attainment by occupation of economically active members of the household 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Field Data, 2008 
 
 
 
No 
education 
Pre-
school 
Primary 
/grade 1 
Primary 
/grade 2 
Primary 
/grade 3 
Primary 
/grade 4 
Primary 
/grade 5 
Primary 
/grade 6 
JSH 
/grade 
7 
JHS 
/grade 
8 
JHS 
/grade 
9 
Completed N/A Total 
Male               
Professional 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.1 10.8 0.0 1.9 
Technician, 
Associate 
professional 
 
1.3 
 
0.0 
 
1.9 
 
0.9 
 
4.1 
 
2.6 
 
2.2 
 
3.4 
 
5.5 
 
10.5 
 
12.8 
 
13.8 
 
0.0 
 
3.6 
Clerk 0.9 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 5.3 3.2 3.1 0.0 0.8 
Elementary 
unskilled 
occupations 
 
51.8 
 
1.1 
 
8.8 
 
10.8 
 
22.0 
 
12.8 
 
4.4 
 
8.0 
 
34.2 
 
15.8 
 
37.2 
 
55.4 
 
31.3 
 
23.1 
Retired 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.2 
N/A 46.0 98.9 88.8 88.3 73.2 84.6 93.3 87.4 60.3 68.4 27.7 15.4 68.8 70.3 
Total 
N 
100 
224 
100 
175 
100 
160 
100 
111 
100 
123 
100 
78 
100 
45 
100 
87 
100 
73 
100 
38 
100 
94 
100 
65 
100 
32 
100 
1,305 
 
Female 
              
Professional 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 11.4 2.0 0.0 0.8 
Technician, 
Associate 
professional 
 
1.9 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
2.6 
 
2.6 
 
0.0 
 
2.2 
 
5.4 
 
12.5 
 
0.0 
 
7.8 
 
0.0 
 
2.0 
Clerk 1.1 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.8 0.0 11.4 5.9 0.0 1.4 
Elementary 
unskilled 
occupations 
 
70.4 
 
10.4 
 
12.6 
 
26.4 
 
29.5 
 
19.5 
 
9.8 
 
21.7 
 
33.9 
 
14.6 
 
44.3 
 
39.2 
 
51.9 
 
36.8 
Retired 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 
N/A 26.1 89.6 86.6 73.6 67.9 77.9 90.2 73.9 58.9 72.9 32.9 45.1 48.1 59.0 
Total 
N 
100 
371 
100 
154 
100 
127 
100 
87 
100 
78 
100 
77 
100 
51 
100 
92 
100 
56 
100 
48 
100 
70 
100 
51 
100 
54 
100 
1,316 
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Even though it was argued earlier on in this section that the lack of job opportunities for 
those with completed schooling could be responsible for many school completers in 
elementary unskilled economic activities, but it could also be that these school 
completers have not acquired the requisite verbal and numeracy skills to enter the 
service and secondary sectors of the economy. This study would explore the importance 
of household occupation on their schooling decision and educational expenditure. 
 
 
5.5 Economic profile    
 
 5.5.1 Household durable goods 
 The ownership of durable consumer goods by households especially in the rural 
communities serves as an indicator by which the economic well being of households 
can be assessed (GSS et. al, 2004).  
 Table 5.12: Percentage of households possessing durable consumer goods 
 Source: Field Data, 2008.    Figures are percentages of household owning durable goods, 
N=521  
 
Households were asked to provide data on the ownership of dwelling assets including 
bed, table, refrigerator, stove/cooker, books other than school books and telephone. 
These various household assets are useful in determining the availability of food storage 
Household Characteristics 
 
Percentage of households possessing durable consumer goods 
 
 
Community 
(%) 
Eku Domaa  Kokodo Total 
Household durable goods 
Bed 
Table 
Stove/Cooker 
Refrigerator 
Fan 
Wall clock 
Wrist Watch 
Sewing Machine 
Radio 
Television set 
Telephone 
Mobile Phone 
Computer 
Bicycle 
Motor Bike 
Car 
Books other than school books 
Light source for home work 
 
88.3 
82.2 
8.3 
20.9 
25.2 
37.0 
63.5 
27.0 
55.2 
22.6 
1.3 
35.7 
0.4 
14.3 
0.0 
3.9 
65.7 
72.9 
 
93.6 
96.8 
11.8 
31.0 
39.0 
63.4 
81.3 
46.5 
85.6 
48.1 
4.3 
42.2 
4.8 
19.3 
3.2 
12.3 
81.8 
92.0 
 
89.7 
89.7 
5.1 
20.5 
29.1 
60.7 
74.4 
29.9 
76.9 
25.6 
8.5 
35.0 
0.0 
12.8 
4.3 
6.0 
50.4 
45.3 
 
90.4 
89.0 
8.8 
24.3 
30.9 
51.4 
72.1 
34.5 
70.6 
32.2 
3.9 
37.8 
1.9 
15.7 
2.1 
7.3 
68.0 
73.5 
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facilities, basic household furniture, supplementary educational materials, access to 
media and mode of transport. Table 5.12 shows the percentage of households possessing 
various durable consumer goods by community. Nine out of every ten households 
indicated that they own a bed (90.4%) and a table (89.0). Even though this large 
proportion of households owns these two items, there still remains about 10% who do 
not have this basic household furniture. These are probably households in the lowest 
decile and also the poorest. With regards to cooking and storage of food, only 8.8% 
indicated the use of cooker or stove. This is actually not surprising considering that 
energy for cooking (i.e electricity and LPgas) using a cooker or stove is not only readily 
unavailable but can also be expensive. Almost a quarter of households have 
refrigerators (24.3%). However, Eku and Kokodo reported about a fifth compared to 
Domaa which had almost a third of households owning refrigerators.  Ownership of 
radio set, television set, telephone and mobile telephone is useful in assessing household 
access to media and by extension information and communication. About two thirds 
(70.6%)  of all households own radio sets, even though Eku has a bit more than half of 
households (55.2%) possessing a radio set. While about a third of all households 
(32.2%) owned television sets. Across communities, almost about half of households 
(48.1%) in Domaa, a quarter of households (25.6%) in Kokodo and a fifth of 
households (22.6%) in Eku indicated ownership of television sets.  
 
Even though a small proportion of households (3.9%) reported ownership of a 
telephone, more than a third of all the households (37.8%) own a mobile phone, with a 
greater proportion (42.2%) in Domaa. In the areas of transport, a small proportion of 
households owned a bicycle (15.7%), a motor bike (2.1%) and a car (7.3%) and this 
could probably be because of the high cost involved in purchasing them or that some 
households do not generally have to travel a long distance.  Household ownership of a 
computer, books other than school books and a light source for home work indicates the 
extent to which children‟s schooling can be sustained. Only about 2% of households 
own a computer, with about two thirds of households owning books other than school 
books (68%) and having a light source for home work (73.5%), but there still remain 
about 30% of households which do not have lights for home work and /or own books 
apart from school books. Clearly, a significant number of households do not have these 
basic household goods which are reflections of their low economic and social status. 
Given that at least one out of every ten households do not have bed or table, while at 
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least a third (32%) do not have books other than school books and light source for 
homework, children from such households are more likely to face difficulties with their 
school work. However, in the midst of economic deprivation, some household have 
assets and these are possibly the households that have the capacity to meet the 
educational expenses of their children, particularly in the private school.  
 
 
5.5.2 Household sources of livelihood and income 
The economic activities and social networks of households in the rural areas are useful 
in determining households‟ sources of livelihood and income. Table 5.13 shows the 
percentage of households‟ sources of livelihood and income.  Three major economic 
activities and livelihood strategies were identified: own farm activities, petty trade or 
business and casual labour in agriculture. Among the three sources of income and 
livelihoods, own farm is a major contributor with more than two thirds (68.9%) of 
households engaged in farming activity and with many households producing at the 
subsistence level. Across communities, there are variations in the proportion of 
households in farming activities. Data indicate that 94.9% of households in Kokodo, 
78.6% in Domaa and 47.8% in Eku derive their livelihood and income from own farm 
activities. The relative small proportion of households engaged in their own farming 
activity in Eku, compared to the other communities, could be explained by another 
major occupation of fishing in the area. Given that own farm agriculture or fishing is 
rated as the occupation of the poor, households in such occupation may be constrained 
in their ability to choose private schooling. 
The second major economic activity is petty trade or manufacture. More than half 
(54.3%) of households, within and across communities are into petty trade or 
manufacture. However, casual labour in agriculture, which is the third most important 
source of income and livelihood indicate almost a fifth of households (18.6%) 
depending on it for their livelihood. Across communities, the proportion of households 
in casual labour in agriculture is unevenly represented, with a majority in Eku  
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 Table 5.13: Sources of household livelihood and non-employment income  
 Source: Field Data, 2008.     N=521 
 
 
(30%) compared with Domaa (4.3%) and Kokodo (17.9%). With about a third of 
households in Eku and almost a fifth of households in Kokodo depending on casual 
labour in agriculture for their livelihood, there is critical concern about households‟ 
economic survival during the dry seasons when their labour may not be required on the 
farm. Such households risk severe economic hardships. Therefore, compared with those 
in petty trading that are able to have some income through their daily sales, those 
depending on casual labour are among the poorest and therefore more likely to have 
difficulties in meeting children‟s educational expenditure. 
None of the communities had safety nets or benefit from poverty schemes, while 
interest on income or property, private transfers within and from abroad was 
insignificant as indicated (see Table 5.13). Furthermore, households were ask to indicate 
whether they have social networks (friends, relatives and well wishers) that regularly 
Percentage of sources of households‟ livelihood and non-employment income 
Household Characteristics 
 
Community (%) 
Eku Domaa Kokodo Total 
Sources of Livelihood and Income 
Own farm activities 
Casual labour in agriculture 
Casual labour (non agriculture) 
 
Wage/salary employment in agriculture 
 
Wage/salary employment (non agriculture) 
Petty business/trade/manufacture 
Major business/trade/manufacture 
Collection/foraging 
Charity/alms 
Safety net/poverty schemes 
 
Interest on income/property/rent on land 
 
Public transfers/pensions/child support grant 
Private transfers within 
 
Private transfers/remittance from abroad 
 
47.8 
30.0 
6.5 
 
0.0 
 
 
3.5 
49.1 
1.3 
0.9 
0.4 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
 
1.3 
2.2 
 
1.3 
 
78.6 
4.3 
2.1 
 
1.1 
 
 
10.2 
59.4 
9.1 
1.6 
2.1 
0.0 
 
1.1 
 
 
0.5 
0.5 
 
0.0 
 
94.9 
17.9 
3.4 
 
6.8 
 
 
4.3 
56.4 
3.4 
0.0 
0.9 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
2.6 
 
0.0 
 
68.9 
18.4 
4.3 
 
1.9 
 
 
6.0 
54.3 
4.5 
0.9 
1.1 
0.0 
 
0.4 
 
 
0.8 
1.7 
 
0.6 
 
Social network 
Yes 
No 
 
 
10.4 
33.4 
 
 
6.6 
28.4 
 
 
5.8 
15.4 
 
 
22.8 
77.2 
Support from social network 
Cash 
Kind 
 
19.4 
31.1 
 
26.2 
1.0 
 
18.4 
3.9 
 
67.6 
35.9 
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support them either in cash or kind. Even though a greater proportion of households did 
not have existing social network (77.2%), about a fifth (22.8%)  indicated they have a 
social networks that support them in cash (68%) and also in-kind by providing them 
with food stuffs and clothing (36%). While the proportion of households with social 
network is small (22.8%), the fact that 68% of household with social networks  received 
cash for schooling expenses  could  have an influence on their ability to pay for school 
expenses and hence participate in school choice. The greater proportion of households 
in Eku with a social network (10.4%) might be explained by financial and material 
support from relatives and friends who embark on migrant fishing expeditions in the 
western part of the country. Therefore, the likely impact of household characteristics 
including occupation and social network on school choice and educational expenditure 
will be explored in later analysis.  
 
5.6 Summary  
The Mfantseman district is one of the poorest districts in the Ghana, with about 60% of 
the population living below the poverty line of a dollar per adult person per day (GSS, 
2005a; MDA, 2006). Evidence from the survey of households in the three study 
communities that have already enrolled their children in school also confirms the extent 
of poverty. Several of the households possessed no assets, have no or few years of 
education and depended mainly on subsistence agriculture. Beside, only about a fifth of 
the households had social network of friends and relatives that supported their 
children‟s education. 
 Therefore, for many of these households access to education came to them at a greater 
cost than households that had regular income, assets or a social network, particularly in 
LFPSs where households were confronted with relatively high non-discretionary 
expenditures. However, in spite of the poverty conditions of the study communities, 
there are a few that have completed schooling and also have relatively stable income 
and assets. This category of households have the capacity to pay for the cost of 
education and therefore more able to enrol their children in a fee paying school of their 
choice, especially if they perceive that school to be of better quality than the other 
schools known to them.  
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The foregoing descriptive analysis has provided a detailed contextual background of the 
socio-economic conditions of households in the study communities. The emerging 
issues raised in the summary of this chapter provides a  basis for exploring how poor 
households explain their school choice decisions and whether they really receive what 
they think they are buying from the low fee private schools. In addition, the household 
direct costs of public and private schooling are examined to understand how they 
compare and also might influence access and choice of schooling. Finally, income and 
expenditure of the study LFPSs are examined to determine the extent to which they 
might be financially sustainable in future. 
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Chapter 6: Analysis of findings I 
How do poor households explain their schooling decisions? 
6.1 Introduction 
Evidence from developing countries points towards the increasing popularity of low-fee 
private schooling amongst the poor in rural areas (Sawada and Lokshin, 2001; Tooley 
and Dixon, 2007b). As indicated in chapter five, the relatively low ratio (3:1) of public 
to private schools in the district under study is an indication of the existence of the 
supply of and demand for private schooling. However, whether it is the poorest who 
access these LFPSs, as argued by Tooley (2005; 2009), Tooley and Dixon (2007a) and 
Srivastava (2008a) requires further investigation. This is because poor households‟ 
choice of schooling is inextricably linked to their ability to pay (Lewin, 2007a; Harma, 
2008), and also to other contextual factors such as information about the characteristics 
of the public and private schools in rural areas (Srivastava, 2006; 2008a).   
 
This chapter examines the schooling decisions of the poor in the three rural 
communities under study in Mfantseman district. The analysis begins by testing the 
hypothesis that school choice in rural Mfantseman was not affected by households‟ 
socio-economic conditions. If so then affordability is not a constraint. This is followed 
by additional insights into how households explained their choices. Data derived from 
interviews with household heads in the lowest income group are used to explore the 
characteristics of those who chose to enrol their children in private school only; those 
who opted for public school only; and those who decided on a mixture of both private 
and public schools (the combined option) – and how they explained the choices they 
made. Finally, the chapter summary pulls together some issues emerging from the 
analysis before drawing some conclusions. 
 
6.2 What are the main determinants of household heads’ school choice decisions in 
rural Mfantseman? 
Households involved in school choice fall into one of the three mutually exclusive 
groups at a point in time, that is, public, private, and public and private (the combined 
option). Table 6.1 lists the coefficients, which were estimated using multinomial 
regression analysis. The results are reported in „relative risk ratios‟ (RRRs) for each 
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explanatory variable, which indicate the relative likelihood of a household type with a 
given set of characteristics (when compared to the reference category for each 
characteristic) choosing private school or the combined school option compared to 
choosing public school, controlling for all other explanatory variables in the model.  
 
The statistical results show that if further children were to be enrolled in school, the 
relative likelihood of the household head enrolling some children in public and private ( 
combined option) increased by about two fold compared to enrolling in public school 
only. Evidence on the sibling effects on schooling in developing countries shows that 
the number of children in the household has a significant impact on demand and choice 
of schooling decisions such that, children with more siblings are less likely to enrol in 
school (Kingdon, 1996; Colclough et al., 2003; Harma, 2008; Rolleston, 2009). Poor 
household interested in private schooling but unable to afford the cost for all their 
children may choose a combined school option. 
 
The household‟s direct schooling expenditure per child is statistically significant on 
household school choice, after controlling for the sex of the child. The results show that 
a rise in education expenditure per child by Gh¢1 (about US$1) increases the relative 
likelihood of the household head selecting either private school only or a combination 
of public and private school as compared to public school only. Since an increase in 
education expenditure is likely to be correlated with household income and private 
school choice (Harma, 2008; Lewin, 2007a), an increase in income increases the choice 
of schooling options for the household and not just for one child. However, this 
statistical result should not be interpreted to mean the ability to afford the cost. This is 
because interviews with a sample of household heads in the lowest income group that 
had children exclusively in private school revealed that enrolling them in Low-Fee 
Private School (LFPS) implied a great sacrifice to the household. This is consistent with 
similar findings in rural India where the poor that enrolled in LFPS had to cut 
expenditure on household essential items such as food and health (Harma, 2008). 
However, the willingness of households to expend more on schooling is an indication of 
the importance they placed on education (Bray and Bunly, 2005).  
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Table 6.1: Determinants of household type school choice options at the basic level  
       in rural Mfantseman  
Outcome variable 
 School choice 
 Private only households 
Choice  = 1 
Public and private households  
Choice = 2 
 
Explanatory Variables 
RRR Z Stat RRR Z Stat 
Household heads characteristics     
       Gender (female = 1) 0.77 -0.28 0.92 --0.15 
       Age in years 0.93 -3.45*** 0.98 -1.26 
       Education in years 1.22 4.59*** 1.12 2.91*** 
      Religion (Christian = 1) 1.70 0.82 2.41 1.63 
Household characteristics     
      Social network 1.58 1.02 0.97 -0.06 
      Average schooling   
      Expenditure 
1.07 6.29*** 1.05 4.51*** 
     Distance in km 0.88 -1.35 0.96 -2.66*** 
Occupation     
Household agricultural   activities 1.18 0.39 2.86 2.44*** 
 Casual agricultural labour     
 
0.78 -0.43 1.58 0.97 
Casual non-agricultural labour 0.52 -0.84 1.18 0.27 
Petty trade/manufacture 1.26 0.68 1.87 2.06** 
Major trade/manufacture 3.67 2.11** 1.95 1.12 
 
     
 No. of children in school 
Sex of child  (female =1) 
0.75 
0.85 
-1.63 
-0.018 
1.86 
0.98 
5.10*** 
-0.04 
 
Observations = 376 
Pseudo R
2
      = 0.2753 
Notes: Base outcome – public only, (p. <0.01)***, (p. <0.05)**, (p. <0.10)*. 
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Among the various occupations on which households depended for their income and 
livelihood, those engaged in self-employed agricultural activities show that this had a  
positive impact on selection of both public and private schooling when compared to 
households not in that occupation; and the likelihood of the household head choosing 
this option relative to public school only increases by about threefold. Given that this 
category of households are considered to be the poorest due to the low and erratic nature 
of their earnings (see chapter five), such circumstances would pose a significant 
constraint on their capacity to enrol their children in an LFPS; consequently they chose 
combined school option. 
 
The results for households engaged in trading activities when compared to households 
not in that occupation reveal an interesting pattern – petty trading increases a 
household‟s likelihood of selecting both public and private schools relative to public 
school only by about twofold. Moreover, in respect of households engaged in a major 
trading activity, the relative likelihood of choosing a private school rather than a public 
school only increases by about fourfold. Household members engaged in petty trading 
were more able to support the schooling of their children than were their counterparts 
not working in this sector (GSS, 2003).   
 
In the case of rural Mfantseman, in the communities under study, households that 
engaged in petty trading were able to earn a small daily income, which contributed to 
meeting their children‟s education costs. Such household were likely to select both 
public and private school. Moreover, households engaged in major trading or 
manufacturing enterprises – such as palm oil processing, buying and selling pineapples, 
or the production and distribution of cassava flour– were most likely to fall into the 
highest income quintile and therefore capable of meeting the costs of private education. 
As a result, households engaged in major economic activities were about four times 
likely to choose private school only compared to public school only.  This is consistent 
with evidence from the literature showing that high-income households have a greater 
chance of enrolling their children in private school than do low-income households 
(Goldring and Philips, 2008; Schneider et al., 1996). 
 
The age of the household head is significant but negatively associated with the selection 
of private school, indicating the likelihood of older household heads compared to 
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younger household heads choosing private school only relative to public school only. 
Interview data revealed that older household heads (over 40 ) perceive public schools to 
have better trained teachers citing prominent people in the past that graduated from 
public schools in their communities as reason for their decision. Harma (2008) also 
found that in rural Uttar Pradesh, older parents were more likely to choose public only 
rather than private school only.  
 
More importantly, household heads‟ years of education significantly affected their 
school choice. An additional year of education increases the relative likelihood of 
private school choice by 1.2 times, while the likelihood of choosing the combined 
school option is increased by 1.1 times. What these results suggest is that more highly 
educated household heads were more likely to choose private school only or 
combination of public and private rather than public school only. Interestingly, in the 
communities in which this study was conducted, only 13 per cent of adult household 
members between the ages of 19 and 25 years had completed their basic education. 
However, about 34 per cent of those between the ages of 26 and 40, and 46 per cent of 
those between the ages 41 and 90 had completed their schooling (see Table 5.10).  
 
What is clear from the results of this study is that if a household head was educated, 
their sense of giving their children a good education was stronger; and if they perceived 
that the private school offered good value, they were more likely to opt for it. Similarly, 
Goldring and Philips (2008) indicate that in the United States, parental educational and 
household income levels are positively correlated to the choice of private school. 
Studies in developing countries, including Al-Samarrai and Peasgood (1998), and Glick 
and Sahn (2000) have also found that the educational level of parents has a positive 
influence on their children‟s access to schooling. Educated household heads or parents 
tend to appreciate more highly the value of education, and are therefore more willing to 
spend money on it. 
 
The distance a child has to travel from home to school is statistically significant in 
explaining school choice in respect of choosing the combined school option compared 
to public school only. The results show that for each kilometre a household‟s residence 
is located further away from school, the relative likelihood of selecting the combined 
school option compared to public school only is reduced by 0.95 times. Previous studies 
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in Ghana (Chao and Alper, 1998) and in other developing countries (Tooley, 2009; 
Gulosino and Tooley, 2002) have also found that distance from school is correlated to 
household demand for schooling and, for that matter, choice of school type. Since 
private schools are often established in areas where public schools already exist (Harma, 
2008), where the distance to the former is further than the latter, households may tend to 
choose public schooling and vice versa. 
 
In short, the statistical results reject the hypothesis that the school choice of households 
in the sample was not affected by socio-economic factors. For example, the results show 
that educated household heads and households with better social and economic 
opportunities are more likely to choose private schooling compared to their counterparts 
who are not so well off. This finding is not surprising, as a number of studies (Goldring 
and Philips, 2008; Betts, 1999; Smrekar and Goldring, 1999) have found socio-
economic factors to be correlated with household choice of private school. Accordingly, 
household school choice patterns in the study communities mirror the manner in which 
the rich and those with social capital in urban and peri-urban areas act in terms of school 
choice. Yet, this result notwithstanding, a minority of the poor households in the sample 
made such a school choice. The next section engages with this group of households 
through interviews in order to understand how they explained their school choice 
decisions.  
 
 
6.3 Explaining the school choice decisions of the poor: the views of household 
heads  
In analysing household schooling decisions, most studies
17
 have employed rigorous 
quantitative analysis that identifies the statistically significant factors. However, the 
deeper meaning of these factors can be gained through engaging with the „voices‟ of 
those responsible for these decisions. Therefore, the three categories of household head 
in the lowest income group who had children in school were interviewed on their school 
choice decisions. These household head interviewees were composed of 14 household 
heads that chose public school only, 13 that chose private school only and finally 11 that 
                                                          
17 A number of studies, including Lillard and king (1984), Gertler and Glewwe (1998), and Al-Samarai and Peasgood 
(1998), have employed a single-period model of household schooling decision-making; whilst Mason and Rozelle 
(1998), and Sawada and Lokshin (2001) use a more sophisticated model that considers schooling decisions over time. 
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selected both public and private school. The results of the interviews are discussed in 
terms of four main themes: examination results, school infrastructure, discipline and 
commitment, and the motivation of the household head.  
 
6.3.1 Examination results 
Household head interviewees who had enrolled their children in public school only 
indicated that they actually preferred private school on account of its better performance 
in examinations; in all, 9 of the 14 interviewees who had chosen public school only 
indicated their preference for private school for this reason. These were households that 
had a preference for private schooling but could not afford to pay the fees and other 
charges. As a result, they had settled for public schooling, which was fee-free.  
 
However, five of the interviewees that choose public school only indicated that they had 
selected the public school because it had better-trained teachers, arguing that prominent 
people from their communities had gone through the public school system in the past. 
This also explains the statistical results, which indicate that older household heads are 
more likely to choose public than private school. These were people over the age of 40 
years who perceived the activities of private schools as profiteering, noting that if 
children in public school studied hard, they were just as likely to pass their exams.  
 
Indeed, this raises the question of why pupils in rural public schools appear or are 
perceived not to be conscientious in their studies compared to their private school 
counterparts. Analysis of interviews with teachers and parents shows that while the 
former blamed parents for not providing their children with their schooling needs, 
accusing them of taking little interest in the affairs of the school, some parents equally 
accused public school teachers of chronic absenteeism, lateness and failure to teach 
their children. Clearly, the poor performance of pupils could be an indication of a lack 
of motivation within the public school system arising from the combination of an 
absence of professional discipline amongst the teachers, the poverty of some 
households, and lack of child discipline. However, whatever the reason, the outcome 
affects the decisions households make in terms of their choice of school. 
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Just like most household heads who enrolled their children in public school only, those 
interviewees who selected both public and private schools indicated that private schools 
did better in the final examinations in comparison to public schools. This group can be 
referred to as „strategic choosers‟ because they actually wanted private schooling for 
their children but could not afford it. Therefore, they enrolled some in public school and 
some in private school in the hope that the household would reap the benefits of higher 
quality private education, as measured by examination results. The following comment 
from a female household head illustrates this view:  
 
The private schools do better than the public schools ...  When we look at all 
the children who sit for the JHSC [Junior High School Certificate] exams, it 
is only the children from the private schools who pass the exam... We know 
because we do not see the other children moving on to SHS [senior high 
school]. Even two of my own children who attended public school couldn’t 
pass the JHS exam to enable them to continue to SHS. 
 
Therefore, the issue of examination results was crucial to household school choice 
decisions. This was because it was examination results that determined whether the 
child could proceed to post-basic education. As a result, when a household made 
different school choices for different children, it tended to create better opportunities for 
those who were enrolled in private school. Accordingly, a greater proportion of 
household resources were devoted to supporting children in private school through the 
payment of extra classes and purchase of supplementary books, while those in public 
school received less support. As Goldring and Philips (2008), and Bosetti (2004) argue, 
having chosen a private school for their child, parents invest money and time in them in 
a bid to prove that they have made the right choice. Consequently, the private school 
child is more likely to have better opportunities and life chances, while the public 
school child is condemned to failure. 
 
The school choice behaviour of interviewees was consistent with the statistical results 
(see Table 6.1); that is, the number of children a household actually had in school 
significantly affected its selection of the combined option relative to choosing public 
school only. Table 6.2 shows percentage of children in school by school choice option. 
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Table 6.2: Percentage of children in school per household by school choice option 
School choice 
option 
Number of Children in School per household 
 
 
 
1 
Child 
2 
Children 
3 
Children 
4 
Children 
5 
Children 
6 
Children 
7 
Children 
 
 
 
Total 
Public only 21.2 31.3 22.9 13.5 9.0 2.2 NA 100 
Private only 48.8 23.3 16.3 6.2 5.4 NA NA 100 
Public and 
Private 
NA 16.8 29.0 35.5 15.9 1.9 0.9 100 
Source: Field Data, 2008.            Figures are row percentages   
 
Table 6.2 shows that nearly half (48.8%) of the households that selected private school 
only had just one child in school and the proportion of household choosing private 
school only reduces as the number of children in the households increase. On the other 
hand, the proportion of households choosing both public and private schools increases 
as the number of children in the household increases. This rise continues up to a point 
and then declines. What the statistical analysis shows is that households with more than 
one school-age child and interested in private education were more likely to enrol some 
in public and some in private school. In effect, households with just one school going 
age child had a greater ability to choose private schooling than did their counterparts 
with more than one child.   
 
Again, even though the statistical results indicate that the sex of the child was not 
significant (see Table 6.1), interview data show that in deciding who should attend 
private school, nearly all interviewees chose the oldest sibling; arguing that while at 
school, an older sibling would be able help their younger siblings in public school with 
their studies and also support them financially after they (the older sibling) had 
completed their schooling. This is consistent with the results of other studies, including 
Harma (2008) and Srivastava (2006) which have shown that a child‟s rank in the 
household was significantly associated with the first child being enrolled in LFPS.  
 
In addition, interviewees who opted for private school only said that they were looking 
for an education that enabled their children to read, write and communicate in English. 
Moreover, they also had aspirations for their children to gain access to post-basic 
education, arguing that the best way of achieving this was through private schooling. 
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The following excerpt is illustrative of why interviewees chose fee-paying private 
school:  
 
The job I do does not bring me a regular income, but the elders say if you 
like cheap things you will end up eating worms... Even though public school 
is free, some children still do not attend school. I don’t want to take the line 
that because it is free, I should send my children to public school. My goal 
is for my children to end up well, and the best way of achieving that goal is 
what I will pursue [ie private school]. (A female household head) 
 
This interviewee‟s circumstances can be described as „transient poor‟ because she was a 
petty trader without a regular income. All household head interviewees who enrolled 
their children in private school only indicated that they made the effort to keep them in 
school due to the greater aspirations they had; therefore, they were willing to go to great 
lengths, even if the cost to the household was substantial. Aspiration without capacity to 
pay school fees and other charges will not sustain a child in private school for the whole 
basic education cycle. Nevertheless, the perception of better examination performance 
together with higher aspirations fuelled household interest in private schooling. 
 
6.3.2 School Infrastructure 
The state of a schools‟ infrastructure was another important theme that emerged from 
household heads who chose private school only and the combined option. Interviewees 
argued that education should bring benefits, pointing out that what mattered most about 
a school was whether learning took place. In comparing public and private schools in 
the community, interviewees acknowledged the poor state of private school 
infrastructure compared to the public schools that possessed standard school buildings 
with adequate seating, desks and well-ventilated classrooms. They emphasised that they 
were aware of the poor state of private school infrastructure and even the quality of the 
teachers, but what mattered most to them was whether learning was effective, and they 
judged this on the basis of examination results. The following contribution from a 40-
year-old male household head and private chooser highlights this view: 
 
Just last year [2007], Domaa Anglo [a public school] entered 30 candidates 
for the BECE; only five passed, and in Domino [another public school], 
only two passed. But Shambu [one of the private schools in the community] 
topped all the basic schools.... If we look at Shambu Private School, you will 
realise that it is not up to standard... I mean, looking at the school structure, 
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you will find that it is not a nice place to send your child, but then learning 
takes place… If I am learning under a tree with the sun shining directly on 
my head or even beaten by the rain, and still benefit from a good education, 
I will prefer that to learning in a multi-storey building which has air 
conditioning in all the classrooms but brings no benefit, or very little. 
 
Several interviewees who had chosen private schooling noted that even though they had 
temporary wooden structures, what mattered most was that their children passed the 
Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE).  
 
6.3.3 Discipline and Commitment 
Interviewees indicated that lack of discipline among pupils was responsible for the poor 
examination results in public schools, and blamed the teachers for failing to instil 
discipline in the children under their care. The following observation by a household 
head with children in both public and private school reflects this view: 
 
During our time, public schools used to be good and they used to teach a 
lot...but these days, the young teachers we have don’t care. They treat 
children’s behaviour at school with apathy and they think that ‘the children 
will reap what they sow.’ After all, at the end of the month, the teacher will 
still receive their salary. (A 52-year-old female household head) 
 
As a result of this perceived situation, several household heads with children in both 
public and private school indicated that they would have preferred a private school for 
all their children but for its relatively high cost. Of the 12 interviewees who had selected 
the combined option, 10 indicated their willingness to move all their children from 
public to private education; but because they could not afford to pay the private school 
fees and other charges for all the children in the household, they had elected to enrol at 
least one child in private school with the intention of moving those in public school into 
private education if there was an improvement in their income.  
 
Furthermore, interviewees noted that private school heads were committed to their work 
and showed an interest in the welfare of their pupils by visiting parents at home to share 
with them their children‟s progress at school. They also mentioned that when a child did 
not attend school on a particular day, the head teacher went to the pupil‟s home to 
discover the reason and often succeed in getting the child to return to school. The 
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following comment from a 36-year-old household head with children in both public and 
private schools reflects this view: 
 
 A private man who has set up his school and is incurring expenses has an 
eye on the children… If a child does not go to school for a day, the teacher 
visits their home to find out why they were not in school, and ensures that 
they report to school the next day. That is what I don’t mind paying for my 
child to have a good education.  
 
Private schools in the communities under study showed a lot more interest in their 
pupils‟ progress. This may be because their survival and sustainability of these LFPSs 
depended on attracting more households that would pay school fees and other costs. 
Thus, private schools valued interacting with parents as this was a way of showing their 
commitment and ensuring high participation.  
 
However, it is important to note that the strategies adopted by private school heads in 
rural communities are not alien to the public school system. Public schools in rural areas 
prior to independence maintained close links with community members and actively 
participated in community activities.  As Bame (1991: 68) puts it, ‘The town or village 
teacher in those days was a letter writer, reader and a counsellor not only to the local 
chief but to all members of his community.’  
 
 Interviews with public school teachers revealed that they hardly visit or participate in 
the activities of the communities where they live. As a result, households in the rural 
areas under study perceived the activities of private schools as a genuine attempt to 
provide high quality education services. Clearly, this influenced the school choice 
decisions that households made.  
 
Household head interviewees said that they did not consider public school teachers to be 
conscientious in their work, citing two reasons for this claim. Firstly, following a break 
time, teachers often failed to return to the classroom when the allotted time was up, but 
allowed the children to continue playing until it was time for pupils to go home; while 
their private school counterparts adhered strictly to lesson times. Secondly, they had 
observed some teachers drinking alcohol during school hours, while others arrived at 
school late or failed to report for duty at all. In the words of one female household head 
who had children in both public and private schools:  
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Sometimes, you will find some public school teachers going to school 
around 11 a.m. and by the time the teacher gets there, the pupils might have 
been fighting all morning... The teachers leave the children in the classroom 
and go on drinking leaving these children unattended...someone who is 
drunk, what can he teach? I found this kind of behaviour disturbing and so I 
decided to send some of my children to the private school. 
 
Households that had selected both public and private school indicated that when they 
compared public school with private school, they found the cost of the latter more of a 
burden. Whilst acknowledging that private school choice was accompanied by costs, 
interviewees argued that given the current poor state of the public education sector, 
private schooling was a preferable alternative. A female household head who had 
children in both public and private school expressed her frustration thus:  
 
Why is it that the government has given every parent the chance to send her 
child to school free of charge? I say I don’t want that, but instead I will send 
my child to a private individual who has established his school to make a 
profit, and pay fees... Ideally, wouldn’t it be better for all of us to support 
the government’s free education policy for our mutual benefit…? But if I say 
I do not want that but want to go to a private school and pay fees, then you 
need to know the reason. When the children go to [public] school, they 
don’t teach them anything at all. 
 
The above comment re-emphasises the point that households might have been poor, but 
fee „free‟ education without evidence of teacher discipline and commitment to pupils‟ 
education in these rural public schools was not sufficient reason to induce parents to 
enrol their children in public school. 
 
Furthermore, interviewees identified two issues related to public school pupils and their 
teachers. They noted that public school children were frequently seen loitering around 
the village during school hours, while their teachers did what they pleased rather than 
teaching. In contrast, private school head teachers adopted a number of strategies that 
ensured teachers‟ commitment.  
 
For example, in three of the private schools under study, teachers received a bonus of 
Gh¢1 for each day they reported to school, the total amount at the end of the month 
constituting about 40 per cent of their salary. In addition, head teachers regularly 
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monitored their staff and were quick to discipline those who failed to teach or regularly 
came to school late. These strategies made teachers in rural private schools more 
accountable and therefore more committed.   
 
Interviewees noted that in public school, teachers were assured of their full salary at the 
end of each month even if they missed school for a number of days or were late for 
work most of the time. Interviewees argued that this did not therefore encourage teacher 
commitment. The following comment from one female household head with children in 
both public and private school highlights this view: 
 
I can see that pupils in public schools are not serious; and even their 
teachers feel that whether they teach or not, they will be paid at the end of 
the month. But in the private school, if you don’t teach, you will be dealt 
with by the proprietor.  
 
Household contribution to the private school in terms of payment of fees and other 
charges created a responsibility on the part of the school to be receptive to parents‟ 
needs. One interviewee cited an instance in which she noticed that her daughter was 
underachieving in class and reported it to the proprietor of the school; the class teacher 
was made to retake the lessons. It is important to note that, the LFPS teachers are 
untrained and therefore have less professional capital. As a result, head teachers of 
LFPSs have a lot of control over their teachers. 
 
While interviewees acknowledged that a public school might respond to such 
complaints, the lack of seriousness it commonly attached to them did not compare 
favourably with the efficiency of the private school. It is clear that the cavalier attitude 
shown by some public school teachers as substantiated by head teachers and teachers 
(see Chapter 7) in comparison to the discipline and commitment of the LFPS swayed 
some of the poor in their decisions to choose private schooling. 
 
6.3.4 The motivation of the household head 
Whether a household enrolled its children in public or private school was influenced by 
its motive for investing in education. In exploring household school choice decisions, 
two motives – self-interest and altruism – related to investment in education emerged. 
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These two motives were relevant to the decision households made in respect of the type 
of school they chose for their children. 
 
The self-interest motive for the household schooling decision was related to the head‟s 
decision to enrol a child in school with the main intention that this should benefit the 
household at some future date rather than the child personally. The dominant views of 
interviewees revealed that across all categories of household head, a school choice 
decision was based on the expectation that the investment in children would produce 
benefits would enable them to take care of them in their old age. The following excerpts 
reflect the self-interested views of the various categories of interviewee:  
 
The reason why I have sent my children to school is because it is for my 
future... Education will give my children a brighter future for them to cater 
for me in my old age. (Combined option chooser)  
 
Spending on my children’s education is like depositing money in my savings 
account, which I will withdraw someday. (Private school chooser)  
 
Schooling is beneficial to us parents in our old age because…if I don’t send 
my child to school, when I grow old they will not be able to take care of me. 
(Public school chooser) 
 
The issue of social security was crucial to interviewees‟ school choice decisions. 
Therefore, from the interviewees‟ perspective, investing in their children‟s education 
amounted to making social security contributions that the household would draw on in 
future.   
 
Interview data show that it was private school choosers who most readily demonstrated 
motives of self-interest in schooling decisions. Of the total of 38 household heads  
interviewed, 7 out of 14 who choose public school; 12 out of the 13 who choose private 
school; and 9 out of 11 who selected the combined option, demonstrated evidence of 
self-interest in making schooling investment decisions. Table 6.3 shows a classification 
of household heads‟ responses. 
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Table 6.3: Frequency of household heads’ who are self interested and altruistic in  
      their school choice decision 
School choice  Number of interviewees Number Self Interest Number Altruistic 
Public 14 7 (50%) 10 (71%) 
Private 13 12 (92%) 9 (69%) 
Combine Option 11 9 (82%) 7 (64%) 
 
Since about 39 per cent of households in the lowest income group in my sample opted 
for private school only and a combination of public and private, in respect of poor rural 
areas, it can be inferred that although some households may be among the transient 
poor, because their investment in education is informed by motives of self-interest, they 
are willing to go to great lengths to invest in private schooling in spite of the probable 
high burden the concomitant expenditure will impose on them. Thus, in order to 
understand household schooling choice, the motives that inform the decisions of those 
who bear the cost of education are significant.  
 
With regard to household heads who demonstrated altruism in their school choice 
decisions, interviewees across all school types indicated the desire for their children to 
become enlightened, disciplined and responsible citizens. They also contended that 
education refined and made a person unique in many ways, including mode of dress, 
speech and general outlook on life. The dominant view across all school types with 
respect to altruism was evenly distributed, 9 out of 13 households opting for private 
schooling only, while 7 out of 11, and 10 out of 14 selected the combined option and 
public school only respectively.  
 
Moreover, interviewees noted that the contemporary world had thrown up new 
challenges and they believed that the young generation needed to be educated in order 
to surmount them. The following excerpt is an illustration of the altruistic consideration 
that informed an interviewee in their investment in education: 
 
The greatest asset to the child is education... because the Bible says ‘seek ye 
the kingdom of God and all shall be opened un to thee…’ But in the field of 
education, seek ye the kingdom of education and all avenues shall be 
opened un to thee, because if you have education you have everything. (A 
male household head and private school chooser) 
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Several household interviewees noted that education could be used as a tool for gaining 
enlightenment and liberation, emphasising that schooling created opportunities beyond 
the reach of those who were uneducated. Other household head interviewees were of the 
opinion that education gave a voice to the voiceless and functioned as a tool for 
empowering women in taking an active part in decision-making in society.  
 
One female household interviewee who had children in both public and private school 
asserted that, ‘Schooling is of great value... Esi Bronya,18 for example, is a woman but 
thanks to education, when she stands up to speak she is like a man, and I want my girls 
to be like that.’  
 
Therefore, household heads who demonstrated self interest were more willing to invest 
in private education than those who acted out of altruism. However, household heads 
that acted out of altruism were equally distributed across school choice options.  
 
Evidently, there was optimism amongst household head interviewees that the returns 
from the schooling of their children would trickle down to them in the form of income, 
respect and security. However, the extent to which households expected to benefit from 
their investment determined their level of motivation in selecting a private school. What 
is clear is that private school choosers are more self-interested than altruistic in their 
motives for investment in education (see Table 6.2). Such households may be poor, but 
schooling decisions are driven more by the level of self-interest or altruism rather than 
just the cost of schooling.  
 
6.4 Summary  
This chapter explains households school choice decisions by first exploring the factors 
that correlates with household school choice in rural Mfantseman. Qualitative evidence 
provided deep insight to some of the emerging factors. 
 
 The evidence from the statistical analysis rejects the hypothesis that school choice in 
rural Mfantseman was not affected by household socio-economic factors, an indication 
that affordability constrained poor households from choosing private schooling. 
                                                          
18
 A pseudonym of prominent female politician in Ghana. 
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Similarly to the case with urban and peri-urban settings in Ghana, schooling choice was 
influenced by the child‟s household social and economic circumstances. With their 
economic and social capital, relatively affluent households in the communities under 
study were more able to afford private schooling, and more likely to chose private 
schools a finding that is consistent with the literature on school choice (Goldring and 
Philips, 2008).  
 
However, the statistical results do not explain why a few poor household heads chose an 
LFPS even with all the economic constraints they faced. Insights from interviews with 
this minority show that there was a general perception that the LFPSs provided a better 
quality of education than did the public schools in the locality, a perception that 
resonates nationally (GSS, 2005; MOESS, 2006). In addition to quality of education, 
the perception that public schools lacked commitment and discipline compared to 
private schools, coupled with the higher aspirations of some poor households, strongly 
fuelled the interest of some of the poor in private education.     
 
Furthermore, in order to access private school, some poor households made a strategic 
choice in enrolling some of their children in public school and some in private school. 
This is because poor households‟ choice is constrained by the number of school going 
age children and income (Harma, 2008). However, when household heads made such 
choices, different educational opportunities arose for different children. This has 
implication for family cohesion due to the inequality it creates as one child is given 
better opportunity than the other. 
 
In conclusion, the statistical results have shown that, households in my sample which 
have poor socio-economic background are less likely to choose private school. 
However, for the minority poor households in the sample that choose an LFPS,  the 
evidence from the qualitative analysis shows that their  private school choice was based 
on rational thinking borne out of what they perceived the LFPS to offer – a better 
quality of education. The next chapter tests whether the perception that LFPSs offered a 
better quality of education than public schools in the same locality is corroborated by 
the evidence.    
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Chapter seven: Analysis of findings II 
Does the relative quality of schools in rural areas explain schooling decisions? 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The qualitative analysis in chapter six indicated that household head interviewees in the 
communities under study who chose private schooling overwhelmingly cited the better 
education outcomes of the LFPS compared to the public school as their principal 
motivation for selecting the former. Evidence from the Criterion Reference Tests 
conducted by the Ghana Ministry of Education suggest that private schools in urban and 
peri-urban areas in Ghana provide better education outcomes than do public schools in 
similar environments (MOESS, 2006; GSS, 2005). However, this might not be the case 
in a typical rural environment owing to factors such as low quality teachers and  
infrastructural facilities. Accordingly, this chapter argues that the quality of education in 
LFPSs in poor rural settings in terms of examination and test results, and school inputs 
is not significantly better than their public counterparts; and that factors other than 
school quality fuel the interest of the poor household in private education. 
 
This chapter employs a number of quality indicators, including examination results, test 
scores,  the quality of teachers, pupil to teacher ratio (PTR) and the standard of school 
infrastructure to examine whether the perception that the private school offers a better 
quality of education is borne out by the reality in the communities under study. It also 
explores the extent to which the interaction between household and the school in a 
locality influences parents‟ response to the school. 
 
The analysis begins by comparing public school and LFPS inputs, for example, 
characteristics of teachers, PTR, and infrastructure. This is followed by a comparative 
investigation of output – examination and test results – indicators in order to determine 
which school type provides a better quality of education. Secondly, qualitative data 
derived from interviews with teachers, SMC members and parents are examined to 
identify the practices that attract some households to the LFPS. 
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7.2 How does the quality of input into public schools and LFPSs compare? 
The quantity and quality of school input is significantly related to the quality of 
education provision.  This section compares the inputs of the public schools and LFPSs 
under study, taking into account the number of teachers and their standard of training, 
pupil to teacher ratio, types of school structure and the number of classrooms per 
school, by school type.  
 
Table 7.1 shows school inputs for the three public schools and three LFPSs under study. 
Generally, the public schools had more and better-trained teachers. At Medico Public 
School, 8 of its 9 teachers had 3 year post secondary teacher qualifications. At Domino, 
11 of its 15 teachers also had post secondary teacher qualifications, while Kyoto had 
only 3 teachers with post secondary teacher qualifications and 13 untrained teachers. In 
comparison with public schools, only one teacher was trained in the three LFPSs. The 
untrained teachers were either senior high school (SHS) leavers or technical school 
graduates (ie grade 12). Therefore, in terms of the proportion of trained teachers to 
untrained teachers in the public rural schools under study, it was about 55 percent, 
compared to 9 percent in LFPSs under study. This is consistent with findings from the 
analysis of national data collected in educationally deprived districts of Ghana, where 
about 50 per cent of public school teachers are trained compared to about 10 per cent in 
private schools (see Chapter 3).  
 
In terms of the sample of rural public and LFPSs studied, the PTR was higher at the 
primary level in both public schools and LFPSs than was the case at the junior high 
school (JHS) level. However, in one of the public schools (Medico School), the PTR 
was higher than the norm stipulated by the Ghana Education Service (GES), which 
requires the PTR in classes at the primary and JHS levels to be 35 and 25 respectively 
(MOESS, 2008). The reason for the large PTR in Medico School was due to the fact 
that it was the only public school in the community. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that even though the sample of schools in this study is too small, PTR patterns in public 
and private schools respectively are consistent with national data (See Figure 3.4). 
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Table 7.1: Inputs of Study Public school and LFPS in rural, Mfantseman (2010) 
Source: The author (Field data, 2010). 
 
All the three public schools had cement block structures and writing desks. Even though 
Medico Public School was overcrowded, pupils still had furniture to sit on and at which 
to write. In contrast, all the three LFPSs were either built from mud and thatch or 
bamboo/wood, roofed with palm branches. In some of the LFPSs, classes were held 
under trees because there were insufficient classrooms or shelters in which to teach.  
 
A consideration of the input indicators of the rural schools under study (see Table 7.1) 
in the context of school inputs in Mfantseman as a whole is useful in explaining the 
quality of public schools and LFPSs respectively throughout the district. Table 7.2 
compares public school and private school inputs in the whole Mfantseman district for 
2008.  
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 All the trained teachers have post-secondary teacher training qualification. 
Inputs Name of Public School Name of LFPS 
 Medico Domino Kyoto Holomo Shamo Fremo 
Teacher 
qualifications 
8 trained 
19
and 1 
untrained  
11 trained and 4 
untrained 
3 trained 
and 12 
untrained  
12 untrained (all 
SSS graduates) 
11 untrained (10 
SSS graduates and 
1 technical school 
graduate) 
9 untrained (SSS 
graduates), 1 
trained, and 2 
trainees 
Pupil: teacher 
ratio – 
primary 
93:1 20:1 26:1 37:1 31:1 25:1 
Pupil: teacher 
ratio – JHS 
46:1 10:1 17:1 13:1 20:1 10:1 
Type of 
Building 
Cement/ 
concrete 
block 
Cement/ concrete 
block andpavilion 
with earth floor 
Cement/ 
concrete 
block 
Cement/concrete 
block, and mud 
and thatch 
structure with 
earth floor 
Cement/concrete 
block and open-
framed bamboo 
pavilion with 
earth floor  
Cement/concrete 
block, and 
structure of 
bamboo and palm 
branches 
Number of 
classrooms 
9 
classroom 
blocks 
6 classroom 
blocks 
9 
classroom 
blocks 
3 classrooms 
made from–
cement blocks, 
and 4 classrooms 
made from mud 
and thatch 
1 room – cement 
block and 1 
pavilion; some 
classes held under 
trees 
1 classroom  
made from 
cement blocks and 
a pavilion 
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Table 7.2: School inputs in the whole Mfantseman District (2008) 
Input Public 
School 
Private 
School 
Primary school teachers        
        Trained 
       Untrained  
       Untrained as total % 
 
JHS teachers 
 
422 
232 
35.47 
 
30 
210 
87.5 
       Trained 
       Untrained 
       Untrained as total % 
456 
128 
21.92 
35 
122 
77.71 
Pupil: teacher ratio 
       Primary 
      JHS 
 
42:1 
19:1 
 
24:1 
14:1 
Schools and classrooms 
      No. of primary schools 
      No. of classrooms 
      % of classrooms NMR 
 
107 
628 
15 
 
42 
224 
1 
     No. of JHSs 
     No. of Classrooms 
     % of Classrooms NMR 
94 
304 
23 
31 
97 
5 
Note: NMR = classrooms in need of major repair. 
Source: Ghana EMIS (2009). 
 
A greater proportion of public school teachers in the whole district compared to their 
private school counterparts were trained. Only about a third (35.47 per cent) of public 
school teachers were untrained compared to 87.5 per cent of private school teachers. 
Therefore, in terms of percentage of trained teachers, Mfantseman is better than the 
national average (50%) of educationally deprived districts (see Chapter 3).  As 
expected, the PTR was on average higher at both primary and JHS levels in public 
schools than was the case in private schools.  
 
However, the number of public school classrooms in need of major repair was 
proportionately greater than in private schools. Nevertheless, this should not be taken to 
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signal that LFPSs in Mfantseman enjoyed better school infrastructure. This was because 
EMIS data was only collected for those schools that were recognised or registered by 
the GES. Consequently, unregistered private schools, particularly LFPSs in rural areas 
that were operated in temporary shelters were not taken into account.   
 
Picture 7.1 shows one of the LFPSs under study. Clearly, the structure poses health and 
safety concerns – education is not simply about outcomes, but is also associated with 
the environment and safety of learners (UNICEF, 2000). Moreover, this area was prone 
to heavy downpours and whenever it rained, pupils were unable to attend class, a 
shortcoming that has implications in terms of „meaningful access‟ for children who 
enrol in such schools.  
 
 
Picture 7.1: A LFPS in rural Mfantseman 
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Picture 7.2: A public school in rural Mfantseman 
 
In conclusion, among the different types of school in Mfantseman District, the public 
sector enjoyed a better quality of inputs than was the case with the private sector, even 
though the latter tended to have a lower PTR. This pattern is not only consistent with 
rural schools under study, but also with the national data on educationally deprived 
schools, as indicated in Chapter 3.  
 
However, if public schools had more and better quality inputs, why did some poor 
households in rural areas choose to enrol their children in LFPSs? Part of the answer to 
this question was established in Chapter 6 - a perception that private school had better 
performance; but what must now be sifted is the evidence of public school and LFPS 
examination and test results in order to establish whether their perception is aligned 
with the reality.  
 
 
 
138 
7.3 How do examination outcomes for public schools and LFPSs compare? 
It is important to note that since unrecognised LFPSs were not registered with the GES, 
they were unable to establish their own examination centres; candidates from these 
schools normally entered for the BECE at relatively nearby recognised LFPSs. Using 
the list of schools obtained from the district office and with the help of two LFPS head 
teachers, all LFPSs during the period 2007-2009 were identified. This was needed to 
develop insights into the respective performances of public and LFPSs in the same 
neighbourhood. Therefore, the analysis of BECE results from 2007, 2008 and 2009 
focused on rural communities in which both public schools and LFPSs were located.  
 
Figure 7.1 shows the BECE results for 2007. The results show that across and within 
communities in which both LFPS and public schools were located, LFPSs performed 
better in BECE than public school – the overall percentage pass in LFPSs ranged 
between 83 percent and 100 percent, while public schools passed ranged from 6 percent 
to 70 percent, but most public schools‟ passes were below 40 percent. However, one 
LFPS located in Kokodo community (Private KyeS) performed poorly scoring only 21 
percentage pass. 
 
Figure 7.1: BECE results for rural communities in Mfantseman hosting both 
public and private schools (2007) 
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In 2008, of the 7 LFPSs that entered for the BECE (see Figure 7.2), two had 100 percent 
success, while 3 had passes ranging from 82 percent to 92 percent. Interestingly, the 
only LFPS in Kokodo community (KyeS) had 9 percent pass, after scoring 21 percent 
pass in the previous year (see Figure 7.1). Compared to LFPSs, one public school had 
100 percent success and another had 67 percent pass, but the majority had passes 
ranging from 42 percent to zero. It is clear that LFPSs performed better in BECE in 
2008 compared to their public schools counterparts, except in one community (Otu 
community) where both the LFPS and public school had 100 percent successes. 
The BECE results in 2009 show similar trend of performance between public and LFPS 
(see Figure 7.3). Of the 10 LFPSs that entered for the BECE, 5 scored 100 percent pass, 
but the LFPS in Kokodo community continued to perform poorly, registering 19 percent 
pass. Only one public school scored 96 percent pass, the rest of the public school 
success range from 37 percent to zero. Clearly, the BECE results of schools in rural 
communities hosting both public and LFPS show that the LFPSs generally performed 
better than public schools. However, the LFPSs generally entered fewer candidates for 
the BECE than public schools did. 
Informal interviews with the head teachers of three of the four LFPSs indicated that 
several strategies were employed to help better their performance in the BECE. For 
example, teachers spent additional time coaching pupils at school, using supplementary 
materials in addition to the government-approved textbooks.  Pupils who failed progress 
examinations were made to repeat the grade, while those who had proceeded to the next 
grade but failed to sustain a high level of performance in the first term examination in 
the final year of the basic education cycle were also encouraged to repeat the grade.  
 
If parents were reluctant to have their children repeat a grade, they were given the 
option of withdrawing them from the school. For example, the head teacher of Shamo 
LFPS explained that 3 of the 19 final year pupils had repeated the grade in 2008, while 
one child had left school due their parents‟ unwillingness for them to be subjected to 
this policy. Clearly, LFPSs only selected their most promising pupils to enter for the 
BECE, a practice that would not have been tolerated in public school. It is important to 
emphasise that these graphs do not take any account of differences in pupil ability and 
characteristics which, in addition to the school they attend, will affect their BECE 
results. 
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Figure 7.2: BECE results for rural communities in Mfantseman hosting both public and private schools (2008)  
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Figure 7.3: BECE results for rural communities in Mfantseman hosting both public and private schools (2009) 
 
142 
In order to control for background characteristic of pupils, English and mathematics 
tests were conducted in 4 LFPSs and 6 public schools in 2007 and 2008. In addition, 
information on pupils‟ background was also collected. A regression analysis was 
conducted to explain differences in performance and progress made by schools. 
However, it is important to note that the regression analysis was based on the 
assumption that children were randomly enrolled in the various schools of a given 
locality ie that selection effects were not an issue, even though some households may in 
reality have deliberately chosen a specific school for their children. The next section 
presents the regression results.  
 
7.3.1 Explaining test performance and progress in English and Mathematics  
Table 7.3 reports the results of estimation of the effects of schools on the performance 
and progress made by pupils in English and mathematic tests, controlling for the 
background characteristics of pupils using regression analysis (see Appendix 6 for 
description of variables). Dummy variables are used for each school to capture the 
effects on performance common to all children at the school, which may be considered 
to capture the effect of the school itself.  Without controls for child background 
characteristics, these dummy variables would also capture the effect of common pupil 
characteristics.  Background controls are included however, while it should be 
remembered that the dummies will continue to capture the effect of unobserved 
common characteristics.  Nonetheless, the approach provides an illustration of the 
differences in performance at school level, controlling for important pupil 
characteristics.  The results are not interpreted necessarily as causal effects of schools.  
The results show that school dummy variables are statistically significant in explaining 
pupil performance in English and mathematics in the cases of many of the schools under 
study.  The reference category is the lowest performing school, so that the significant 
effects indicate a significant difference between an individual school and the school 
with the lowest performance in the category concerned.    
 
The reference category (lowest performing school) for the modelling of results in 
English and maths is a rural public school.  In the case of progress scores, which 
measure the difference between pupils‟ score in 2007 and 2008 on the same test, 
however, the reference category is a rural private school.   
143 
 
Table 7.3: Determinants of performance and progress in test scores at the basic      
       school level            
 Performance 2007/08  Progress 2007/8-2008/9 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES English 07–08 Mathematics 
07–08 
English 07–09 Mathematics 
07–09 
Sex 0.748 5.180 1.434 5.339 
 (0.35) (2.75)*** (0.53) (2.37)** 
Age 11.399 8.027 5.043 0.352 
 (7.32)*** (6.01)*** (2.39)** (0.21) 
Household literacy (Test Sum) 0.064 0.083 0.043 -0.001 
 
Dominase circuit schools 
 
(0.87) (1.32) (0.48) (-0.01) 
 
Public rural primary (Kokodo)  17.678 14.611 26.990 -2.957 
 (2.10)** (2.03)** (2.11)** (-0.29) 
Public rural JHS (Kokodo) Ref Ref 39.650 18.995 
   (2.84)*** (1.70)* 
Public rural primary (Akoma) 6.949 9.883 26.608 -5.110 
 (0.79) (1.31) (2.11)** (-0.51) 
Public rural JHS (Akoma)  3.199 12.791 24.900 0.127 
 (0.37) (1.72)* (1.93)* (0.01) 
Private rural primary (Kokodo)  5.903 9.625 37.328 2.583 
 (0.69) (1.30) (3.06)*** (0.26) 
Private rural JHS (Kokodo) 21.324 15.257 Ref Ref 
 (2.27)** (1.90)*   
 
Narkwa circuit schools 
 
    
Public rural primary (Eku) 29.740 30.093 31.115 11.024 
 (3.52)*** (4.19)*** (2.51)** (1.10) 
Public rural JHS (Eku) 28.020 30.404 34.746 15.406 
 (3.37)*** (4.21)*** (2.75)*** (1.47) 
Private rural primary (Eku) 43.534 38.575 37.530 11.633 
 (4.71)*** (4.91)*** (2.79)*** (1.04) 
Private rural JHS (Eku) 26.771 30.562 44.197 18.592 
 (2.62)*** (3.47)*** (2.97)*** (1.53) 
     
     
Constant -100.769 -65.127 -65.924 15.230 
 (-4.48)*** (-3.37)*** (-2.34)** (0.68) 
Observations 254 248 175 170 
R-squared 0.66 0.57 0.45 0.42 
                    
Notes: *** = p<0.01; ** = p<0.05; * = p<0.1; t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
In English, private schools scored higher than the reference public school for the most 
part when controlling for children‟s age and sex and for the household caregiver‟s 
literacy level.  However there were two public schools which also scored highly when 
compared to the reference school.  In mathematics, the pattern was somewhat similar 
with typically higher scores for the private schools plus the two best performing public 
schools.   
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When progress in both English and mathematics is examined, however, a somewhat 
different pattern emerges.  While the models for English and maths results control for 
background characteristics, they do not control for children‟s prior ability.  And it is not 
unreasonable to expect that households might enrol more able pupils in private school, 
or that those with better socio-economic circumstances may have more able children, 
including because they may have received better education earlier on in their lives.  So 
the progress measures may be considered a better measure of school effects, by 
controlling for a range of unobserved factors which served to determine the original test 
score.  While advantage in terms of home background will also affect progress, it may 
be expected to have a much smaller effect than on the first score.  In terms of progress 
in English, there was not a strong pattern of greater progress being made in private 
schools.  Indeed the lowest progress was made in a private school, but otherwise there is 
no clear distinction in terms of the progress made between the school types.  In 
mathematics, only one school was associated with progress which was higher than in 
the reference (private) school in statistically significant terms.  Interestingly, this was a 
rural public school.   
 
When comparing within the same community, in Dominase circuit there appeared to be 
no private school advantage in English or in mathematics scores.  Nor was there a clear 
advantage in relation to progress in mathematics or English.  In Narkwa, although the 
highest scoring school in English and mathematics, when controlling for pupil 
backgrounds, was a private school, there was no large difference among the schools and 
the lowest scoring school was also private.  Again, in relation to progress, notable 
differences between public and private schools are not found.  In effect, what is found to 
be generally true of urban and peri-urban private schools– as indicated by the GSS 
(2005) and Tooley and Dixon (2007) – does not hold in rural Mfantseman District when 
comparing across and within two education circuits. Apparently, as far as the poor are 
concerned, the indices of quality are not based on school-level differences in scores 
which account for pupil backgrounds, but then those are of course difficult to discern.  
In short, after controlling for the background characteristics of pupils, and especially for 
prior test scores, the regression analyses showed no palpable systematic differences in 
performance between public and private schools. Therefore, as far as the poor are 
concerned, their school choice is influenced by the general claim that LFPSs perform 
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better in exams than their public schools counterparts, coupled with some poor 
households‟ higher aspirations for their children reinforce their preference for private 
schooling. 
 
7.4 Why are the poor attracted to the LFPS? 
The previous section indicates that the LFPSs perform better in terms of test scores than 
their public school counterparts in the same locality. This raises the issue of what 
whether or not other factors apart from exam results might attract the poor households 
to LFPS. This section argues that it is the practices and processes of the LFPS compared 
to those of the public school that fuel the perception of the higher quality of the former. 
The section develops insights into how LFPSs gain the upper hand by focusing on the 
nature of the interaction between parents and schools. It also explores the practices and 
process of LFPS management in order to explain how it might attract households to 
private schooling. 
 
7.4.1 Interaction between the school and the household  
The way the school relates to the household in a rural setting is significant in 
understanding the way the household might respond to the school. This section employs 
interview data derived from head teachers, teachers and parents to explore the nature of 
the interaction between the school, and (1) households with children in public schools, 
and (2) households with children in LFPSs.  
 
A dominant view of public school teachers was that parents did not normally visit them 
at school to inquire about their children‟s studies. However, all the seven public school 
teachers interviewed noted that when a pupil was naughty at home or a parent felt that 
the school had treated their child cruelly, such as in using the cane, they were quick to 
go to the school to complain. The following comment from a public school head teacher 
highlights the key issues relating to their interaction with parents: 
 
Parents don’t come to school to see me except when they have a problem 
with the school or their child. For example, if the child is proving to be 
stubborn at home, the parents sometimes come to the school to seek our 
advice on how to manage them. Just recently, a child had a problem with a 
teacher in this school and because of that, he refused to come to school. 
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When his parents reported this to me, I invited the child to the school to 
explain to me why, and that was when he told me that he had done 
something in class and the teacher had scolded him publicly – he is an older 
child – so because of this, he felt humiliated in front of his classmates. I 
talked to him and was able to convince him to return to school. At other 
times when a child misbehaves in school, we also ask them to go home and 
fetch their parents. 
 
Several teachers interviewed complained that parents‟ visits were frequently somewhat 
confrontational. Interviewees noted that some members of the community went to the 
school with the express purpose of insulting them for disciplining their child. When 
asked how they interacted with the household, one public school teacher commented, 
„Two years ago, I caned a boy for misbehaving in class. The boy went home to inform 
his parents, who brought the police to arrest me.‟ While caning in school is not against 
the law, the GES regulation stipulates that caning can only be administered by the head 
of the school or by a teacher under the head teacher‟s supervision. This is to ensure that 
teachers do not abuse their authority by caning pupils for committing trivial offences. 
Clearly, the public school teacher in this case failed to follow due procedure and was 
therefore liable to prosecution. 
 
Interestingly, the views of many LFPS teachers and my own lesson observations 
revealed that these schools readily employed corporal punishment – including caning – 
as a means of attempting to force pupils to learn. However, one private school teacher 
and former pupil of a public school in the community noted that while corporal 
punishment might not have been an acceptable method of instilling discipline, it was 
utilised in private schools when pupils broke school rules, unlike the case in the public 
education sector. This teacher went on to make her point clear thus:  
 
In this school [an LFPS], we do cane pupils but we also teach them…it is 
only when they do something wrong that they are caned… But in my 
previous [public] school, the teachers did not go to class… They allowed us 
to sit and talk in class; but when they did enter the classroom, they would 
ask the class prefect to bring forward the chatterboxes and we would be 
caned. 
 
In my observations of public schools, I also found that when a teacher was absent pupils 
in that teacher‟s class were left on their own, another teacher occasionally entering the 
room to cane the whole class for making a noise. Clearly, if this kind of action was 
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being practised on a wide scale, some parents might have considered themselves to be 
justified in confronting the school. 
 
Furthermore, all three public school head teachers indicated that none of them had ever 
visited a parent at home. However, they noted that when they met parents on their way 
to or from school, they took the opportunity to discuss their children‟s problems with 
them. It is important to recognise that public school heads and their teachers were 
dealing with poor households in which there was generally no history of schooling (see 
Chapter 5). These were parents who trusted the state to deliver education to their 
children, but it appeared that public school teachers interpreted the failure of parents to 
visit the school as a mark of indifference to their children‟s schooling. This observation 
is reflected in a comment made by one public school teacher interviewed: 
 
Teachers are given control over the [public] school, which we take as a 
private arrangement; we solve school issues ourselves. Where parents are 
expected to deal with a problem, we do it for them. For example, neatness, 
nutrition, among others, should originate at home. It seems that parents are 
left behind and the school is seen as the teachers’ domain. 
 
This is the clear expression of a teacher who was frustrated at the lack of parental 
interest in children‟s schoolwork. Public school teachers expected parents to 
demonstrate awareness of their responsibilities by going to the school to find out how 
their children were getting on. Conversely, of the seven public school teachers 
interviewed, only one said that he sometimes visited parents at home. Any relationship 
necessitates reciprocal effort, and children‟s education requires a healthy interaction 
between parents and teachers. Household–school interaction is important because 
parents get to know how well their children are doing at school, while the school also 
has the opportunity to identify children‟s problems and address them appropriately. 
However, this element appears to have been absent amongst the actors involved in rural 
public education in the research area. The following comment from a public school head 
teacher highlights the significance of such interaction:  
 
Last week, I was doing an exercise and so I called for the class registers. I 
found that three pupils had not been coming to school for the past three 
weeks. When their parents were invited to the school to explain why, we 
found out that even though every morning they got dressed to go to school, 
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they ended up somewhere else… So, I reminded the parents of the need to 
visit the school regularly. 
 
Evidently, if the school had taken more of an interest in its pupils‟ daily attendance and 
followed up cases of prolonged unauthorised absence with households, incidents such as 
the three weeks‟ non-attendance in the above example could have been avoided. 
However, by their own admission, rural public school head teachers and their staff did 
not place much importance on visiting parents, which could have been a reflection of 
the extent to which they viewed their role in the provision of education – classroom 
teaching only. Yet, in a context in which parents believed that it was the responsibility 
of the school to reach beyond the mere provision of tuition, it is hardly surprising that 
they tended to respond to those institutions they perceived as being genuinely interested 
in building a personal relationship with them.  
 
In contrast to the public schools under study, all three LFPS head teachers interviewed 
indicated that parents did sometimes visit them at school. They added that attitudes 
varied, and while some parents did not even check their children‟s report cards, others 
were quick to go to the school when they discovered that their children were not doing 
well. In addition, all three LFPS head teachers asserted that they regularly visited 
parents, especially when a child had been absent from school. The following comment 
from an LFPS head teacher is illustrative:  
 
Not all parents come to see me. Those who come to see me at school are 
those who do not understand certain things…some even come to my house if 
they are not clear about something. Some parents do not look at their 
children’s report cards, but others go through exercise books and when they 
are not happy with a child’s performance, they come to see me at school. 
There is a teacher who is responsible for giving me daily reports of what is 
happening in school; for example, if a parent has a complaint, or if a child 
does not come to school for two or three days...then I will follow it up by 
visiting the parents…that is something the parents like. Friday is my day for 
visiting the remote villages, which I go to on my motorbike with the class 
teacher whose pupil has not been in school. Often, when we get to the 
community the people are surprised to see us, and some will say to the 
parent, ‘You are really lucky a whole headmaster has come to see you!’  
 
As was the case with the public schools under study, not all parents with children in 
private school visited regularly. However, in terms of the LFPSs under study, 
interviewees noted that parents who did visit the school tended to blame their children  
149 
for poor schoolwork rather than directly accuse the teacher of incompetence. However, 
unlike public school head teachers, their LFPS counterparts had a policy of visiting 
parents if pupils were absent from school for two or three days. As indicated in chapter 
six, parents regarded teachers‟ visits to their homes as a demonstration of how much 
LFPSs cared about their pupils and the respect with which they treated parents.  
 
However, some public school teachers viewed LFPS heads‟ practice of visiting parents 
as a marketing exercise – a strategy to lure people into enrolling their children in their 
school. The following statement by a public school head summarises how some public 
sector teachers regarded the activities of the LFPS: 
 
One trick they [private school head teachers] have been playing on us is 
that when they realise that one of our pupils is a high achiever, they will go 
to the parents and tell them that their child is good but could do better if 
they went to the private school… The parents then agree to send their 
children there because they believe that the private school teaches better 
than the public school… maybe because of their BECE results. 
 
It appears that public schools were acutely aware of the persuasive enrolment drive 
strategies adopted by private schools but, surprisingly, none of the public school head 
teachers interviewed indicated that they had ever visited a parent at home. 
Consequently, parents perceived the LFPS practice of conducting out-of-school follow-
up of pupils‟ progress as an innovation intended to promote the education of their 
children. The following comment from an LFPS head teacher highlights the importance 
that parents attached to such visits:  
 
When they [parents] see me in their homes, they are very happy because in 
the first place, I know where they live. Secondly, they can at least boast that 
this is their child’s headmaster…so when I go to their homes, I am held in 
even higher esteem than the president… When I visited a boy in Edumano 
community, which is about a kilometre away…the boy’s parents said that 
they were indeed very happy… The boy was ill but didn’t want to go to 
hospital… I carried him to the hospital and back to his house on my 
motorbike… Because of this, some parents enrolled their children in my 
school… When I go to the nearby village on my personal visits, I take the 
opportunity to go to see some of the parents and crack jokes with them, and 
they very much appreciate this.  
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The above comments also corroborate household head assertions in respect of their 
preference for the LFPS. Households appreciated the way in which private school head 
teachers interacted with them, particularly when their children did not report to school. 
For those households that experienced difficulty in keeping their children in school, 
private school head teachers‟ visits helped to ensure regular attendance.  
 
It may thus be concluded that the LFPS enrolment drive strategies were most 
persuasive, being implemented by means of social interaction and network building 
with households. This clearly shows that there were activities being played out below 
the surface of the education arena in rural communities. One key strategy was the nature 
of the interaction between the LFPS and the household, which contributed to the interest 
of the poor in these schools, a phenomenon that had a direct effect on the decisions they 
made in terms of school choice. 
 
 
7.4.2 The perception of private education in relation to public schooling in the 
same locality 
There were certain LFPS practices that often determined the way in which households 
regarded private education in relation to public schooling in rural Mfantseman. In order 
to explore such practices, heads, and teachers of public and private schools, SMC 
members, and parents were interviewed. In addition, intensive classroom observation of 
teacher contact time was conducted. The emergent themes are discussed under three 
main headings: the strict enforcement of school discipline, the utilisation of teacher 
contact time, and school management strategies. 
 
The strict enforcement of school discipline 
Interviewed LFPS head teachers explained that there were a number of factors which 
attracted some poor parents to their schools. Firstly, the heads argued that their 
enforcement of strict discipline had a strong appeal. Interviewees stated that there were 
rules of behaviour laid down in their schools and pupils who broke them were punished. 
For example, if a child reported to school late they were made to weed the school 
field/farm or carry stones and sand. The following comment from a head teacher 
summarises how the school went about instilling discipline into its pupils:  
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A child must be in school at six thirty in the morning and after six thirty, we 
take a roll call and they will be punished if they are not in school… At the 
slightest sign of misbehaviour, we will hand out a physical punishment that 
must be undertaken…by making them do the weeding…sometimes, 
collecting stones for the school to sell to raise money. They do it and their 
parents don’t complain. If they don’t do it, we will expel them from the 
school… Some of the children, when you punish them, they decide to go 
home…so when they do, their parents come and beg, but we still go ahead 
and punish them before we accept their parents’ apology. This means that 
parents are confident that when they bring their children here, they will not 
be spoilt…so they always bring us naughty children to train them. 
 
This account demonstrates the firm position this LFPS took with regard to instilling 
discipline in this school. As noted earlier, the contemporary GES ruling on corporal 
punishment was that caning should only be administered by the head, or by a teacher 
under the supervision of the head. Yet, it might reasonably be argued that corporal 
punishment should not have been tolerated in school at all because it violated the rights 
of the child. However, even when the law allowed the minimal use of corporal 
punishment, public schools – unlike LFPSs – had difficulty in applying it as a 
disciplinary tool. One reason is that the LFPS did not hesitate to expel a child whose 
parent behaved antagonistically toward them, an action that would not have been 
tolerated in the state system. This is how one LFPS teacher recounted his dealings with 
a parent:   
 
The way a parent will insult a teacher somewhere [in public school]…that 
cannot happen here in my school. I well remember we came for a PTA 
meeting and we decided to levy parents for the making of bricks. We agreed 
that if a parent refused to pay, we would expel their child. Parents who 
failed to attend the PTA meeting also had to pay a fine of Gh¢2. When I 
started implementing the PTA’s decision, some parents started insulting me. 
I kept quiet and bided my time until I found a scapegoat… .. A female elder 
[the queen mother ] was insulting me and I had evidence, so I decided to 
expel all four of her children from school…she came to the school begging, 
but I still went on to suspend her children for two weeks. Since that time, no 
parent has tried to insult me, at least in my hearing… It is the discipline that 
is working here, and parents also respect it. 
 
This is an illustration of how LFPSs abused pupils and parents in rural communities, all 
in the name of instilling discipline. In contrast to what was happening in the private 
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education sector, public school head teachers were constrained by GES regulations, 
which determined the extent to which they could penalise pupils and parents.  
 
Furthermore, several interviewed parents complained that lack of teacher discipline in 
public schools did not promote child discipline. An LFPS head teacher who also worked 
as a part-time Mathematics teacher at a public school in the community expressed shock 
at the behaviour of public school pupils:  
 
Here [in private school], when we punish pupils, they don’t complain…they 
carry the punishment out before complaining. The other day, I went to 
Domino Public School to teach, and while I was in the classroom teaching, 
a pupil came walking through. I asked the pupil to kneel down but was 
shocked when he asked me what offence he had committed… I said to the 
child, ‘you will not do this in my school.’ When I reported the case of the 
child’s behaviour to the assistant head later, all he said was, ‘This is the 
problem we are facing here in this school.’  
 
Unlike LFPS head teachers, those of public schools were expected to act within the law 
and were therefore forced to operate under difficult constraints. For example, a public 
school head teacher and two LFPS head teachers noted that most public school teachers 
did not respect their heads because they had control over neither their appointment nor 
their dismissal. The head teacher of one public school described the nature of the 
relationship between him and his teachers as follows:   
 
Here, in the public school, there are some limitations…over there [at the 
private school], the teachers are forced to work and if they don’t, they will 
not be paid; but here, you cannot force a teacher to work. The teacher can 
decide to be sick…what can you do? Over there, if the head realises that 
they are lying or pretending to be sick, they will lose that day’s pay or even 
be sacked from the school… You have staff [in the public school] who are 
not co-operating…you have staff whereby only a few are willing to do their 
best, while others are relaxing under a tree… For example, look at what is 
happening here…you can see [referring to the researcher] that only two or 
three teachers are in the sun preparing the children for the Sixth of March 
[Ghanaian Independence Day], while the rest are sitting there looking on.  
 
This is a typical example of how public school head teachers and their staff related to 
each other, several teachers in both public schools and LFPSs confirming that a similar 
situation prevailed in almost all the public schools in their communities.  
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This stands in marked contrast to the situation in the LFPS: my school observations 
revealed that when an LFPS teacher was absent, their colleagues were willing to take on 
the additional responsibility of covering the class. Informal interviews with teachers 
indicated that their heads expected them to cover whenever a class teacher was absent, a 
requirement with which they readily complied since they did not want to incur the 
displeasure of the head. In the public school, such co-operation was seldom the case, 
even when the head formerly requested a teacher to cover for their colleague. This was 
because public school teachers believed that their responsibility lay solely with their 
assigned classes or subjects. One private school teacher summarised his views on 
teacher–teacher interaction in his school thus: 
  
In public school, the problem flows from the teachers to the head of the 
school… Among the teachers, there seems to be a lack of good interpersonal 
relations whereby when one teacher is not there, another would go and take 
care of the class… For example, the main subject I teach is Mathematics, 
but the form three class doesn’t have an English teacher, and so I have 
taken it upon myself and have been teaching them English and sometimes 
Social Studies. In public school, I can’t see a primary school teacher going 
to teach in JHS… There was one incident just last year when a primary 
school teacher went to the JHS just to help them in Mathematics [on 
account of the Mathematics teacher being absent for several days], and 
when the Mathematics teacher reported to school and found that a teacher 
from the primary school had come to teach his pupils he was very angry. 
 
Since private school head teachers operated under market conditions, they had a sense 
of power over and responsibility for their staff. In contrast, public school teachers might 
not have felt a sense of accountability to their heads since they were posted to the school 
by the state. As a result, this could have affected their sense of commitment to the 
school and its leadership. The implications of such a situation are that when a teacher 
was absent from school, it was a problem for either the head teacher alone to solve or 
else the pupils were left to their own devices.  
 
Indeed, in many instances during my school observations, I came across a classroom 
full of children but a teacher never entered it to teach all day long. Empty classrooms 
due to the teacher being absent, on transfer, or undertaking further studies constituted a 
common phenomenon in the public schools under study, a situation that parents were 
well aware of and one that was a source of worry to them – after all, they wanted their 
children to go to school to learn. LFPSs appear to have capitalised on the situation in 
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public schools, demonstrating to local parents that they were able to provide better 
education outcomes by ensuring that at least some learning took place even when a 
teacher was not in school.  
 
Moreover, teacher discipline, both at school and in the community, could affect 
children‟s behaviour and parents‟ attitude to the school. Some parents and LFPS 
teachers lay the blame for pupil indiscipline in public schools partly with their teachers; 
arguing that if teachers were openly disrespectful to their heads or were guilty of 
misconduct in the presence of their pupils, the latter would follow such examples and 
fail to respect their elders. This view is clearly expressed in the following statement by 
an LFPS head:  
 
When teachers do not respect the headmaster, the children will see it and 
will not respect their teachers either; so, that is when the problem starts… 
For example, we are going to have the Sixth of March…as a teacher you 
should prepare the children and you should be on the playing field with 
them. But the master gives the command and the teachers do not do it…it 
becomes contract work for one or two teachers while the rest relax. It 
means that the rest don’t respect the headmaster. So, when the teacher tells 
the children to do something, they will be messing about and won’t want to 
do it…when the children go home they tell their parents. At times, you find 
teachers fighting…quarrelling and insulting each other while their pupils 
are also there. So, the parents have seen that even the teachers themselves 
don’t respect each other…so how much will they respect the teachers?  
 
Several interviewed parents indicated that such behaviour between the head 
teacher and their staff seldom occurred in the LFPSs; and both teachers and head 
teachers of LFPSs attested to the fact that when similar incidents did take place in 
their schools, the teacher concerned was often forced to resign. Child discipline in 
school was clearly linked to good manners in teacher–head teacher and teacher–
teacher interaction, something that appeared to be lacking in most rural public 
schools. Parents in the various communities were aware of the behaviour of 
teachers in the various kinds of school in their communities, prompting some poor 
households to respond to the tendency towards a negative role model on the part 
of public school teachers by opting for an LFPS.  
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The utilisation of teacher contact time  
Another in-school practice that constituted a significant factor in reinforcing the interest 
of households in the LFPS was teacher contact time utilisation. Each term, basic schools 
had a programme of activities that led to loss of instructional time. For example, it was 
mandatory for all schools irrespective of type to participate in inter-school sports 
activities and Independence Day celebrations. However, teacher interviewees at both 
public schools and LFPSs indicated that the latter were selective in their participation in 
co-curricular activities such as sports activities in the education circuit and wider 
district. Even though LFPSs were obliged to participate in co-curricular activities as 
were public schools, interviewees including parents and teachers still considered them 
to be a waste of instructional time. Therefore, when LFPSs engaged in activities outside 
the classroom, they ensured that the time lost was recovered through an adjustment to 
the timetable, teaching lessons later than usual and beginning school early. The 
following comment by a head teacher explains some of the time recovery strategies 
employed by LFPSs:  
 
During sports activities and preparations for Independence Day 
celebrations, we lose about two to three periods of teaching time every 
morning, and we try to make up for this loss by extending school home time 
from two p.m. to four p.m. each day. Again, instead of beginning the school 
holidays on the same date as the public schools, we finish a week later and 
reopen a week earlier, and this gives us an additional two weeks, which 
enables us to make up for the lost time. 
 
However, several interviewed parents complained bitterly about how preparation for 
circuit or district sports competitions and Independence Day celebrations enabled the 
majority of pupils who were not taking part to simply loiter idly about.  
 
With regard to another cause of lost instructional time, the SMC chairperson of one of 
the public schools under study noted that he could not understand why, given that there 
were so many unemployed educated people in the community, the government preferred 
to engage teachers on national programmes such as immunisation, national censuses and 
voter registration exercises that took them out of their classrooms for at least two weeks 
each time.   
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Insights gained into the nature of instructional time lost due to co-curricular activities 
and public programmes prompted a further exploration of public school and LFPS 
utilisation of instructional time. Therefore, an intensive observation exercise of teacher 
contact time in grades 1, 4 and 6 in two public schools and two LFPSs was conducted. 
By making a comparison with teaching timetables, the study attempted to determine 
whether teachers actually utilised the teaching time allocated to each subject as 
indicated on the timetable (see Appendix 7). It is important to note that in both public 
schools and LFPSs, teaching timetables were not strictly adhered to; however, it was 
still possible to estimate instructional time usage as each class had a specific number of 
subjects that had to be taught each day. The summarized results for two schools – one 
LFPS and one public school – are reported in Tables 7.4 and 7.5.20 (See Appendix 13 
for details on teacher contact time) 
 
Table 7.4: Teacher contact time in LFPS 
Primary 1/Grade 1 Primary 4 / Grade 4 Primary 6 / Grade 6 
Teacher gives pupils exercises 
but not much engagement 
with pupils. There is excess 
time use for every subject 
taught. Time loss in day 1 is 
27 minutes, day 2 is 1 hour 45 
minutes, day 3 is 1 hours, day 
4 is 40 minutes and only 
makes excess use of teaching 
time on day 5. Total time loss 
is 3 hours 52 minutes 
Teacher makes excess use of 
time per subject taught -time 
spent writing notes on the 
board and marking exercises. 
Time loss in day 1 is 30 
minutes, day 2 is 45 minutes, 
day 3 is 15 minutes, day 4 is 
45 minutes and day 5 is 1 
hour 20 minutes. Total time 
loss is 3 hours 35minutes 
Teacher makes excess use of 
time such as spending long 
time writing questions on the 
board and marking. Teacher 
occasionally leaves class to 
chat and sometimes teacher is 
in class but not te aching. 
Time loss on day 1 is 1 hour, 
day 2 is1 hour 10 minutes, 
day 3 is 2 hours 15 minutes, 
day 4 is 10 minutes and day 5 
is 1 hour 12 minutes. Total 
time loss is 5 hours 47 
minutes  
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Four schools (two public and two private) were observed, but only one of each type was utilised in the 
analysis of teacher contact time, owing to the fact that patterns of classroom activity were similar in both 
school types. 
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Table 7.5: Teacher contact time in the rural public school 
Primary 1/Grade 1 Primary 4 / Grade 4 Primary 6 / Grade 6 
Teacher generally arrives late 
to school, leaves classroom 
and sits under a tree or 
veranda chatting with 
colleagues. Teacher 
sometimes in school but not 
teaching. Time loss on day 1 
is 2 hours, day 2 is 3 hours 20 
minutes, day 3 is 3 hours 15 
minutes, day 4 is 3 hours 39 
minutes and day 5, 4 hours 21 
minutes. Total time loss is 16 
hours 35 minutes. 
Teacher normally gives 
exercises to pupils and reads 
her distance education 
programme course book. 
Pupils are made to use 
teaching time to play. Also, 
makes excess use of teaching 
time on just on subject. Time 
loss in day 1 is 2 hours 56 
minutes, day 2 is 1 hour 13 
minutes, day 3 is 3 hours 14 
minutes, day 4 is 3 hours 45 
minutes and day 5 is 3 hours 
56 minutes. Total time is 15 
hours 4 minutes 
Teacher makes excess use of 
teaching time. Regularly 
teacher leaves classroom 
during contact period to chat 
with colleagues. Sometimes 
teacher in class but not 
teaching. Time lost in day 1 is 
1 hours 51 minutes, day 2  is 
2 hours 10 minutes, day 3 is 3 
hours 2 minutes, day 4 is 2 
hours 6 minutes and day 5 is 2 
hours 34 minutes. Total time 
lost is 11 hours 9 minutes. 
 
 
Evidence from the classroom observations shows that in terms of processes, there was 
generally an excessive use of time per a subject, which resulted in only half of the 
subjects on the timetable being taught each day, a phenomenon that was more 
pronounced in the LFPS. On the other hand, in the public school, even when teachers 
were present, they seldom remained in the classroom for the whole teaching period.  
 
In terms of the utilisation of teacher contact time, out of a weekly timetable of 25 hours 
per class per week, the LFPS lost 3 hours 52 minutes in grade 1; 3 hours 35 minutes in 
grade 4; and 5 hours 47 minutes in grade 6, representing 15 per cent, 14 per cent, and 23 
per cent respectively. Public school teachers lost a significantly greater amount of 
teacher contact time: in grade 1, 16 hours 35 minutes; in grade 4, 15 hours 4 minutes; 
and in grade 6, 11 hours 9 minutes, which constituted about 66 per cent, 60 per cent, 
and 44 per cent respectively.   
 
In all the public schools observed, at least two classrooms were permanently without 
teachers as heads waited for new members of staff to be posted. In terms of classes that 
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did have regular teachers, many reported to school but did not necessarily engage the 
pupils in teaching and learning activities. In many instances, teachers were in school but 
not in the classroom for most of the day or else left school before home time.  
 
The fact that the Educational Assessment and Research Centre (EARC, 2003) found 
teacher absence from school to be a major cause of time loss nationwide – amounting to 
about 19 per cent – notwithstanding, this study found the principal cause of time loss to 
be attributable to a phenomenon whereby the teacher was in  school but not present in 
the classroom. This is consistent with other studies, such as Suryadharma et al. (2004) 
cited in Abadzi, 2009), which found that 47 per cent of time lost to teaching resulted 
from teachers remaining outside the classroom during teaching hours in India. These 
observations are also corroborated by household head assertions with regard to teaching 
in public schools. 
 
Clearly, there is evidence that teacher contact time was not maximised in either public 
schools or LFPSs; however, the sources of time loss varied by school type. LFPSs lost 
comparatively little instructional time, but all observed teachers made excessive usage 
of contact time such that inordinately long periods were spent on just one subject. On 
the other hand, in public school in particular, teachers tended to report for work but did 
not actively use the time to teach.  
 
Thus, if the time lost due to the failure to maximise teacher contact hours is added to 
that lost due to absence and secondment to national programmes, such an annual deficit 
is much greater in the case of the public school than in the LFPS; a factor that has 
significant implications for the provision of high quality public education in rural areas. 
Therefore, when processes and teacher contact time usage are added together, the result 
corroborates the views of households in respect of the relative merits of public and 
private schools in a given locality (see Chapter 6); hence the interest shown in LFPS 
education.   
 
School management strategies 
The management of an LFPS can be likened to that of a sole proprietorship business, in 
which the school head or proprietor takes decisions with the overriding goal of making a 
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profit. Thus, the unique position of the LFPS heads enables them to maintain strict 
supervision and adopted strategies aimed at improving the school‟s academic 
performance.  
 
In two of the LFPSs under study, the proprietors revealed that in 2008 they had 
established camps
21
 for their final year JHS examination pupils in rented 
accommodation on or close to school premises. While the other two LFPS proprietors 
stated that they did not put their final year pupils into such accommodation, one school 
organised compulsory evening tuition for their examination class while the other made 
it compulsory for final year pupils to join their parent school in an urban area. This 
practice enabled LFPSs to provide pupils with extra classes in the evening and also to 
supervise their evening studies.  
 
Interviewees argued that rural children would not read if left to their own devices; 
therefore, in supervising homework, they were at least ensuring that pupils did some 
revision for their final examinations. The following comments from an LFPS 
proprietor/head teacher highlight some of the strategies they adopted:  
 
For the final year pupils [JHS 3], what we do every year is to organise 
evening classes from seven p.m. to eight p.m. every day for them. Yesterday, 
for example, they studied Science and today it will be Mathematics. At the 
end of the lesson, the teacher and I [the school proprietor] accompany all of 
them to their homes.  
 
LFPS employed such strategies to ensure that final year pupils were given additional 
support in revising for their BECE examinations. The practice of accommodating 
examination candidates in a camp was common practice amongst urban private schools, 
which had been mimicked by LFPSs in rural areas.  
 
In addition, all the LFPSs under study indicated that their mock and final examinations 
were set at the beginning of term by an external body called the Centre for Performance 
Monitoring and Evaluation (CPME), which distributed a scheme of work to the school 
the at the end of the previous term, thus allowing it to teach specifically for the 
examination.  
                                                          
21
 Examination candidates stayed in temporary residential accommodation, which was under school 
supervision. 
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In conclusion, the analysis identified four key factors associated with the popularity of 
the LFPS that explained why the poor were attracted to them. Firstly, LFPSs capitalised 
on the weak level of interaction between public schools and parents, in offering a viable 
alternative by means of follow-up with households when children failed to attend school 
due to illness, reluctance to go to school, or for any other reason. The LFPS social 
interaction approach won over the hearts and minds of parents, particularly in those 
households in which no one was educated and the schooling of at least some of its 
younger members was regarded as being long overdue.  
 
Secondly, public school heads found it difficult to manage their teachers effectively 
since they had no control over their appointment or dismissal. Pupil indiscipline and the 
unprofessional behaviour of some teachers in the public schools under study also meant 
that with their extremely strict enforcement of discipline, the LFPS became the 
preferred option for some poor households.  
 
Thirdly, observations revealed that public school pupils sometimes had just one or even 
no lessons all week, while the LFPS provided at least some teaching each day, even in 
the absence of one or two teachers. Households were aware of these differences and 
reached the obvious conclusions.  
 
Finally, rural LFPSs replicated some of the practices of private schools in urban areas, 
for example, the accommodation of examination candidates in camps in order to coach 
them in the evenings; and the supervision of reading was also regarded by parents as a 
significant factor in improving their children‟s chances of examination success. All of 
these factors combined to prompt households – including some of the poorest – to take a 
renewed interest in private schooling. 
 
 
7.5 Summary  
This chapter has put forward two arguments. Firstly, it contends that the perception of 
the rural poor that the LFPS provides a better quality of education compared to the 
public school is not borne out by the evidence. Secondly, it argues that there are 
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practices and processes embedded in the rural school environment that conspire to drive 
the interest of the poor in private schooling.  
 
Evidence from the analysis of public school and LFPS quality input indicators shows 
that the former had a greater number and better quality of teachers, and school 
infrastructure, but that this was accompanied by a higher pupil to teacher ratio than the 
private school. This finding is consistent with national data on educationally deprived 
schools (see Chapter 3) and therefore raises concerns about the quality provided by 
LFPSs. This is because high quality education is not just about outcomes but also about 
children attending school regularly in a healthy and safe environment. What is clear 
from the examination of LFPSs is that several of their school buildings posed significant 
health and safety risks to learners, and were not sufficiently weatherproof so that 
schools had no choice but to close during the rainy season. However, parents value 
BECE exam results and LFPS heads interaction with them and these were the principal 
motivation for choosing LFPSs. 
 
Moreover, analyses of both public and private school BECE examination results in 
urban and peri-urban areas reveal higher private school performance (see chapter 3; 
GSS, 2005), confirming Tooley and Dixon‟s  (2007a) findings from Ga West District, 
Ghana. The descriptive analysis of BECE results in rural communities in Mfantseman 
District that host both public and LFPSs shows that private schools generally had better 
results. However, there are public schools that perform just as well – or indeed just as 
poorly – as the LFPSs.  
 
In addition, the analysis of English and Mathematics test results, controlling for the 
background characteristics of children, shows no significantly better performance by 
LFPSs. The test results show that only one public school made progress in mathematics. 
Therefore, what is generally the case in urban and peri-urban environments does not 
hold true in the sample of schools in rural Mfantseman. Clearly, the reason why the 
poor choose LFPS may be due to their better performance in examination and 
achievement tests coupled with households‟ higher aspirations for their children fuels 
interest in private schooling. 
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Aside from the perception of quality which was not related to actual exam and tests 
performance, the qualitative evidence shows that there were practices and processes in 
the rural schooling environment that attracted the poor to the LFPS. For example, an 
aggressive enrolment strategy was employed; head teachers regularly visiting parents at 
home and ensuring that pupils attended school was a key strategy in prompting poor 
households to respond with a demand for private schooling.  
 
There were practices and processes within the LFPS environment that did not exist in 
the public school, such as the strict disciplining of pupils and teachers, and the more 
efficient use of contact time, all of which attracted households. However, as the analysis 
shows, the LFPS employment of strict discipline meted out in the form of physical 
punishment constituted an abuse of the rights of the child; and this kind of practice was 
not tolerated in the public school system due to GES regulations. 
 
Given that the preference of the poor for an LFPS education for their children must be 
backed by an ability to pay for it, the next chapter examines the role that the direct costs 
of schooling plays in the choices households make. 
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Chapter 8: Analysis of Findings III 
 
What role does cost play in school choice in rural Mfantseman? 
   
 
8.1 Introduction 
The cost of education and its interaction with household school choice decisions in poor 
rural communities constitute an issue that is central to this thesis. This is because a poor 
household‟s decision to send a child to school and its selection of a particular type of 
school are influenced by consideration of relative costs. Even though evidence from a 
number of studies in developing countries indicates the cost of education forms a barrier 
to the access to schooling (Oduro, 2000; Chao and Alper, 1998; Penrose, 1998; Bray, 
1996), recent research into private education in Asia and Africa, including Ghana, 
suggests that in the case of the LFPS, the poor might be willing to make a small 
financial contribution in the hope of receiving a high quality education for their children 
(Tooley and Dixon, 2007a; Tooley, 2005; 2009).  
 
There is a persuasive argument that the abolition of school fees through a fee „free‟ 
education policy could result in expanded access to public schooling. However, without 
significant reduction in other costs (direct and opportunity costs) together with an 
improvement in the quality of schooling, some poor households in rural areas may still 
not consider public education to be a viable option in the long term and even less so 
with private education because of additional costs that it imposes on households. This 
chapter explores the extent to which the direct costs of schooling to the household 
interact with school choice. It also compares the income and expenditure of the LFPSs 
under study to determine to what degree they might be sustainable.  
 
This chapter addresses several questions. Firstly, how much do households spend on 
education; what are the main expenses incurred in public and LFPS respectively; and 
how do costs vary between public and private schools? Secondly, what factors are 
associated with household expenditure on education; and how important is cost in 
influencing school choice? And finally, to what extent are LFPSs in rural Mfantseman 
sustainable?  
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The analysis begins with an examination of the composition of the direct household 
costs of schooling in the public and LFPS sectors respectively. This is followed by an 
independent sample t-test to determine whether there are significant differences in 
household direct costs of public and private schooling, and what it means for poor 
households‟ school choice decisions. A standard multiple regression analysis is 
employed to explain patterns of expenditure in basic schools in the selected rural 
communities in Mfantseman, and how significant factors related to school choice 
decisions. This is followed by an assessment of the ability of poor households to pay 
school fees by estimating the proportion of household income expended on public and 
private education respectively and this also compared to the national data (GSS, 2008). 
It also examines school data on fee payment and the contents of interviews with 
household heads in the lowest income group (quintile 1) on their survival and 
management strategies. Finally, the financing of the LFPS is explored in terms of its 
long-term sustainability. The chapter summary highlights the significance of the cost of 
education to the poor household‟s access to and choice of schooling in rural 
Mfantseman.  
 
8.2 How do the direct costs of schooling vary by school type? 
In my household survey of the rural communities under study in Mfantseman District, 
detailed data were collected on basic schools‟ per-term education expenses. It is 
important to note that due to the capitation grant  allocated to schools, there were no 
direct charges such as tuition or examination fees levied on parents with children in 
public school. However, parental contribution to the operational costs of the public 
school was permitted with the express permission of the SMC or district director. Yet, 
in the case of the LFPS, these charges (tuition and examination fees, and parental 
contribution) constituted over ten per cent of average direct cost per term (Table 8.1).  
 
Generally, LFPSs required considerably higher contributions than did public schools 
and the cost of items including food, stationery and uniform were also higher in the 
private education sector. This is because these items were mandatory charges in LFPSs. 
While it would be difficult to argue that any variation in expenditure by grade in public 
school arose from the fee-free policy or implementation of the capitation grant, there 
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were marginal variations in LFPS cost by grade due to small differences in tuition and 
examination fees (see Appendix  8 for LFPS fees by grade).  
 
Table 8.1 compares average direct termly cost per pupil in LFPSs and public basic 
schools respectively; data for LFPSs are given in columns two to five, while those for 
public schools are shown in columns six to eight. Of the four LFPSs under study, only 
one did not report the cost of transport to school. Of the remaining three, two  (Shambu 
and Shamo) indicated that such costs constituted about 12 per cent (Gh¢9.80) and 14 
per cent (Gh¢10.24) of average direct costs per term respectively. On the other hand, 
none of the public schools under study reported transport costs. This might be explained 
either by their proximity to the communities they served or the fact that there was 
normally a school actually located in the community with regard to those households 
that opted for public education. 
 
Table 8.1: Average direct costs per child per term in Ghanaian cedis for LFPS and 
public basic school respectively (Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
      1                         2                 3                4                 5                        6                7                  8 
 Low-fee private schools Public schools 
Item Shambu 
n=117 
 
Shamo 
n=134 
Holomo 
n=67  
Fremo 
n=168  
Medico 
n=450 
Domino 
n=212 
Kyoto 
n=257 
Transport 9.80 
(11.53) 
10.24 
(13.67) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
2.88 
(5.56) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
School meals 38.71 
(45.53) 
30.45 
(40.65) 
25.7 
(38.36) 
18.7 
(36.09) 
16.75 
(44.92) 
22.57 
(57.84) 
22.26 
(64.18) 
Tuition fees 10.47 
(12.31) 
7.97 
(10.64) 
13.83 
(20.64) 
5.04 
(9.73) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
PTA 
contribution  
1.50 
(1.76) 
1.00 
(1.33) 
0.97 
(1.45) 
0.5 
(0.96) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
2.50 
(6.41) 
1.41 
(4.07) 
Examination 
fees 
2.12 
(2.49) 
1.64 
(2.19) 
1.58 
(2.36) 
1.72 
(3.32) 
2.28 
(6.11) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
Extra classes 7.00 
(8.23) 
8.37 
(11.17) 
6.13 
(9.15) 
8.13 
(15.69) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
N/A 
(0.00) 
School 
uniform 
6.31 
(7.42) 
9.66 
(12.89) 
12.34 
(18.42) 
8.01 
(15.45) 
10.19 
(27.33) 
7.07 
(18.12) 
7.81 
(22.52) 
Stationery 9.12 
(10.73) 
5.59 
(7.46) 
6.44 
(9.62) 
6.84 
(13.20) 
8.07 
(21.64) 
6.88 
(17.63) 
3.20 
(9.23) 
Average total 
cost per child 
85.03 
(100) 
74.92 
(100) 
66.99 
(100) 
51.82 
(100) 
37.29 
(100) 
39.02 
(100) 
34.68 
(100) 
Notes: figures in parentheses are column percentages. N/A = not available and/or not applicable. 
Source: The author (Field data, 2008).   
 
However, in the case of the LFPSs, some head teachers indicated that they charged a fee 
to provide transport for pupils who had long distances to travel. The statistical results 
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for household school choice in chapter 6 (see Table 6.1) indicate that the further away a 
private school was situated from a pupil‟s home in comparison to a public school, the 
more likely a household was to choose the latter. The general conclusion is that children 
who went to school outside their communities were enrolled in private school. This is 
an indication that the cost of transport influenced school choice decisions.  
 
School meals (food at school) constituted the most expensive single item of all the 
direct costs of education in both private and public schools, although households that 
enrolled their children in the former incurred the highest expenditure on food. The cost 
of LFPS meals ranged from Gh¢18.7 to Gh¢38.71 per child per term, while that at the 
public schools ranged from Gh¢16.75 to about Gh¢23; thus the cost of LFPS meals was 
on average about one and half times that of the public school. Informal interviews with 
parents revealed that, some children refused to go to schools if they were given food 
rather than money for food. The relative high cost of meals in LFPS compared to public 
was due to the fact that it was mandatory and also cost a bit more in an LFPS than a 
public school.  
 
One would expect private school tuition fees to have been much higher than the cost of 
school meals but this was not the case. It was found that the LFPSs either contracted 
local food vendors to sell food on school premises or made their own arrangements for 
pupils to purchase food. In contrast, the purchase of meals was not obligatory in public 
school, and vendors sold food to pupils on the premises without a contractual 
arrangement with the school. Nevertheless, in effect, tuition fees, extra classes, and 
expenditure on food appear to have been the principal causes of increased household 
education expenditure with regard to the LFPS. 
 
This pattern of expenditure is consistent with the evidence presented in Chapter 3. Also, 
GSS (2008) concludes that in the rural coastal area in which the district under study is 
located, annual food, board and lodging costs at primary school constitute the highest 
average household expenditure item (26.4 per cent), while tuition and registration fees 
account for only five per cent of total expenditure per year. Given that of the 279 
households that chose public schooling (see Table 8.3) 23 per cent fell within the lowest 
income group, the relative high cost of school meals could have served as a disincentive 
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to some poor households to enrol their children in public school, especially if they 
considered the opportunity cost of education to be high and the quality doubtful.    
 
As noted earlier, public schools were tuition free but private schools were not. The 
LFPS tuition fee constituted only about a tenth of total its direct schooling costs. When 
this is compared with the cost of meals, extra-classes and stationery, it can be inferred 
that the marginal cost of paying private sector fees was not so prohibitively high so as to 
discourage some poor households from opting for private education. Clearly, auxiliary 
cost items (e.g. meals, stationery and extra classes) constituted a significant proportion 
of the direct household cost of schooling; but in public basic school, the cost of 
uniforms and stationery per child averaged about a fifth of the average total direct cost 
of schooling.  
 
This kind of cost structure at the basic school level – at which auxiliary costs in terms of 
both public and private schools constituted significant proportions of average direct 
expenditure on education – provided an incentive for poor households, which perceived 
private schooling to be a better alternative, especially if they thought LFPSs offered 
value for money; and they were therefore willing to make sacrifices in order to help 
realise their aspirations. Thus, focusing simply on direct costs as the key determinant of 
the poor household‟s decision in choosing between public and private schooling could 
be misleading. Equally, policies solely concerned with the abolition of direct fees might 
not necessarily translate into a higher demand for education by the poor because costs 
depend on other things apart from school fees. 
 
8.2.1 Principal direct household school costs 
In order to understand the main direct household costs of schooling, expenditure per 
child per term by school type was estimated. In households in which there was one child 
in public school and another in LFPS, the respective cost of education was entered 
against the school type that the child was enrolled in.  
 
Table 8.2 shows direct household education costs by school type. Even though public 
schools did not charge school fees, parents were still obliged to make a financial 
contribution to the school. For example, public school PTAs required occasional 
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payments, the amount a household was required to contribute depended on the number 
of children it had in school; this averaged out at Gh¢1.3 per term, which was more than 
the similar average contribution made per child at LFPS (Gh¢0.99). Moreover, 
households that enrolled their children in public school had to pay an examination fee – 
Gh¢0.76 per term on average – even though the capitation grant was intended to cover 
such expenses. 
 
Table 8.2: Direct household cost of education per child per term by school type  
Amount in Ghanaian cedis per term (Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
Cost item Public 
school 
Low-
fee 
Private 
school 
Cost differential 
(private minus 
public) 
 Percentage 
cost 
differential 
     
Transport to and from school 0 4.08 4.08 13.9 
School meals 17.46 25.27 7.81 26.60 
Tuition fee (school fees) 0 8.10 8.10 27.60 
Parental contribution (PTA) 1.3 0.99 -.031 -1.10 
Examination fees 0.76 1.07 0.031 1.10 
Extra classes 0 7.53 7.53 25.70 
School uniform 7.17 8.02 0.85 2.90 
Stationery (exercise books, textbooks, pens, 
etc.) 
6.05 7.0 0.95 3.20 
     
Average total cost per child per household 32.74 62.06 29.32 100 
Source: The author (Field data, 2008). 
 
Interviews with head teachers concerning household education expenditure revealed 
that schools levied fees in order to conduct special or „super mock‟ 22 examinations for 
their final year JHS pupils. However, no charges were made for extra classes, following 
a directive from the GES to all public basic school heads instructing them not to collect 
any additional payment from parents for such tuition. Household heads, public school 
heads and teachers who were interviewed attested to the fact that no fees were charged 
for extra classes; although some teachers expressed the need for and willingness on their 
part to conduct extra classes if parents were willing to pay.   
 
                                                          
22
 Super mock examination is the last internal exams conducted by the school prior to their final 
examination conducted by WAEC. 
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In the case of the LFPS, since attending extra classes and taking meals at school were 
compulsory, these costs items – along with tuition fees – remained the main direct costs 
of schooling. On the other hand, in terms of the public school, food, uniforms and 
stationery were the main costs; even though the percentage differential of the cost of 
uniforms and stationery between private and public is small, as indicated in Table 8.2.   
 
The evidence thus indicates that apart from LFPS tuition fees, the difference between 
public and private schools in the average cost of education per child lay in extra class 
fees (26 per cent) and school meals (27 per cent). This is a clear indication that it was 
not the cost of tuition that made the LFPS more expensive, but rather the auxiliary costs 
of schooling, especially meals.  
 
8.3 Is there a significant difference in the direct household costs of education 
between the LFPS and the public school? 
About 26 per cent of the study‟s sample of households had chosen to send children to an 
LFPS, whilst 21 per cent had selected the combined option, enrolling their children in 
both private and public schools. However, the majority of the sample had enrolled their 
children in a public school (53 per cent); a statistical breakdown that is consistent with 
Harma‟s (2008) study in rural India. Overall, the selection of an LFPS was manifested 
across the whole range of households in the three communities under study (from the 
poorest to the richest households).  
 
Not surprisingly, the vast majority (61 per cent) of households in the lowest income 
quintile utilised public schools. Given that about two fifths (38.85 per cent) of 
households in the lowest income quintile had made a school choice – with 23 per cent 
choosing private schooling only, and 15.83 per cent selecting the combined option (see 
Table 8.3) – it is important to determine whether there was much difference in the direct 
cost of education between the two school types, taking into account the fee-free 
education policy in respect of the public sector. 
 
An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare means of direct household cost 
of schooling in terms of three key items: school uniform, stationery and school meals 
(see Table 8.4). The test also compared public and private education in terms of the 
average cost of schooling per child.  
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Table 8.3: Percentage distribution of households by income quintile and school  
       type 
 
Amount Gh¢ 
Quintile 1  
208.02 
Quintile 2 
355.24 
Quintile 3  
518.74 
Quintile 4  
875.17 
Quintile 5  
1,909.04 
 
All Households 
Households 105 105 105 105 105 525 
 
Household 
school 
preference 
      
Public 61.15 54.55 55.36 47.06 48.86 279 
Private 23.02 27.27 25 22.69 30.68 135 
Combined 15.83 18.18 19.64 30.25 20.46 111 
Total 100 100 100 100 100  
Source: The author (Field data, 2008).     
 
The results showed no statistically significant differences between public and private 
education in respect of expenditure on school uniform or textbooks and stationery. On 
the other hand, the higher cost of food in private school was statistically significant – 
public school: µ =17.46, Sd=11.3; and private school: µ =25.37, Sd=13.6 – although the 
magnitude of the mean variation (µ =7.81) was moderate (eta squared = 0.074). 
Average expenditure varied significantly, with public at µ =32.7, Sd=14.9; and private 
at µ =62.06, Sd=23.6. The average cost of enrolling a child in LFPS was greater than 
that of public school, the magnitude of the variation (µ =29.34) being very high (eta 
squared = 0.293). As expected, households that had opted for an LFPS incurred 
significantly higher direct costs per child than did those with their offspring in fee-free 
public school. 
 
Table 8.4: Independent sample t-test comparison between public school and LFPS 
in terms of the direct cost of education, 2008 (in Ghanaian cedis; Gh¢1.43 = US$1 
at 2004 rate) 
 Public Private   
Cost item N Mean  SD N Mean  SD t (df) Sig. 
Food 292 17.46 11.3 133 25.27 13.6 5.80 (218) 0.000 
School uniform 291 7.17 6.5 133 8.02 7.7 1.70 (221) 0.090 
Textbooks & 
stationery 
292 6.05 10.5 133 7.0 16.4 1.07 (182) 0.286 
Average cost 272 32.74 14.9 126 62.06 23.6 12.8 (173) 0.000 
Source: The author (Field data, 2008).       Note: equal variance not assumed. 
 
The mean cost differential shows private education in the communities under study to 
be about twice as expensive as public schooling (see Table 8.3). Yet, such a cost 
differential notwithstanding, a sizeable proportion of households (about 40 per cent) in 
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the lowest income quintile were either among those that had chosen private schooling 
only or had selected the combined option (see Table 8.2). Given the relatively high 
direct cost of private education, we might infer that the majority of poor households that 
had opted for it had either chosen the least expensive private schools and/or were among 
those that had social networks of friends and relatives who were able to absorb private 
education costs and so were not so poor that it was unaffordable.   
 
The Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition (GNECC, 2005) analysis of the 
education expenditure of an unrepresentative sample of 29 households in seven 
extremely deprived schools in catchment areas in Ga West District, both immediately 
preceding and following the implementation of the fee-free capitation grant policy in 
Ghana, provides further insight into the differences between household education 
expenditure under varying circumstances. Table 8.5 shows that the fee-free policy led to 
the removal of mandatory expenditure on schooling at both primary and JHS levels, 
such that households were freed from the obligation to provide annual levies, PTA dues, 
textbooks and examination fees. 
 
Table 8.5: Comparison of annual household education expenditure in Ga West 
public basic schools before and after the introduction of the capitation grant in 
2004/05 (in Ghanaian cedis; Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
 
Source: GNECC (2005).     
 
Expenditure item Pre- 
capitation 
grant 
primary 
school  
Post-
capitation 
grant 
primary 
school 
Pre-
capitation 
grant JHS 
Post-
capitation 
grant 
JHS 
 Median  Median Median  Median 
Annual levy 2.9 0       2.5 0 
Annual PTA dues 0.5 0        0.5 0 
Examination fees  1.0 0 3.0 0 
Textbooks  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Stationery 8.0 8.0 3.2 3.2 
Rules and geometry sets 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 
School bags 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 
School uniform 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 
School meals 88.0 88.0 66.0 66.0 
Total cost without school meals      28.1 23.4 25.2 19.2 
Total cost with school meals 116.5 111.4 91.2 85.2 
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However, the cost of school meals remained the main component of the direct 
household cost of schooling in Ga West, constituting about 75 per cent of total 
expenditure on education at the primary level. This is consistent with GLSS 5 evidence 
(see Chapter 3); and also with the results of the case schools of the present study in rural 
Mfantseman (see Table 8.2), which, following interviews with poor household heads, 
found that the government‟s fee-free policy had effectively contributed to a substantial 
reduction in the burden of education. Indeed, all that households now needed to do was 
pay for school meals. When asked whether or not the fee-free policy had made 
schooling more accessible, one household head made the following comments: 
 
Free education has really helped many children to go to school. Before 
capitation, even though they went to school, they were often sent home for 
the school fees; but now, no child is sent home for the fees… We just have to 
give a child money for food and they go to school.  
 
However, the general consensus that the fee-free policy had contributed to reducing the 
cost burden notwithstanding, some interviewees noted that some children still did not go 
to school due to the inability of their parents to provide them with their education needs, 
especially school meals. The following interview excerpt reflects the extent to which 
household heads believed that the fee-free policy had increased accessibility:  
 
[The] fee-free [policy] has helped some parents to send their children to 
school… It is true that the government has removed fees, but it will not give 
us books, pens or even furniture. So, if the government is helping to send 
your child to school, it means that you must also help yourself; and if you 
are not working, you will not be able to do so. As I speak, some parents 
have never sent their children to school; and if you ask why, the parent will 
say that they don’t have the money – there is probably no money to buy food 
for the child to go to school. 
 
As previously mentioned, the purchase of food at school was obligatory in respect of the 
LFPS, but not in the public education sector. However, several interviewed household 
heads indicated that if they are unable to provide their children with money for school 
meals or for food to take to school, they were reluctant to go. Clearly, the straitened 
circumstances of the household itself formed a barrier to access. This was because if a 
household could not provide its children with school meals, it made no difference 
whether this was in terms of public or private education.  
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It may be argued that the cost differential between public and private schools, as 
evidenced by the t-test results, was due to varying household demographics and socio-
economic characteristics which influence household‟s ability to afford the cost of a 
school type. To test this, the determinants of education expenditure were examined 
using a standard regression technique. 
 
 
8.4 What factors are associated with education expenditure in rural   
       Mfantseman? 
While Table 8.1 shows average household education expenses in terms of basic public 
school and LFPS, more can be learned by employing a standard regression technique to 
explain factors associated with education expenditure, controlling for other explanatory 
variables. To identify significant factors influencing household spending on schooling 
in rural Mfantseman, the log of total household expenditure on education per child was 
regressed on a variety of household and school variables (see Appendix 5 for 
description of explanatory variables). Table 8.6 shows the regression results.  
 
The model as whole is statistically significant F(15, 282) = 19.62, p. < 0.001, indicating 
a strong correlation between education expenditure, and household and school 
characteristics. The R
2 
= 0.51 reading indicates that 51 per cent of the variance in 
education expenditure is explained by the regression.  
 
The regression result shows that the level of a household head‟s education is positive 
and statistically associated with educational expenditure, an indication that more 
educated household heads spend more than less educated on education. This is hardly 
surprising since there is a direct correlation between number of years of education and 
level of income; and the more highly educated a household head, the more value they 
were likely to place on education, and thus the more they spent on it for their children 
(Colclough, et al., 2003; Glewwe and Patrinos, 1999).   
 
With regard to occupation, household agricultural activities had a significant negative 
impact on school expenses. Households whose main livelihood depended on own farm 
agriculture spend less on education than those not in that occupation. Considering that 
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the majority (nearly 70 per cent) of households in the sample were engaged in such 
small-scale farming (see chapter five), this is an interesting finding. It is probably 
explained by the subsistence nature of activities in the rural communities studied, which 
reduced household capacity to bear the cost of education and hence their ability to 
exercise school choice.  
 
Table 8.6: Determinants of household expenditure on education at the basic level 
Notes: *** = p. <0.01; ** = p. <0.05; * = p. <0.10. Figures in parenthesis = standard 
errors. 
Source: The author (Field data, 2008). 
 
 
ln (total direct education expenditure 
per child)  
 
Constant 3.55 
(0.17) 
Household head characteristics  
    Gender of household head 
0.011 
(0.058) 
    Age of household head  -0.002 
(0.002) 
    Educational level of household head  0.016** 
(0.007) 
   Religion of household head (Christian =1) 0.141* 
(0.080) 
 Household characteristics  
    Social network -0.039 
(0.069) 
   Household assets (three or more = 1) -0.063 
(0.102) 
     Occupation 
          Household agricultural activities 
          Petty trade/manufacture 
          Major trade/manufacture 
 
                  -0.107*  (0.059) 
                  -0.035     (0.053) 
                  -0.113     (0.085) 
 
Children in school  
        No. of children actually in school      0.261*** 
(0.052) 
       No. of children in public school 0.038 
(0.050) 
       No. of children in private school   0.065 
(0.044) 
Household school choice  
            Private school only 
 
           Public and private school 
    0.326*** 
(0.105) 
-0.325*** 
(0.103) 
Distance to school (km) 0.003 
(0.003) 
Observations 
R
2
 
298 
0.51 
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The private school variable – the dummy variable – which indicates whether the child 
was in public or private school, has a significant (1 per cent) positive impact on school 
expenses – private school attendees spent more on education than their counterparts in 
public school. The private school variable is intended to be a more accurate indicator of 
marginal costs to households that transferred their children from public to private school 
(Glewwe and Patrinos, 1999). Thus, the coefficient of private school choice indicates 
that it cost a household almost 40 per cent more when they transferred a child from the 
public to the private education sector (i.e. e
0.326
 = 1.385). This reaffirms the fact that the 
LFPS was not an easy choice for the poorest households, especially those subsisting on 
very low and unstable sources of income. 
 
On the other hand, the selection of the combined option had a significant negative 
impact on education expenditure, confirming the view that enrolling different children 
in both public and private school reduced the household‟s financial burden in 
comparison to those that enrolled all their children in an LFPS. However, it is important 
to note that approximately half the households (48.8%) in my sample that had chosen 
private education had just one child in school. 
 
In order to entice households, LFPSs adopted strategies to induce demand from 
households interested in private schooling.  In one particular private school, the total 
fees that a household paid was reduced for every additional child enrolled.   A fourth 
child enrolled paid no fees.  Two of the low-fee private schools encouraged households 
to enrol children between the ages of three to five for free in their pre-schools. This 
practice ensured that they had a stock of children ready to enter the fee paying stream.  
Households who were able to pay fees promptly and in full sometimes received a 
discount of 10% to 15%.  These practices ensured that the low-fee private schools were 
able to recruit from among some of the poor households. In short, the LFPS operated in 
a way that maximised demand from households on very low earnings but had a 
preference for private education.  
 
However, it is important to note that the reduction in the total cost of an LFPS education 
arising from the strategies adopted to attract more clients notwithstanding, the average 
cost per child in private school compared to those in public school was still substantially 
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high, as shown in Table 8.2. This raises the important question of how the poor were 
able to afford to send their children to LFPS given their relatively low income. This 
problem is explored in the next section.  
 
8.5 How important is cost in determining the poor household’s school choice?  
The cost of education is clearly a significant factor in determining school choice. This is 
because choice has to do with the affordability of the various available school types 
(Harma, 2008). This section assesses the extent to which the poor could afford the cost 
and hence the choice of an LFPS. Firstly, the proportion of household income spent on 
education per child is analysed. Secondly, LFPS enrolment and fee data from the 
previous academic year are used to determine the fee arrears households owed to the 
LFPSs under study. Finally, interview data derived from poor household heads 
concerning their survival and management strategies are employed to examine the 
extent to which such strategies might have contributed to the sustained demand for 
private education. 
 
8.5.1 The proportion of household income spent on education 
To determine the proportion of household income expended on education, and taking 
into consideration whether a child was in public or private school, the  household direct 
cost per child for these two school types was compared with the mean household 
income by quintile. Table 8.7 shows mean and median household income by quintile. 
 
Table 8.7: Mean and Median annual household income by quintile (in Ghanaian 
cedis; Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
 Quintile 1 Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
Mean household income             208.02 355.24 518.74 875.17 1,909.04 
Median household income            222.00 360.00 540.00 900.00 1,575.00 
Source: The author (Field Data, 2008).  
 
A comparison of the average total cost per child at private – Gh¢62.06 – and at public 
school – Gh¢32.7 – (see Table 8.2) with the corresponding mean household income by 
quintile reveals that the enrolment of just one child in LFPS by a quintile 1 household 
would expend about a third (29.8 per cent) of its income. Given that in the communities 
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under study households on average had two school-age children (see Chapter 5), if both 
of them were enrolled in private school, this would consume the majority of their 
income. If a household had, for example, one child in public school and one in LFPS, 
the average cost would of course be lower than if they enrolled both of them in private 
school but this will still constitute about 45% of the poorest household income. And for 
those with all their children in public school, the requisite proportion of household 
income expenditure would be much less – about 16 per cent.  
 
In terms of quintile 2 households, the proportion of income expenditure would be 17 per 
cent and 9 per cent for private and public school respectively; while for quintile 3 
households, the proportions would be reduced to 12 per cent and 6 per cent for private 
and public school respectively. Those in quintile 4 could expect a further reduction to 
about 7 per cent for LFPS and 4 per cent for public school. With regard to the richest 
households in the community (quintile 5), the gap between the proportion of income 
expenditure on LFPS and public school would narrow even further to about 3 per cent 
and 1.7 per cent respectively.  
 
Analysis of GLSS 5 data indicates that in terms of a household in quintile 1, a much 
lower proportion (16.5 per cent) of its income was expended on a child in private JHS 
(see Chapter 3). However, based on criteria suggested by Lewin (2007b) that no more 
than 10% of the poor households‟ income is expended on one child‟s education, the 
analysis show that households in quintiles 1–3 in rural Mfantseman spent more than 10 
per cent of their income on just one child, corroborating the assertion that, in general 
terms, private education is beyond the financial means of the poor (Harma, 2008). Thus, 
for those poor households under study that chose private schooling, huge sacrifices and 
cutbacks on everyday necessities would be required. Clearly, the poor in this context 
had no real choice given the cost of private schooling relative to their income.  
 
However, it emerged from my interviews with 38 household heads that while the 
introduction of the fee-free capitation grant to schools had reduced the cost burden of 
public education considerably, it might have had the unintended consequence of 
encouraging a few households to consider the combined school option. In effect, the 
„savings‟ from the abolition of public school fees and the attractive proposition of the 
high quality of education offered by the LFPS created an interest in it.   
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8.5.2 LFPS enrolment and fee income  
This section examines enrolment rates and fee data for three of the four LFPSs for the 
academic year immediately preceding the study (2008/09) in order to determine the 
extent to which expected revenue from fees matched actual receipt. Table 8.8 shows 
enrolment figures and fee income for these schools.  
 
Of the total of 227 pupils enrolled in Shamo LFPS, only 1 had dropped out and overall 
fee arrears as a percentage of total expected revenue constituted just 3.26 per cent. At 
Holomo LFPS, 34 pupils of a total enrolment of 136 were in fee arrears, accounting for 
an overall total revenue deficit of Gh¢231.50.  This amount (Gh¢231.50) represent 
about 11% of the projected income. Finally, at Fremo LFPS, 52 of its 187 pupils were in 
fee arrears, amounting to a total revenue deficit of Gh¢176 about 13% of the school‟s 
projected income. The difference in fee arrears in relation to the number of pupils per 
school whose households owed fees reflects the level of fees charged by each LFPS; for 
example, Holomo charged higher fees than did Fremo – fees ranged from Gh¢ 11 to 
Gh¢ 20 in Holomo compared to Gh¢ 6 to Gh¢ 10 charged by Fremo (see Appendix 8). 
 
Table 8.8: Enrolment figures and fee revenue for three LFPSs, 2008/09 academic 
year (in Ghanaian cedis; Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
School Total 
Enrolment 
Number of 
pupils  
ever 
suspended 
pending 
payment 
of fees 
Number 
of drop 
out 
Amount 
owed by 
drop outs 
Number in 
fee arrears 
Expected 
fee 
revenue 
 
Total 
amount in 
arrears 
Total 
fee 
arrears 
as a  
percent
age of 
total 
revenue 
Shamo 227 92 1 7.50 8 2,069.50 67.50 3.26 
Fremo 187 154 15 102.00 52 1,349.00 176.00 13.05 
Holomo 136 40 11 28.00 34 2,120.00 231.50 10.92 
Source: The author (Field data, 2010). 
 
A plausible explanation for this differential fee level is that Holomo did not face such 
stiff competition compared to Fremo, which was subject to a greater degree of rivalry 
for pupils with other private schools in the education circuit.  
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As noted earlier, the fee arrears experienced by Fremo and Holomo amounted to about 
13 per cent and 11 per cent of total fee revenue respectively, while the amount owed by 
drop out was 8 per cent of total expected fee revenue in each school respectively. Thus, 
if the fees owed by drop outs are added to the fee arrears, the total arrears as a 
percentage of overall expected revenue from fees was 20.16 per cent and 12.4 per cent 
at Fremo and Holomo respectively. Shamo experienced fee arrears of less than 4 per 
cent of its expected fee income; but at Holomo, the figure was about 10 per cent; while 
approximately 20 percent of Fremo‟s expected income was in arrears due to non-
payment and drop out.  
 
A follow up with eight of these drop out pupils‟ households revealed that two had 
dropped out because of illness, one had transferred to another school, while the 
remaining five were staying away on account of owing money for such items as tuition 
fees, extra classes and school meals. Even though this result is drawn from a small 
sample, it clearly signals that not all poor households could afford to maintain the costs 
of private schooling, a conclusion corroborated by the fact that many pupils were 
suspended pending the payment of school fees (see Table 8.8).  
 
In Holomo LFPS, 40 per cent of pupils were suspended at least once pending the receipt 
of their fees; the figure was 41 per cent in Shambu; while Fremo, which had the lowest 
rate of fee arrears of all, apparently enjoyed a high degree of success by suspending 
about 82 per cent of its pupils until their fees were paid. According to teachers and 
heads of LFPSs, several pupils were suspended more than four times a term. In two 
schools, pupils who failed to pay their fees were caned, interviewees arguing that such 
„punishment‟ made children put pressure on their parents to pay up. In respect of the 
poorest households, clearly financing their children‟s LFPS tuition was a difficult 
undertaking, meaning that, in the long term, it was highly probable that they would not  
sustain their demand for private schooling due to the high auxiliary costs enumerated in 
table 8.2. 
 
8.5.3 Household survival and management strategies 
In order to understand how the poor sustained their children‟s schooling, 12 household 
heads among the lowest income quintile were interviewed on their survival and 
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management strategies, given that a substantial proportion (30 per cent on LFPS) and 
(16 per cent on public school) of their income was spent on education.  
 
One of the most frequently cited coping strategies was the purchase of education 
materials and food on credit, or the sale of personal belongings such as clothes in order 
to buy these items. Of the 12 household heads interviewed, 9 cited purchase on credit or 
sale of belongings. Harma (2009) also found similar practices amongst poor households 
in rural Uttar Pradesh, where households that could not easily afford the cost of private 
education had to cut back on other household necessities. Clearly, this source of 
education funding is not sustainable, and calls into question the continued enrolment of 
children from such households in private school. 
 
Furthermore, in rural communities, the issue of inadequate access to credit – particularly 
amongst small-scale and peasant farmers – is well known (Mason and Rozelle, 1998). 
However, in rural Mfantseman, some households engaged in agriculture were able to 
access credit through advance loans from those who bought their farm produce. For 
example, in describing how they coped, one household head noted that,  
Buyers of our farm produce sometimes pay us in advance before we harvest 
the crops for them. They also give us interest free loans and the produce 
from the farm is then used for repayment.  
 
This demonstrates that even though accessibility to credit was a major obstacle to the 
ability to engage in productive economic activity in the communities under study, some 
households were still able to raise the money to support their household budget. For 
many smallholders who did not have other sources of livelihood, obtaining money on 
credit was key to their survival. The benefits of this source of income notwithstanding, 
it could also have negative consequences in terms of the ability of the household to 
sustainably finance their children‟s education. This was because many of these 
households grew farm produce in order to meet their subsistence needs. A poor harvest, 
which was a common phenomenon in such rural areas – arising mainly from the 
traditional nature of farming – together with the small acreage of land holdings, drove 
them into a deeper cycle of poverty (GSS, 2005b). Clearly, the burden of education 
expenditure on such households would be enormous and, consequently, might have 
negatively affected their capacity to sustainably finance the education of their children. 
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Another coping strategy was the parental condoning of child labour – children engaged 
in casual farm work, petty trading or fishing during term time or the school holidays – 
to raise money in order to support their education. Children were allowed to travel to 
Mankessim during the school holidays to carry out petty trading; or to Half Assini, in 
Western Region, to fish. The income raised was used to help meet general household 
and education expenses.  
 
One LFPS head teacher explained that children in his school who did not receive 
financial support from their parents were permitted to engage in casual labour one day a 
week in order to raise money to meet their schooling expenses. However, allowing 
pupils to work during term time could have serious consequences for the child‟s 
sustained school attendance and completion. For example, the Ghana child labour 
survey report (GSS, 2003) indicates that children who engage in long hours of 
employment tend to learn little because they are frequently absent from school or too 
tired to concentrate in class.  
 
Some households depended on social networks of friends and relatives to provide food 
items or money to pay for schooling expenses. However, as indicated in chapter five, 
only about a fifth of the households under study depended on social networks for 
survival, leaving the vast majority with no such network. Thus, in situations in which 
the household was unable to obtain sufficient food, it was revealed that children went to 
school on empty stomachs, or else refused to go to school altogether.    
 
The present study‟s affordability analysis demonstrated that the cost of education was 
important to the poor household‟s choice of schooling, finding that the LFPS was 
generally beyond the sustainable financial reach of the poor. The minority of poor 
households that did manage to enrol and keep their children in LFPS achieved it only by 
taking advantage of fee-reduction strategies by LFPSs and making stringent sacrifices. 
Interviews with households in the lowest income quintile revealed that management and 
survival strategies enabling the initial enrolment of a child in LFPS failed to provide a 
reliable source of funding: small-scale and unreliable sources of income such as 
subsistence farming and fishing simply did not raise enough money to sustain a pupil‟s 
private schooling for the whole basic education cycle. 
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Given that some households owed LFPS fee arrears in the range of between 10 and 20 
per cent of the school‟s expected fee income, the question from the opposing point of 
view is whether the LFPS was able to raise sufficient income to sustain its operations. 
The next section examines the income and expenditure of the LFPS in order to 
understand whether it was a sustainable enterprise in the poor rural environment. 
 
8.6 Operating the rural LFPS – how much room for expansion? 
In the LFPSs income analysis earlier in this chapter (Table 8.8), it was established that 
of the three schools for which data was available, one had a fee income deficit of 20 per 
cent, while another experienced a 12 per cent shortfall arising from default in the  
 
Table 8.9: Estimated LFPS recurrent/operational costs, 2008/09 academic year (in 
Ghanaian cedis; Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
Cost items School 
Holomo Shamo Fremo 
Recurrent/operational costs     
Salary costs    
 Salaries 2,320.00 2,400.00 1,493.8 
 Total 2,320.00 2,400.00 1,493.8 
    
Non-salary costs    
 Administration    
- Teachers‟ notebooks 49.05 50.00 84.00 
- Class registers 10.00 16.00 14.50 
- Chalk 25.20 120.00 60.00 
- Pens 7.00 10.00 15.00 
- Cardboard 6.00 10.00 9.00 
- Poster paint 3.50 10.00 - 
- Water - 48.00 20.00 
- Photocopying 3.00 10.00 9.00 
- Refreshments (visitors) 50.00 50.00 5.00 
- Transport (meetings) 150.00 50.00 10.00 
- First aid (drugs) 10.00 130.00 30.00 
- Annual registration fees - - - 
 Textbooks    
- Social Studies 18.00 45.00 27.00 
- Science 30.00 45.00 40.00 
- Mathematics 18.00 45.00 37.00 
- English Language 25.00 45.00 37.00 
- Other books 68.00 30.00 20.00 
Sports activities - 210.00 60.00 
Other expenses - 150.00 105.00 
Total 472.75 1,054.00 582.5.00 
Grand Total  
(salary + non-salary costs) 
 
2,792.75 
 
3,474.00 
 
2,076.30 
Source: The author (Field data, 2010). 
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payment of fees and pupil drop out. Considering that such schools made a point of 
charging comparatively low fees in the first place, this raises the important question of 
how they were able to meet their operational costs.  
 
An additional issue was that of balancing the books after operational costs were 
deducted from revenue. If there is no viable profit margin, concerns may well be raised 
about the long-term sustainability of low-fee private education in the poor rural 
environment. This was explored by comparing the estimated revenue of the three LFPSs 
under study with their estimated recurrent/operational costs. In addition, LFPS teachers 
were interviewed on the challenges they faced in their various schools.  
 
Table 8.9 shows the estimated costs of operating the three LFPSs. In Holomo, salaries 
amounted to Gh¢2,320, representing about 83 per cent of its total operational costs. The 
corresponding figures for Fremo were Gh¢1,349.80, 72 per cent of total operational 
costs; while at Shamo, they were Gh¢2,400, 69 per cent of total operational costs. Of 
the three schools, Shamo spent less in percentage terms on salaries simply because it 
paid its teachers less – the mean basic monthly salary at Shamo was Gh¢23.00, 
compared to Holomo and Fremo, which paid mean salaries of Gh¢37.00 and Gh¢31.00 
respectively (Table 8.10).  
 
Table 8.10: Monthly income per teacher in three rural LFPSs, 2010 (in Ghanaian 
cedis; Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
 Holomo Shamo Fremo 
 Salary Other  Total Salary Other Total Salary Other Total 
Mean 37.00 20.00 57.00 23.00 20.00 43.00 31.00 20.00 51.00 
Mode 30.00 20.00 50.00 23.00 20.00 43.00 30.00 20.00 50.00 
Minimum 30.00 - - 23.00 - - 11.25 - - 
Maximum 60.00 - - 23.00 - - 60.00 - - 
Teachers   12   11   12
23
 
Source: The author (Field data, 2010). 
 
                                                          
23
 The head was trained and two other members of staff were taking a distance learning teacher training 
course. Holomo and Shamo had no trained teachers. 
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In addition to a basic monthly salary, teachers received additional income from the daily 
collection of extra classes fees, meaning that gross monthly income per teacher in 
Holomo, Fremo and Shamo averaged at around Gh¢57.00, Gh¢51.00 and Gh¢43.00 
respectively. However, the high mean monthly salaries enjoyed by teachers at Holomo 
were explained by its proprietor and head teacher‟s comparatively high remuneration. 
The modal monthly salary in respect of teachers at Holomo shows that their gross 
monthly remuneration was about Gh¢50.00.  
 
Yet, these rates of pay were still far below that an LFPS teacher would have earned if 
they were paid the national minimum daily wage of Gh¢3.11, which it was by law 
mandatory for employers to pay their employees. Such flouting of the law was 
commonplace in the LFPS sector and proprietors got away with it. Table 8.11 shows the 
estimated monthly salary an LFPS teacher would have received if paid the minimum 
wage. It is evident that if such teachers had been paid even the 2010 minimum daily 
wage of Gh¢3.11 (assuming a month to be an average of 28 days), their monthly salary 
would have been Gh¢87.08, Gh¢30.00 more than that paid at the time of the study. 
Nevertheless, this also indicates that remunerating LFPS teachers on the basis of the 
minimum wage would have meant that the salary cost to the school would have almost 
doubled and hence drastically further reduced any profit margin it actually enjoyed. 
   
Table 8.11: Estimated LFPS teachers’ monthly income, based on daily 2010 
minimum wage (in Ghanaian cedis; Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
Source: The author (Field data, 2010). 
 
Comparative data on public school and LFPS teachers‟ salaries show that mean monthly 
income for those employed by an LFPS is about one sixth that of a trained public school 
teacher‟s salary, and about a third of what an untrained teacher in the public education 
sector can expect to earn (see table 8.12). However, since LFPS teachers did not have 
access to a union that could have fought for better wages on their behalf, LFPS owners 
School Minimum daily 
wage 
Monthly wage 
Per teacher 
Total number of 
teachers 
Total monthly 
wage  
Holomo 3.11 87.08 12 1,044.96 
Shamo 3.11 87.08 11 957.88 
Fremo 3.11 87.08 12 1,044.96 
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had no reason not to continue to remunerate their teachers poorly; since they too were 
struggling to make ends meet.   
 
Table 8.12 shows public school teachers‟ salaries, from which the significant conclusion 
can be drawn that the relatively low remuneration of LFPS teachers in comparison to 
their public school counterparts notwithstanding, salaries still accounted for a 
significant proportion of the total operational costs of the private school. The question 
of whether LFPSs in rural areas raised sufficient revenue to sustain the running of their 
enterprises highlighted earlier in this chapter is next explored on a school-by-school 
basis, comparing revenue and operating costs. 
 
Table 8.12: A public school teacher’s monthly salary, 2010 (in Ghanaian cedis; 
Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
 Source: Computed from data on the remuneration of public school teachers.  
 
In terms of the LFPSs under study, given an average extra tuition fee of Gh¢7.66 per 
pupil, per term (see table 8.2), and assuming that no child was absent for a single day 
from any of the three schools – and thus paid for the maximum number of extra classes 
– the total revenue from extra tuition would have been equal to the total termly 
enrolment multiplied by the cost of extra classes for each pupil. Therefore, at Holomo 
the total revenue from extra tuition would have been Gh¢1,041.76; at Shamo the 
amount would have been Gh¢1,738.82; and Fremo‟s revenue would have amounted to 
School Medico Domino Kyoto 
Qualification Trained 
teacher 
Untrained 
teacher  
Trained 
teacher 
Untrained  
teacher 
Trained 
teacher 
Untrained  
teacher 
Mean 349.00 177.00 233.42 99.90 342.60 177.75 
Mode 330.00 - - 109.19 321.00 172.00 
Minimum 152.00 - 153.00 72.02 321.00 144.00 
Maximum 594.40 - 417.79 109.19 386.00 196.00 
Number of 
teachers 
8 1 11  4 3 8 
Subtotal  2,656.00 177.00 2,567.64 399.59 1,028.00 1,398.00 
Grand total 2,833.00 2,967.23 7,278.00 
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Gh¢1,432.42. If this income is added to the expected revenue from standard tuition fees, 
total revenue and operating costs can be compared. Table 8.13 shows this data. 
 
The revenue and costs data in table 8.13 show that all three LFPSs under study made a 
profit. However, all three interviewed head teachers also complained of the difficulties 
they faced in paying teachers‟ salaries, due in the main to defaults on and irregular 
payment of fees. In some cases, children had transferred to public school or else had 
dropped out of the education system altogether, which further reduced the LFPSs‟ 
anticipated revenue. 
Table 8.13: Estimated LFPS revenue and operating costs for term 1, 2008/09 (in 
Ghanaian cedis; Gh¢1.43 = US$1 at 2004 rate) 
 Revenue/cost Holomo Shamo Fremo 
Tuition fees
24
 (A) 
Extra classes (B) 
Total school revenue  (A+B) 
2,120.00   
  1,041.76 
3,161.76 
2,069.50  
1,738.82 
3,808.32 
1,349.00 
1, 432.42 
2,781.42 
Total operational cost (D) 2,792.75 3,474.00 2,076.30 
Surplus/deficit [(A+B)-D] 369.01 334.32 705.12 
Minus lost revenue due to drop out pupil   28.00 
 
7.50 
 
102.00 
 
Minus fee arrears 231.50             67.50 176.00 
Surplus 109.51             259.32 427.12 
Source: The author (Field data, 2010).  
  
In effect, these private schools might have barely been remaining operational. The 
difficulty in paying salaries each month could also explain why there was such a high 
teacher turnover in the three LFPSs under study, as indicated in table 8.14. 
In all the LFPSs for which data were available, there was evidence of a high rate of 
teacher turnover. For example, in 2007, 30 percent of teachers at Holomo, 50 percent of 
                                                          
24
 See table 8.8 for school fee revenue. 
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all those at Shamo, and 71 percent of those at Shambu left their respective schools. 
Similarly, in 2008, 50 per cent, 40 per cent and 50 per cent of teachers at Holomo, 
Shamo and Shambu respectively resigned. In 2009, 30 per cent of teachers at both 
Holomo and Shamo, and more than 44 per cent of those at Shambu left. 
Although there was only data on teacher turnover from three of the eight registered 
LFPSs in the district (see table 8.14), the evidence clearly shows that if a similar pattern 
to that observed in these three schools was manifested in the other LFPSs, a further 
concern about the long-term viability of private education in the rural setting is raised.   
Table 8.14:  Teacher turnover in rural LFPSs (2007/09) 
Year  Number of teachers Number resignations Resignation as a percentage of the 
total annual complement of 
teachers  
 Holomo Shamo Shambu Holomo Shamo Shambu Holomo Shamo Shambu 
2007 10 12 7 3 6 5 30 50 71 
2008 10 10 6 5 4 3 50 40 50 
2009 12 12 9 4 4 4 33 33 44 
Source: The author (Field data, 2010).   
In order to gain a deeper insight into the challenges that LFPS teachers faced in their 
schools, five members of staff were interviewed; with at least one from each of the four 
LFPSs under study. Analysis of interview data found that poor salaries posed a great 
challenge to teachers‟ economic survival. Additionally, at all of the LFPSs, teachers and 
head teachers acknowledged the irregular nature of the payment of their salaries – they 
all suffered salary arrears of between two and three months. Interviewees also noted that 
arrears were often paid in instalments, making it difficult for them to manage their 
finances effectively.  
A former LFPS head who at the time of the study was working as an ordinary private 
school teacher noted that the biggest challenge the school had faced, and was still 
facing, was the retention of teachers. The high teacher turnover was attributed to very 
low salaries arising from low enrolment and the inability of some parents to pay the 
fees. Thus, teachers tended only to stay in the job from between six month and a year; 
after which they resigned in order to look for better employment opportunities 
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elsewhere, leaving behind classes without teachers. In such circumstances, those who 
remained in post were forced to teach multigrade classes.  
 
Even though it has been suggested that in areas in which it is difficult to recruit staff and 
enrolments are low, multigrade teaching should be seen as a viable option (Little, 2006), 
unfortunately, LFPS teachers were generally untrained and therefore lacked the 
necessary skills to teach such classes. Two heads who were interviewed informally 
admitted that their teachers were reluctant to combine classes because they found it 
difficult to manage two or three different grades at the same time. The implication of 
such a situation is that even if teachers agreed to take multigrade classes, there was a 
good chance that some pupils were silently excluded from lessons.  
 
All LFPS teacher interviewees said that they wished to leave their schools for jobs in 
the public education sector or else move to the city where there were better job 
opportunities, citing two reasons for their decision. Firstly, they noted that they would 
not get a pension if they taught in an LFPS all their working lives. One interviewee who 
had taught in an LFPS for four years noted that his reason for planning to leave the 
school was not only due to the low salary but that he also needed to consider his 
retirement, commenting, „If I spend 50 years in private school, I still won’t get a 
pension.’  
 
Secondly, teachers cited long-term job security as another reason for wanting to leave, 
pointing out the collapse of two LFPSs in the in the community.  In all the communities 
under study, there was evidence that between 2007 and 2009, several LFPSs had closed. 
One interviewee, a teacher in Shambu mentioned Holy Heart International School and 
Ama Atta Aidoo International School as examples of enterprises in their communities 
that had gone bust, and listed low enrolment rates; insufficient teachers; pupil attrition 
to public school; and non-payment of fees at Shambu LFPS as factors that all combined 
to make the future of the school extremely uncertain.  
 
The above analyses show that LFPSs would have to overcome enormous challenges, 
principally the need to secure the custom of sufficient households prepared to enrol their 
children and pay school fees regularly, if these enterprises were to remain viable. 
Moreover, even though the estimate of LFPS income and expenditure indicated that the 
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three schools under study were making a profit, interviews with teachers revealed salary 
arrears ranging between two and three months, adding that all that actually sustained 
them was their daily income from extra tuition.  
 
Yet, it is equally clear from the analysis that these schools were not generating 
sufficient revenue from households but rather, all that was keeping them in business was 
the exploitation of their teachers through poor wages begrudgingly paid in instalments. 
Such a situation had serious implications for the long-term sustainability of the LFPS.    
 
8.7 Summary  
The evidence discussed in this chapter has shown that the cost of education plays an 
important role in the poor household‟s access to and choice of school. The study found 
that households spent on average about Gh¢33 and Gh¢62 per term on public school 
and LFPS respectively. Payment for tuition, extra classes, food and uniform were the 
main direct costs of schooling. However, given that fees constituted 13 per cent of 
private schooling costs, and principal direct household expenditure was in the form of 
auxiliary costs, an incentive was created for the poor to choose private education as it 
was perceived to offer better value for money.  
 
The study also found that even though public schooling was supposed to be free of 
charge, there was evidence that households were obliged to make some payment, which 
was sometimes in excess of that paid in the form of legitimate fees to the LFPS. 
Moreover, even though the statistical analysis showed a significant difference between 
the cost of food at public school and that at LFPS, qualitative evidence from poor 
households revealed that the cost of school meals remained the main barrier to access to 
both public and private school. 
 
Households who enrolled their children in both public and private school were able to 
spread the cost of their education expenditure and hence reduce the burden on the 
household. However, the fact that some of the poorest households in the sample had 
enrolled at least one of their children in an LFPS does not necessarily mean that all 
those in this income quintile could afford such schools or were willing to send their 
children to them. It would appear that those committed to giving some of their children 
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a private education were helped to meet the cost by taking advantage of LFPS profit-
maximising strategies and falling back on assistance from their social networks. It is 
notable that all household members interviewed indicated that they would much rather 
there had been a more accountable and good quality public school system that was also 
truly fee free.   
 
The assessment of the degree to which cost influenced the poor in their choice of 
schooling indicated that a sizeable proportion of their income was spent on education. 
Almost two thirds of the households under study in the lowest income group (quintile 1) 
had enrolled their children in public school, spending an average of about 16 per cent of 
their household income on education per child. This means that for a sizeable proportion 
(about 61 per cent) of households in the lowest income group, access to public basic 
education came at a great price.  
 
The qualitative evidence showed that poor households that chose private schooling 
employed a number of management and survival strategies, but these were not 
sustainable or reliable sources of funding. In addition, analysis of the payment of private 
school fees indicated that this was often not a smooth process, as all the schools were 
obliged to periodically suspend pupils pending the payment of fees – sometimes more 
than four times a term. In some schools, children who reported for class without having 
paid their fees were caned. This is clear evidence that these poor households could not 
afford the costs of private schooling on a sustainable basis, even after utilising all the 
fee-reduction and coping strategies available to them. 
 
Finally, the analysis of LFPS income and expenditure indicated that high levels of 
teacher turnover; the non-payment of fees; and the poor working conditions of teachers, 
coupled with evidence of the collapse of four LFPSs in the communities under study, 
means that there is a high degree of probability that such schools are not sustainable in 
the long term.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Exploring the contribution and limits of private basic education 
 
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter summarises the findings of the study and highlights the key contributions 
of the thesis. It also discusses policy implications, lessons learnt and areas for further 
research. 
 
In developing countries, the provision of schooling has been the responsibility of the 
state, a principle that arises from the view that education is a public good. As a result, 
many such countries have embarked on fee-free basic education policies. In Ghana, for 
example, the fee-free education policy that was implemented in 2005 was aimed at 
ensuring that children from poor households were not denied access to education due to 
prohibitively expensive school fees.  
 
Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests a burgeoning low-fee private education sector in 
poor areas of many developing countries. Indeed, GLSS data show that an increasing 
number of poor households in rural areas of Ghana enrolled their children in LFPSs 
between 1991/92 and 2005/06 (see chapter 3); a clear indication that the prospect of 
good value private education holds significant interest for the nation‟s poor.  
 
While such interest in the LFPS might appear to be a surprising development, some 
commentators (Tooley, 2005; 2009; Tooley and Dixon, 2007a) have heralded its 
increasing popularity as a positive innovation that signals the best chance for the poor to 
gain a reasonable quality of education. However, since the level of access to and choice 
of schooling available to the poor household are influenced by considerations other than 
simply the means to pay basic tuition fees, this thesis set out to investigate the full range 
of factors that determine the accessibility of the LFPS to the poor in rural areas. The 
findings and contribution of the study are summarised in the following section. 
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9.2 Revisiting the claims and evidence – the findings and contribution  
The element of cost is central to the issue of the poor household‟s access to education 
and its degree of school choice. Evidence from the study‟s analysis shows that there was 
a significant difference between direct household costs incurred in respect of children in 
public school compared to those in LFPS, an indication that the fee-free capitation grant 
policy applied to public basic schools contributed to reducing the cost burden of 
households.  
 
Analysis of national data on household schooling expenses (see chapter 3) shows that 
when a rural household enrols a child in LFPS, it costs about two and half times more 
than it does for a child in public school; annual expenditure on school meals constituting 
the most significant drain on the household budget. The evidence from the communities 
under study corroborates this statistic – schooling cost a household almost twice as 
much when it enrolled a child in LFPS.  
 
Yet, it is important to note that the principle of fee-free schooling did not mean that it 
literally cost the household nothing when it enrolled its children in public school. 
Uniform and stationery, for example, constituted about 20 per cent of the overall direct 
costs of schooling. However, of all the various education costs incurred by households, 
the study found that school meals constituted the most significant cost item and 
contributory factor in the barrier to access for the poor in terms of both public school 
and LFPS.  
 
Although the purchase of food was not obligatory at public school, the evidence 
suggests that pupils from the poorest households who did not have the means to eat at 
school were reluctant to go at all. Therefore, even though school meals were more 
expensive in private school than in public, the issue of school meals was not a matter of 
public or private school choice but concerned the economic well-being of the household 
making this finding a significant contribution of the thesis. 
 
Descriptive evidence from the GLSS shows that the cost of enrolling each child in a 
rural private JHS constitutes about 16 per cent of household income; and, therefore, in 
terms of affordability, this is also a huge burden on the poor. An assessment of the 
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importance of cost to poor household access and choice of schooling in the communities 
under study revealed that enrolling a child in a rural public school came at a great price, 
as the household would need to spend about 16 per cent of its income to educate just 
one child. On the other hand, the accessibility of the LFPS in the communities under 
study was assessed from three perspectives: typical quintile 1 income, household 
management and survival strategies, and school revenue.  
 
It is clear from the descriptive data that households in quintiles one to three spent more 
than ten per cent of their income on education. Analysis of the income of the LFPSs 
under study also shows that some households were in a chronic state of fee arrears, 
constituting about 10 to 20 per cent of fee income in two of the schools. Additionally, 
qualitative interviews with quintile 1 household heads revealed that the management 
and survival strategies the poor adopted to finance their choice of private schooling 
were not sustainable. In effect, all three perspectives used in assessing the importance of 
cost to private school choice show consistency with national data, that is, the LFPS was 
not an affordable option for the poor. This means that the minority of poor households 
that did choose private schooling were forced to make stringent sacrifices. 
 
The quality of private education is key to its continued demand by the poor. This is 
because if fee-paying private schools are unable to provide a significantly better quality 
of education than their fee-free public counterparts, demand for the LFPS may decline 
and hence affect its sustainability. The results of the GSS (2005a) and MOESS (2006) 
indicate that private schools perform better in examinations than do public schools. 
Analysis of national data on the examination results of educationally deprived schools 
in 53 districts of Ghana show that between 2005 and 2008 that the modal grade score of 
both public and private schools in mathematics was 5 and given that the private schools 
in these districts are mainly high fee and selective, this result is quite surprising. 
However, in terms of overall score in BECE, private schools consistently scored higher 
in the BECE in comparison to their public counterparts (see chapter 3). But this result 
does not control for the socio-economic background of children. Moreover, the BECE 
exam results data do not reflect the performance of the typical rural LFPS, as most of 
the country‟s private schools are in urban or peri-urban areas, selective in their 
enrolment, and also charge high fees. This consideration prompted a comparative 
analysis of the inputs and examination/test results of both public and private schools in 
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some typical poor rural communities of the district under study. The results show that, 
even though some LFPSs did not do better than public school in exam or test 
performance, on the whole LFPSs performed better in BECE examination compared to 
public schools.  
However, public schools in the communities under study had more substantial and 
better quality inputs than their private counterparts; the only advantage that the LFPSs 
enjoyed was their relatively low PTR. This finding is consistent with national data 
showing that public schools on average have a larger complement of better-trained staff, 
as well as a higher quality of teaching and learning materials than do private schools in 
educationally deprived districts. Clearly, public schools have not delivered on the basis 
of the inputs they have.  
More importantly, the LFPSs under study had deplorable school infrastructure, 
classrooms generally being made of bamboo or wood with palm branches as roofing; 
and some of them were even forced to hold classes under trees. Clearly, such structures 
not only posed health and safety concerns, but would also have had a detrimental effect 
on learning in areas in which heavy downpours were commonplace, especially during 
the rainy season.  
 
Descriptive analyses of public school and LFPS BECE results in similar rural settings 
generally do provide evidence of the superior performance of the private education 
sector. However, the comparative analysis also shows that both school types might 
perform either well or poorly depending on the community. Interviews with head 
teachers of LFPSs involved in the study reveal that, the selection of best candidates for 
exam in addition to the provision of extra classes accounted for the LFPSs‟ relatively 
better performance in BECE. Beside, school classroom observation on teacher contact 
time with students and interviews with parents with children in both public and private 
schools show that low achievement in public schools is simply the result of pupils not 
being taught.  
 
Moreover, the regression analysis of English and Mathematics tests does not reveal 
better performance on the part of the LFPS (a conclusion reached after controlling for 
pupils‟ backgrounds). Therefore, although the general perception that the private school 
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offers a better quality of education is based on rational thinking, it is not borne out by 
the evidence; and it may be concluded that – unlike in urban and peri-urban areas – any 
belief to the contrary in respect of the LFPS in the study rural communities needs to be 
taken with caution. However, interview data show that parents‟ indices of quality were 
based on better BECE exams results, teacher commitment to teaching, child discipline 
and the practice of child seeking by LFPS. These were practices which were not given 
much consideration in the study rural public schools. Thus, parents‟ indices of quality 
together with their high aspirations fuelled the poor household‟s interest in private 
education, making this finding a significant contribution of the thesis.  
 
School choice is dependent on the ability of the household to meet the cost. 
Nevertheless, Tooley and Dixon (2007a) claim that Ghana‟s poor are able to access the 
LFPS. Yet, evidence from the communities under study show that it is not the typical 
poor household that chooses private education. Even though these were poor rural 
communities, households that accessed an LFPS were relatively better off than their 
neighbours.  
 
This is demonstrated by the fact that of the 105 lowest income quintile households 
under study, the majority (61 per cent) chose public school only. Only a minority (39 
per cent) – consisting of those that chose LFPS only (24 per cent) and those that 
selected the combined option (15 per cent) – were able to access an LFPS. Furthermore, 
such households were only able to do so because of the way in which these private 
schools operated: flexible payment terms such as fee waiver, fee discount and a fee-free 
policy at the pre-school level. In addition, households that were poor but had a social 
network of friends and relatives in a position to assist with schooling expenses were also 
able to access the LFPS. This finding is a key contribution of the thesis. 
 
Qualitative evidence based school observations and the views of poor household heads 
indicates that practices and processes in the LFPS in terms of the discipline of teachers 
and pupils; commitment to teaching; and use of instructional time were some factors 
that attracted poor households to these schools. However, LFPSs were found to 
habitually break the laws relating to minimum wage, beating of pupils in fee arrears and 
use of corporal punishment that violated fundamental human rights of their pupils. 
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The study also presents new evidence on households that employed the strategy of 
enrolling some of their children in LFPS and the others in public school (the combined 
option), a phenomenon that appears to be little documented in the literature on private 
education to date. As indicated earlier, the study sampled about 15 per cent of 
households in the lowest income quintile that had some children in public school and 
some in LFPS. When households made such a strategic school choice it tended to give 
children different educational opportunities and this may have implication for family 
cohesion due to the inequality it creates among the children. 
 
It has been argued that in regions in which government provision is unable to 
adequately absorb all school-age children, the LFPSs may be utilised to plug the gap. 
Consequently, Tooley (2005) suggests the need for the state to support such schools. 
However, the present study‟s comparative analysis of the estimated revenue and 
operational costs of the LFPSs under study shows that even though in some instances a 
profit appears to have been made, in all the schools for which data was available teacher 
interviewees revealed that they were owed unpaid salary or were remunerated between 
two and three months in arrears.  
To give an idea of the exploitation that is rife in the LFPS sector, public education 
sector salary estimates indicate that if public schools were to employ only untrained 
teachers, they could employ six such members of staff for the cost of one trained 
teacher, but this would certainly not be an effective strategy for development. 
Moreover, if the country‟s minimum wage legislation were properly enforced, many 
rural LFPSs would find that meeting their operational costs would be a challenge. LFPS 
teachers are mostly untrained and as long as they are paid less than one sixth of the 
salary of a trained public school teacher, their employers may be able to remain in 
business and continue to charge low fees.  
 
However, LFPS teachers are disadvantaged in other ways too: they have no career path 
or professional development structure, and little stability in their jobs due to the low and 
irregular payment of salaries, as clearly indicated by the high teacher turnover in the 
schools under study. Since continuity is a significant element of career development, 
high teacher turnover and the fact that in all the communities a number of LFPSs had 
closed down while new ones emerged, suggests that the LFPS in a poor rural setting 
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may not be a sustainable enterprise in the long term, and therefore is able to provide 
neither job security for its teachers nor a durable education solution for the poor.  
 
Finally, it is often argued that in a marketised economic environment, private sector 
provision flourishes. As a result, the growing marketisation of education through private 
sector provision in some developing countries has been associated with the liberal 
economic environment in such countries. In Ghana, for example, the post independence 
education policies were driven by a socialist agenda of state ownership and control, 
which stifled growth of private education provision in the country.  But as the Ghanaian 
economy became more liberalised from the late 1980s, public funding on education was 
reduced, and the way was paved for greater private sector participation in education. 
Rapid expansion of private sector provision in basic education began after the 
implementation of the 1992 constitution which gave individuals right to establish and 
maintain private schools at their own expense (MOE/GES, 2001). Evidence from the 
GLSS 3 data in 1991 show that, only 0.5 percent of the rural poor in Ghana enrolled in 
private school and by GLSS 5 in 2005 this has increased to about 10 percent (see 
chapter 3).  
 
The growth in private school participation in Ghana, like many other developing 
countries, has been heralded by some who argue that, it would promote choice and 
competition and therefore improve quality and ensure equity (Forsey, et. al., 2008; 
Tooley, 2009; Tan, 1998; Plank and Sykes, 2003).  However, school choice may not 
promote equity if private schools draw their clients (pupils) mainly from those from a 
higher socio-economic background.  The evidence from this thesis show that even 
within the poor rural environment, it is the relatively better off, certainly not the poorest 
group, which are likely to choose private schools for their children. Majority of the poor 
still are priced out of low-fee private schools because of the costs, and those who are 
able to access them, do so with great difficulty.  An education growth strategy to 
achieve EFA through expansion of low-fee private schools in rural areas in that case is 
likely to be anti-equity. If the strategy for expanding access requires public investment 
in the low-fee private sector, then LFPSs in rural settings must be made to operate in 
ways that do not conflict with the achievement of education for all. As this thesis has 
shown, this cannot be assumed to be the case since those who have the strong voice – 
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rural households with better social and economic capital, choose private school for their 
children, leaving out the majority poor whose voices are weak in the public sector. This 
could have implication for quality public education provision in the rural setting and 
therefore hinder the achievement of education for all.   
   
9.3 Is low-fee private education a viable option for the poor? Policy implications 
This thesis presents a number of policy implications and indicates various strategies the 
government might adopt to address some of the findings of the study. The evidence 
suggests that the LFPSs are not accessible to the poorest because the majority of those 
that take advantage of their services are from socio-economically better off households. 
As a result, when Tooley (2005) argues that the money used in public schools should be 
redirected to privately run schools on sub contracts , my argument is that this would not 
be in the best interests of the poor, since supporting such schools would ultimately only 
benefit those households that are relatively well off and not the true poor. Therefore, in 
environments like the communities under study, it would be more beneficial to the poor 
if existing state schools were improved.  
 
Nevertheless, the low level of professionalism and indiscipline shown by some public 
school teachers and their pupils, in addition to the perception in rural communities that 
the LFPSs offer better quality, suggests that the policy of fee-free education in Ghana 
needs to do more than that which the capitation grant alone offers; fee-free education 
must be built on an incentivising foundation that makes public schools more 
accountable to local communities and district authorities than it currently exists.  
 
For example, public schools should be made accountable for the way in which they 
utilise the capitation grant to improve access and quality and, together with the 
community and district GES, set targets for improvement. In addition, the GES should 
consider introducing the sociology of living and working in a rural environment onto its 
teacher training curriculum in order to help prepare teachers to appreciate the scope of 
expectations amongst rural populations in terms of teachers and the schooling of their 
children. District assemblies along with the GES should also educate rural communities 
in the modalities of the various types of school available to them so that households are 
able to make informed decisions on the best school choice for their children.  
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Further, by improving the professional practice of public school teachers and 
encouraging schools to be more child-friendly and child-seeking would potentially help 
to redeem their image in the rural areas. This could be achieved if the Ghana Education 
Service (GES) worked closely with communities to make rural public schools more 
accountable through regular supervision and monitoring of teachers in order to improve 
school practices such as discipline and the more effective use of instructional time; all 
of which contributed to negative perceptions of public school. 
 
The fact that LFPSs in the rural communities under study had poor school infrastructure 
that was a health and safety risk to pupils suggests the need for operational regulation. 
In addition, pupil discipline enforcement processes in LFPSs – including the carrying of 
stones and sand – constitute a clear violation of the fundamental human rights of the 
child. Therefore, legislation should be drafted to address LFPS operations in rural 
communities that bring them under the umbrella of state policy to improve access for all 
– by ensuring that both public schools and LFPSs are bound by similar regulatory and 
accountability standards. This may help the proprietors of the latter to operate in a way 
that improves their sense of responsiveness to the expectations of local communities, 
and safeguards pupils and their parents against abuse and exploitation of their teachers.  
 
Additionally, it has been established from GLSS data analysis corroborated by the 
present study, that the price of school meals rather than the payment of tuition fees 
constitute the highest education cost item for households. Since the cost of food in both 
public school and LFPS is high relative to other education expenses, coupled with the 
fact that children from the poorest households may withdraw from school if they are 
unable to eat there, suggests that in poor communities, access could be improved if the 
food cost barrier were removed. Accordingly, the provision of free school meals would 
greatly reduce the burden on poor households; and, together with improved systems of 
quality accountability, this would redress the balance in demand for public school 
education. 
 
Furthermore, some commentators such as Tooley and Dixon (2007a), and Tooley 
(2005), have argued that the LFPS provides a service that addresses a need. This 
argument is particularly relevant in regions in which government provision is 
inadequate for the absorption of all school-age children. Therefore, the interest shown 
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by some relatively poor rural households in LFPS education suggests that the state must 
support these schools in keeping their costs down. In practical terms, this might mean 
supplying them with textbooks and other instructional materials. However, in my 
sample LFPS, there was no evidence of plugging gaps. This is because children who 
had been enrolled in an LFPS were those who would have otherwise gone to a public 
school. Moreover, the question of whether or not the state needs to support a school 
should be based on evidence of sustainability. This is because in the communities under 
study, there was documented evidence of the collapse of a number of LFPSs, while 
some new ones also sprang up. Clearly, the uncertain lifespan of the LFPS in poor rural 
areas such as Mfantseman suggests that this type of school may not provide a secure 
avenue of access to education for the poor, given that it could close down at any time, 
leaving the pupils of such schools stranded before they had completed their educational 
journey.  
 
Finally, the EMIS data collected by the GES only captures those schools that are 
registered with it. As a result, private schools that are not recognised by the GES are not 
included in the annual school mapping exercise. Therefore, it is necessary for the GES 
to include both registered and unregistered LFPSs in this exercise to facilitate a better 
understanding of their expansion and relative costs; and private school data would also 
be a significant input in policy planning. 
 
9.4 Limitations of the study 
One limitation of this study is restricted coverage of the research area. This is due to the 
fact that of a total of eight education circuits in the district, only two were selected for 
the study. Consequently, only four out of eight LFPSs in the district were taken into 
account. Moreover, the wide dispersal of settlements and lack of accessible roads to 
many villages meant that as a lone researcher, I was unable to sample all the 
communities given limited resources and time. Nevertheless, analysis of national data 
on household education expenses and school inputs provided a broader context that 
enabled me to compare the results of my small sampling with countrywide statistics. 
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A second limitation is related to the design of the household survey instrument. A major 
flaw was the way in which household education expenses data were gathered – 
information was based on enrolment at either public school only or private school only. 
However, without data relating to the third choice – households that selected the 
combined option – it was difficult to estimate the education expenses of this category. 
This flaw notwithstanding, the data derived from the use of the survey instrument led 
me to some clear conclusions in terms of household education costs. 
 
9.5 What lessons might improve demand for public school in areas also hosting 
       LFPSs? 
During the course of interviews and classroom observations, I came to realise that it was 
what was going on in the school environment – the practices and processes in the 
various school types – that were the significant factors in determining the household‟s 
reaction to the school. It was clear that the way in which the LFPS interacted with 
households – going from house to house urging parents to enrol their children in their 
school; visiting pupils at home when they had been absent from school for few days – 
encouraged parents to think of them as taking an interest in their welfare and for that 
matter, their children‟s education. Additionally, school practices such as teacher 
discipline and the more effective use of instructional time by the LFPS attracted the 
interest of households. Public schools could learn from this mode of interaction, and 
school practices and process in order to expand and sustain demand for state education.  
 
9.6 Recommendations for further research 
The implementation of the fee-free policy in all Ghanaian public basic schools from 
2005 seems to have yielded some dividends – as evidenced by the significant expansion 
in access to education during the past decade (Akyeampong, 2009; Rolleston, 2009). 
However, this improvement appears to have failed to ensure horizontal equity in 
education access – the poor and those in rural areas still lag behind in terms of overall 
access to education. Therefore, research is needed to explain the factors that contribute 
to this inequity, and to identify ways to bridge the access gap.    
 
Furthermore, given that LFPSs are increasing in number (see chapter 3), it is anticipated 
that an MOES/GES longitudinal study and census of all private schools – particularly 
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those in poor areas of the country – irrespective of status would provide important 
information on number, years of operation, rate of expansion, number of new 
enterprises and number of those that close. This would provide information necessary 
for the understanding of LFPS growth patterns and the real contribution to basic 
education access made by this type of school, data that would be invaluable in policy 
planning.  
 
 
9.7 Conclusions 
Claims of the widespread access of poor households to the LFPS appear to have been 
exaggerated. Evidence from the communities under study suggests that LFPSs might be 
accessible to children from better-off socio-economic backgrounds, but the majority of 
households in the research area have no real choice. Even the minority of poor 
households that do choose private education for their children are only able to do so 
because schools offer manipulative if favourable terms in the form of flexible fee 
practices.  
 
Nevertheless, paying tuition fees and other school expenses for the duration of the basic 
education cycle cannot be sustained by the poor due to low, unreliable and unstable 
income. In addition, the perception that the LFPS provides a better quality of education 
relative to the public school in a similar environment is not supported by the evidence. 
Rather, it is a belief in the superior quality of the LFPS combined with the poor 
household‟s greater aspirations for its children that fuel interest in private schooling. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: T-test comparing the BECE results of public and private schools in   
            educationally deprived district of Ghana 
 
 
  Aggregate results,2005 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   23310    30.88288    .0587015   8.962313 30.76782 30.99794 
       2 |    7910    27.96688    .1071921   9.533468 27.75675 28.177 
combined |   31220    30.14407    .0520574   9.198116 30.04204 30.24611 
    diff |            2.916006    .1185481            2.683647 3.148365 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)            t =  24.5977 
Ho: diff = 0                      degrees of freedom =    31218 
    Ha: diff < 0          Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
Maths results, 2005 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   23036    5.484112    .0110105  1.671129  5.462531 5.505693 
       2 |    7816    5.129478    .0200736  1.77467   5.090128 5.168828 
combined |   30852    5.394269    .0097065  1.704919  5.375244 5.413295 
    diff |            .3546338    .0222266           .3110689  .3981988 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                t =  15.9554 
Ho: diff = 0                      degrees of freedom =    30850 
    Ha: diff < 0        Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000       Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
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English results, 2005 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   23034    5.609186    .0104838   1.591121 5.588637 5.629735 
       2 |    7820    5.003325    .0179413   1.586566 4.968155 5.038495 
combined |   30854     5.45563    .0091751   1.611637 5.437646 5.473613 
    diff |            .6058616    .0208092           .5650747 .6466486 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)            t =  29.1150 
Ho: diff = 0                      degrees of freedom =    30852 
    Ha: diff < 0         Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregate results, 2006 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   51748    31.55256    .0408927  9.302346 31.47241 31.63271 
       2 |   10653    25.57308    .0998487  10.30572 25.37736 25.7688 
combined |   62401    30.53175    .0390084  9.744367 30.4553  30.60821 
    diff |            5.979484    .1008728           5.781774 6.177195 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                  t =  59.2775 
Ho: diff = 0                         degrees of freedom =    62399 
    Ha: diff < 0         Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
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Maths  results, 2006 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   50830    5.480602    .0080918   1.824332 5.464742 5.496462 
       2 |   10438    4.585265     .017794   1.817948 4.550386 4.620145 
combined |   61268    5.328067    .0074904   1.854043 5.313386 5.342748 
    diff |            .8953366    .0195927            .856935 .9337383 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                   t =  45.6976 
Ho: diff = 0                  degrees of freedom =    61266 
    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000       Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
English results, 2006 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   50987    5.978955    .0072145  1.629047  5.964815 5.993096 
       2 |   10457     4.81773    .0164565  1.682832  4.785472 4.849988 
combined |   61444    5.781329    .0068398  1.695435  5.767923 5.794735 
    diff |            1.161226    .0175876            1.126754 1.195697 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)              t =  66.0253 
Ho: diff = 0                      degrees of freedom =    61442 
    Ha: diff < 0        Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000   Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000       Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
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Aggregate results, 2007 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   10512    31.54195    .0886872  9.092928  31.36811 31.7158 
       2 |    2984    26.84417    .1830865  10.00128  26.48518 27.20316 
combined |   13496    30.50326    .0818023  9.503159  30.34292 30.6636 
    diff |            4.697783    .1929334            4.319607 5.07596 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)         t =  24.3492 
Ho: diff = 0                   degrees of freedom =    13494 
    Ha: diff < 0         a: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000    Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000   Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
Maths results, 2007 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   10386    5.599942    .0176149  1.795162  5.565414 5.634471 
       2 |    2928    5.028347    .0355263  1.922361  4.958688 5.098006 
combined |   13314    5.474238    .0159389  1.839126  5.442995 5.50548 
    diff |            .5715952    .0381631            .4967902 .6464003 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                t =  14.9777 
Ho: diff = 0                   degrees of freedom =    13312 
    Ha: diff < 0           Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
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English results, 2007 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   10397    5.788978    .0157707  1.608073  5.758064 5.819891 
       2 |    2930    4.776451    .0293537  1.588901  4.718894 4.834007 
combined |   13327    5.566369    .0143598  1.657736  5.538222 5.594516 
    diff |            1.012527    .0335467            .9467708 1.078283 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)             t =  30.1826 
Ho: diff = 0                     degrees of freedom =    13325 
    Ha: diff < 0     Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000       Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
Aggregate results, 2008 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   52988    32.15539    .0381364  8.778675  32.08065 32.23014 
       2 |   12544    25.96508    .0885713  9.919981  25.79147 26.1387 
combined |   65532    30.97046    .0364529  9.331659  30.89901 31.0419 
    diff |            6.190311    .0894467            6.014995 6.365626 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)               t =  69.2067 
Ho: diff = 0                      degrees of freedom =    65530 
    Ha: diff < 0          Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000    Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000   Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
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Maths results, 2008 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval] 
       1 |   52571    5.591695    .0072923  1.672016  5.577402 5.605988 
       2 |   12421    4.867482    .0165913  1.849095  4.834961 4.900004 
combined |   64992    5.453287    .0067894  1.730847  5.439979 5.466594 
    diff |            .7242126    .0170327           .6908285  .7575966 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)           t =  42.5190 
Ho: diff = 0                   degrees of freedom =    64990 
    Ha: diff < 0      Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
English results, 2008 
 
Two-sample t test with equal variances 
   Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. 
Interval] 
       1 |   52579    6.022062    .0069597  1.595874  6.008421 6.035703 
       2 |   12419    4.837185    .0156054  1.739075  4.806596 4.867774 
combined |   64998    5.795671    .0066276  1.689678  5.782681 5.808661 
    diff |            1.184877    .0162048            1.153116 1.216638 
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)            t =  73.1191 
Ho: diff = 0                degrees of freedom =    64996 
  Ha: diff < 0        Ha: diff != 0                 Ha: diff > 0 
 Pr(T < t) = 1.0000  Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000          Pr(T > t) = 0.0000 
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Appendix 2: Household survey instrument 
Please provide data required in this questionnaire as accurately as possible. Data supplied will be treated with outmost 
confidentiality. The data is for DPhil thesis and will purely be used in determining household schooling costs, poverty and 
school choice of public and private rural schools in the Mfantsiman District.  
1. Household No…………………………………………………. Full household address, including description of location and approach  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-------------- 
  Contact tel no. (if available) ....................................................   Date of interview (DATE)…………………………………….       
  Name of interviewer (INTNAME)…………………………… Village/town name (VILLNAME)…………………………… 
SECTION 1: HOUSEHOLD ROSTER of RESIDENT MEMBERS. List all individual household members who meet all four of the following 
criteria 
1) they lived under this roof or within same compound/homestead (use relevant terms)at least 15 days out of past year and 
2) when they are together, they share food from the same kitchen/source, and    
3) they contribute to or share in a common resource pool and  
4) slept in this compound/homestead/ at least 15 days out of the past month (this condition is noted in order to include domestic servants aged 5-1 who work and 
sleep in this compound) 
Household Roster – demographic and basic education details 
ID 
code 
Name Relation 
to HH 
head 
Sex Date of 
Birth* 
Marital 
Status 
Current 
Education 
Status 
Highest level 
education 
completed  
Main 
occupation  
Occupatio
n sector 
 
ID 
spouse 
ID 
father 
ID mother  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
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Column 3 relation to Head of 
Household 
1=self 
2= spouse of head 
3= married child 
4=spouse of married child 
5= unmarried child (biological) 
6= unmarried child fostered/being 
cared for 
7= unmarried child adopted 
8= grandchild 
9=father/mother 
10= father in law/mother in law 
11=brother/sister 
12=brother in law/sister in law/other 
relative 
13=servants/employees/other non 
relative 
Column 6 Marital Status 
1= never married 
2= currently married 
3= widowed 
4= divorced 
5=separated 
 
Column 7 Current Education Status 
1=never enrolled in pre-school, primary 
or primary NFE 
2=currently enrolled in pre-
school/preschool NFE, primary, primary 
NFE or lower secondary/NFE 
3.=completed schooling 
4. senior high school 1 
 
Column 8 Highest Grade Completed  
1=none 
2=pre-school 
3=grade 1 primary (or NFE equivalent) 
4=grade 2 primary (or NFE equivalent) 
5=grade 3 primary (or NFE 
equivalent)6= continue filling out these 
grades with terms that match the 
relevant education system   
 
Column 9 Main occupation  
ISCO codes need to be created (AL 
to do more work on this – and teams 
to match country codes against 
ISCO)  
 
 
Column 10 Occupation sector 
(CREATE countries need to specify 
– categories below may or may not 
meet the normal classification of 
Occupation sectors used in country 
** ) 
Government 
Private/self 
NGO 
Semi-government  
 
* date of birth very important for 3-
16. For others, age in years is 
sufficient 
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Section 2: School Expenses of children aged 5-16 years  
ID Name Grade of 
Student 
How does…. Get to 
school? 
1. Walks to school 
2. Public transport 
3. Driven to school 
How far is 
the school 
away 
(estimate in 
km) 
How much 
did it cost 
for …. to 
travel from 
home to 
school and 
back last 
week? 
Last week how 
much did it 
cost to 
provide…. 
with food 
whilst at 
school? 
How much was 
…. school 
tuition fees last 
term? 
How much 
was PTA dues 
for ……..last 
term? 
How much 
does a school 
uniform cost? 
79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 
          
          
          
          
          
 
ID Name Last term how 
much was spent 
on examination 
fees for…..? 
Last term 
how much 
was spent on 
extra classes 
for……? 
This year how 
much has been 
spent on paying 
for school 
uniforms for….? 
Last term how much 
was spent on exercise 
books, textbooks, 
pencils etc for …….? 
Altogether how much 
does it cost to send **** 
to school each term? 
Last term how were…… 
education expenses paid for? 
1.Parents/guardian of the child 
2.Scholarship 
3.Resources provided by child 
4.Remittance from someone else 
5. Other 
  89 90 91 92 93 94 
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 Section 3: Economic Status of Household    
4a Dwelling and services 
ID Dwelling 
Appropriate 
alternatives needed 
Living 
Rooms 
How 
many 
rooms 
does the 
dwelling 
have* 
Ownership  
Does the 
household own 
this dwelling or 
rent it 
 
Water Distance 
How far do household 
members have to go 
(one way) to fetch 
water? 
Water Source 
What is the source of 
water most often used 
in this household for 
drinking?   
Does the 
water used 
for drinking 
come from 
the same 
source as the 
water used 
for bathing 
and washing? 
Sanitation.   
What kind of 
toilet does the 
household use? 
(CREATE teams 
to fill out 
appropriate 
alternatives) 
Energy 
Is this 
househol
d 
connected 
to 
electricity 
supply? 
Cooking 
What fuel 
is used for 
cooking? 
          
 1. Separate house 
2. Semi-detached 
house 
3. Flat / apartment 
4. Huts 
5. Hotel/Hostel 
6. Tent 
7. Improvised 
house(kiosk) 
8. Living quarters 
attached to 
office/shop 
9. Other 
 
Number 1. Owns it 
fully 
2. Owns it, on 
mortgage 
3. Rents it 
4. Family 
property 
 
1. Less than 20 meters 
2. 20m – less than 100 
m 
3. 100m – less than 
500m 
4. 500m – less than 1 
km 
5. 1 km – less than 3 km 
6. 3 km or more 
 
Piped into dwelling or 
compound 
Public tap 
Borehole 
Protected well 
Unprotected well 
Rain water 
River, lake, pond, 
stream 
Dam 
Vendor, truck, sachet 
water,  
Others …………. 
Mostly yes 
Sometimes 
Mostly no 
Flush toilet 
Pit latrine 
KVIP 
Bucket  
None/use fields 
etc   
Yes 
No 
Dung 
Wood 
Coal 
Gas 
Electricity 
 
* Excluding bathrooms, toilets and passages but including kitchens, dining rooms, lounges and bedrooms  (NROOMS) 
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Section 4a Dwelling Asset ownership  
 
I have a list of items which someone in the household may own. Which of the following does any member of the household own?  
 
!D Asset  Asset code Yes/No Asset Asset code Yes/No 
10 Bed 1  TV   
11 Table 2  Telephone   
12 Stove/cooker 3  Mobile phone   
13 Refrigerator 4  Computer   
14 Fan 5  Bicycle   
15 Wall clock 6  Motor bike/rickshaw   
16 Wrist watch  7  Car   
17 Sewing machine 8  Books other than school books   
18 Radio 9  Light source for homework   
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Section 4b: Household Livelihood and Non-employment Income 
What are the sources of livelihood of this household (in cash and in kind). Circle all that apply 
ID     
     
 Own farm activities  1 Collection/foraging 8 
 Casual labour in agriculture 2 Charity/alms 9 
 Casual labour (non agriculture) 3 Safety net/poverty schemes 10 
 Wage/salary employment in agriculture 4 Interest on income/property/land rent etc 11 
 Wage/salary employment in non agriculture 5 Public transfers/pensions/child support grants 12 
 Runs Petty business/trade/manufacture 6 Private transfers/remittance from within country  13 
 Runs Major business/trade/manufacture 7 Private transfers/remittance from abroad 14 
   Other (Specify) 15 
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Then ask ‘which are the THREE most important in terms of the income they generate’.  
Write codes in the space provided 
 
ID  Code Approximate 
monthly income 
   
 1
st
 most important activity (write code)      
 2
nd
 most important activity (write code)      
 3
rd
 most important activity (write code)      
  
Other 
     
 Total monthly income      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 
Section 4c: Shocks to the Household 
ID Has anyone in the 
household suffered any 
serious injuries in the past 
year (name injury) 
Has anyone in the 
household suffered 
any serious illness in 
the past year (name 
illness) 
Have any of the 
following events 
occurred in the 
household in the past 
year (circle) 
Please indicate if any events have had an adverse effect on your 
children’s education and if so what was the effect? 
   1.Loss of job 
2.Death 
3.Divorce 
4.Major theft 
5.Fire 
6.Flood 
7.Drought 
8.Arrest 
9.Other trauma 
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SECTION 5: Social networks of Adult Household members (Household head and primary care-giver)  
1. In the last 12 months have you been an active member of any of the following types of groups in your community?  
 
ID 
Code 
Name Work/ Trade 
Union 
Y/N 
Community 
Assoc/Coop 
Y/N 
WomensGroup 
 
Y/N 
Political 
Organisation 
Y/N  
Religious 
Organisation 
Y/N 
Credit/ 
Funeral Club 
Y/N 
Sports 
 
Y/N  
         
         
 
2. In the last 12 months did you receive any help from these groups related to your children’s education. This can be emotional help, economic help 
or assistance in helping you to know or do things?  
 
ID 
Code 
Name Work/Trade 
Union 
Y/N. If yes, 
specify  
Community  
Assoc/Coop 
Y/N. If yes, 
specify 
Women’s 
Group 
Y/N. If yes, 
specify 
Political 
 
Y/N. If yes, 
specify  
Religious 
Organisations 
Y/N. If yes, 
specify 
Credit/ 
Funeral 
Y/N. If yes, specify  
Sports 
 
Y/N. If yes, specify  
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3. In the last 12 months, have you received any help or support from any of the following people for your children’s education. This can be emotional 
help, economic help or assistance in helping you to know or do things? 
 
ID 
Code 
Name Family 
 
Y/N If yes, 
specify  
Neighbours 
 
Y/N If yes, 
specify 
Other friends 
 
Y/N If yes, 
specify 
Community 
leaders 
Y/N If yes, 
specify  
Religious 
leaders 
Y/N If yes, 
specify 
Politicians 
 
Y/N If yes, 
specify  
Government 
officials 
Y/N If yes, 
specify  
Charities 
NGOs etc 
Y/N If yes, 
specify 
Other 
 
Y/N If yes, 
specify  
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Appendix 3:  Interview Guide 
3-1: The considerations informing household school choice decision 
 Household understanding of education as a ‘commodity for  investment’ and how they 
analyze this investment  
 
1. What motivated you to send ......X........ to School? Probe identify the value 
household attach to education 
 
2. What does the family loses by sending  ...X...   to school (working on the farm / 
trading income, etc). Probe for specific examples. Do households calculate this 
loss?  How do they estimate the loss? 
 
3. What does the family/household see as a benefit from sending ... X... to school?  
Probe to find out why and how they arrive at that decision. 
 
 Households schooling decisions and investment choices 
 
1. Why have you chosen to enrol .....X .....  in public / private school?  
 
2. How did you learn about this school? Probe to find out whether „interpersonal 
network‟ (word of mouth, talking to others) or „formal network‟ (published test 
results, public meeting, etc) were key in arriving at the decision. Also, find out 
whether household has social network including relatives, friends and any group 
that provide them with economic support. 
 
3. If you could change your child‟s current school (say public to private/ or private 
to public) will you take the chance? Why?  
 
4. What are some of the considerations that guided you in choosing a public /  
private  school for your child?  
 
5. How much does it cost the family to provide the following in a month? Help 
household to estimate this: 
 
Income.....................................? 
Expenditure on food................? 
Other specify............................? 
 
 Direct subsidy to poor households 
 
1. What do you know about the capitation grant?  
 
2. In your opinion, do you think the capitation grant has made schooling more 
accessible? Probe for explanations and specific examples 
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3. If the government were to give the capitation grant of (Gh 3 cedis /30,000) to 
you , would have sent     X    his/her current school? Why? Probe to determine 
what household expect government to do with subsidies. 
 
4. If government decides now to pay part of your child‟s school fees (irrespective 
of whether in public or private school) which of these schools would you enrol 
your child?  Probe further to find out how much household are willing to pay if 
government is willing to provide them with direct subsidy and why they will be 
willing or unwilling to pay. 
 
5. What other ways can the government support the education of children to ensure 
that they enrol and stay on in school?  
 
 
 
3-2: Managing and surviving strategies of households in the lowest income quintile 
1. How is your household able to pay for the child or children‟s educational 
expenses? (probe to find out how household meet this expenses) 
2. How to do the household survive given the amount you spend on education?  
(Probe to find out household surviving strategies) 
3-3:Challenges of teachers teaching in Low fee private school  
1.  How many years have been teaching in this school? How long would you 
continue to teach in this school and why? 
2. What are some of the things you like most about teaching in this school? 
3. What are some of the things you do not like about teaching in this school? 
 
3-4: Interaction between households and schools 
Household heads/ Head teachers / Teachers 
1. What is the nature of interaction between parents and public/private schools? Do 
parents in each school type think they are getting value for money? 
 Household heads 
 i. Are you happy with the school your child attends? Probe eg why children are in a 
particular school. 
ii.  Have you ever gone to the school to talk to the head teacher about issues concerning 
child‟s schooling? Why not? 
iii. How did the school respond?  
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iv. How do the household heads feel in the way they are valued? 
2. head teachers/teachers:  
i. Questions - do you have parents coming in to see you?  What do you discuss? /Why 
not? Have you made an attempt to see them yourself? 
ii. What is it that (Public/Private) schools do, if a child does not come to school?  
Probe -ask school heads whether when their pupils do not come to school they go round 
to see them? Why? What will make you do that? 
3. SMC/PTA Chair/Members 
How do parents understand the value of private schooling in relation to public 
provision in this locality? 
i. What do you think makes private schooling popular among some households? 
ii.What do you think the school needs in order to improve its exam results? 
iii.What are some of the things that you find in the (1) public school (2) private  
      school that 
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Appendix 4: Description of explanatory variables for household school choice 
Household Head Characteristics 
Gender   
 
Age  
Education 
Religion 
Household Characteristics 
Social network 
 
Household expenditure per child 
Distance to school 
Occupation  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Child Characteristics 
Children in school 
 
Gender of child 
 
 
Indicator variable for household head‟s gender (female is 
reference category) 
Household head age in years 
Household head years of education 
Indicator variable for religion - Christian =1, other =0 
 
Indicator variable for household receiving support from 
friends and relatives (Cash and in kind=1, No  support=0) 
Household schooling expenditure per child in Ghana Cedis 
per term  
Distance from home to school in kilometres 
A set of binary indicator variables for occupation of 
household- 
       Own farm agriculture                 =1, 0ther =0 
       Casual labour in agriculture       =1, other =0 
       Casual labour in non-agriculture=1, other =0 
       Wage Salary in agriculture         =1, other =0 
       Wage Salary in non-agriculture =1, other =0 
       Petty trader                                  =1, other =0 
       Major trader                                =1, other=0    
 
Number of children in the household actually in school 
 
Indicator variable for child‟s gender (female is reference 
category) 
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Appendix 5: Description of explanatory variables for educational expenditure 
Household Head Characteristics 
Gender of household head 
 
Age  
 
Education 
 
Religion 
 
Household Characteristics 
Social network 
 
 
Household Assets 
 
 
 
Occupation of  household 
 
 
 
 
 
Children in school 
Children in public school 
Children in private school 
 
School characteristics 
    Private 
     
     Mixed 
 
 
Distance to school 
 
 
Indicator  variable for household head‟s gender 
(female is reference category) 
Age in years 
 
Years of schooling 
 
Indicator  variable for religion - Christian =1, other 
=0 
 
 
Indicator  variable for household receiving support 
from friends and relatives (Cash and in kind=1, No  
support=0) 
Indicator  variable of household owning three or 
more household durable assets (Three or more 
assets=1, less three assets=0 
 
A set of indicator  variables for occupation of 
household 
      Own farm agriculture                 =1, 0ther =0 
      Petty trader                                  =1, other =0 
      Major trader                                =1, other =0 
 
Number of children in household actually in school 
Number of children in household in public school 
Number of children in household in private school 
 
 
Indicator variable of public or private - with public 
school being the reference category. 
Indicator variable of public or mixed with public 
being the reference category 
 
Distance in kilometres 
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Appendix 6: Description of explanatory variables for test performance and progress  
Child characteristics  
Sex Indicator variable of student (reference category 
female 
Age Age  in years 
Over age years Years of being over age 
Fostering Indicator variable, fostered =1, other =0 
Pre-school years Years spent in pre-school 
Age of entry Age in years f entry into in primary  
Private tuition outside home Indicator variable, private tuition=1, other 
Household literacy test sum Household head total score in literacy test 
Household water distance Distance in kilometres 
 
Household Occupation/ Livelihood 
 
Household indicator variables 
Farming Household in farming =1, other=0 
Casual labour Household in casual labour=1, other=0 
Household wages/salaries in employment Earn wages/salary = 1, other=0 
Household wages/salaries in non-agric Earn wages/salary in non-agric=1, other=1 
Household runs petty trade Runs petty trade =1, other =0 
Household runs major trde Runs major trade=1, other=0 
Foraging Foraging =1, other=0 
Charity/alms Charity/alms =1, other=0 
Safety net Safety net =1, other=0 
Private transfer within Private transfer within Ghana=1, other=1 
 
Schools 
 
Public rural primary Kokodo Public primary school 
Public rural JHS Kokodo Public JHS 
Public rural primary Akoma Public primary 
Public rural JHS Akoma Public JHS 
Private rural primary Kokodo Private primary 
Public rural primary Eku Public primary 
Public rural JHS Eku Public JHS 
Private rural primary Eku Private primary 
Private rural JHS Eku Private JHS 
Private rural JHS kokodo Private JHS 
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Appendix 7: Teaching Time-table of Classes observed 
1. Public School Teaching Time Table 
Days Class/ 
Grade 
7:40 
8:00 
8:00 
8:30 
8:30 
9:00 
9:00 
9:30 
9:30 
9:45 
9:45 
10:15 
10:15 
10:45 
10:45 
11:15 
11:15 
11:45 
11:45 
12:15 
12:15 
12:45 
12:45 
1:15 
1:15 
1:45 
1:45 
PM 
Monday 1 
A
S
S
E
M
B
L
Y
/R
E
G
IS
T
R
A
T
IO
N
 
MATHS LIBRARY 
B
R
E
A
K
 
LANGUAGE & LIT ICT 
B
R
E
A
K
 
INT. SCIENCE SCH. BASED 
ASSESSMENT 
C
L
O
S
S
IN
G
 
4 ENGLISH MATHS  PHYSICAL 
EDUCATION .(P.E) 
INT SC. LANGUAGE & 
LIT 
CREATIVE 
ARTS EDU. 
6 ENGLISH MATHS PHYSICAL EDU. INT. SC. GHANAIAN 
LANGUAGE 
C.E.D 
Tuesday 1 MATHS P. .E LANGUAGE & LIT CA CA INT  SC. 
4 P. E. ICT/CA MATHS ENGLISH GHANAIAN 
LANGUAGE 
LIBRARY 
6 P. E. ICT/CA MATHS GHANAIAN 
LANGUAGE 
C. A S. B. A. 
Wednesday 1  
WORSHIP 
P. E MATHS ICT NCS LANGUAGE & LIT 
4 ENGLISH INT. 
SCIENCE 
MATHS C. A. S.B.A 
6 ENGLISH INT. 
SCIENCE 
C. E. D C. A. C. A. S.B.A 
Thursday 1 MATHS ICT/CA LANGUAGE & LIT C. A. C. A. INT SCIENCE 
4 C. E. D. P. E. GH LANG INT. SCIENCE C. A. ICT/ENG 
6 MATHS C. E. D. GH LANG INT SCIENCE C. A. ENGLISH 
Friday 1 P. E. S. B. A. LANG & LIT LIB MATHS C. A. 
4 MATHS C. E. D. INT 
SC 
ICT GH 
LAN 
ENGLISH C. A. S.B.A 
6 MATHS C. E. D. ENG ICT C. A. ENGLISH C. A. S. B. A 
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2. Low-Fee Private School Teaching Time Table   
 
 Class/Grade 8:15-9:15 9:15-10:15 10:15-
11:00 
11:00-12:00 12:00-1:00 1:00-
2:00 
2:00-3:00 
Monday 1 Maths Library 
B
R
E
A
K
 T
IM
E
 
Language/Literature ICT 
B
R
E
A
K
 T
IM
E
 
SBA 
 
4 
Language & 
Literacy 
Maths Oral English Natural 
Science 
Creative Art 
 
6 
Integrated 
Science 
ICT English Maths Maths 
Tuesday 1 Maths P.E Language/Literature Creative Art Natural Science 
 
4 
Languate 
and Literacy 
Oral English Creative Art ICT Maths 
 
6 
Citizenship 
Education 
Fante Integrated Science English 
Language 
ICT 
Wednesday 1 WORSHIP P.E Maths Natural 
Science 
English 
Language 
4 WORSHIP ICT Maths English Lang. Natural Science 
6 WORSHIP Maths Creative Art Citizenship Fante 
Thursday 1 Maths ICT English Language Creative Art Natural Science 
4 Maths ICT Oral English Maths ICT 
6 Citizenship English 
Language 
Integrated Science ICT Creative Art 
Friday 1 PE SBA English Language ICT Library 
4 ICT Creative Art Natural Science Oral English Language & Lit 
6 Fante Creative Art Citizenship Educ. Maths English 
Language 
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Appendix 8: Enrolment and fee income of LFPSs 
 
1. Number of Pupils enrolled in Holomo and Fee Payment (Ghana cedis), Last Term 2008/2009 
Class/ 
Grade 
Fee Per 
Child 
(Gh 
cedis) 
Total 
Number of 
children in 
class 
Number of 
children 
ever sent 
home for 
fees 
Number 
dropped 
out 
Fees 
owed by 
dropped out 
How many 
are in fee 
arrears and 
Expected 
fee 
revenue 
 
Total 
Amount in 
arrears 
Fee 
arrears as 
a % of 
total 
expected 
revenue 
1 11.00 13 5 1  2 143 4.00 1.73 
2 11.00 17 2 -  7 187 102.50 44.28 
3 11.00 14 4 1  5 154 16.00 6.91 
4 14.00 12 5 3 Gh8 4 168 32.00 13.82 
5 15.00 17 7 2  4 255 29.00 12.53 
6 15.00 18 4 -  4 270 14.00 6.05 
7 15.00 14 5 1  - 210 - 0.00 
8 17.00 29 6 3 Gh20 6 493 27.00 11.66 
9 20.00 12 2 -  2 240 7.00 3.02 
Total  136 40 11  34 2,120 231.50 10.92 
 
Source: Field Data, 2010 
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2. Number of Pupils enrolled in Fremo Preparatory and Fee Payment (Ghana cedis), Last Term 2008/2009 
Class/ 
Grade 
Fee Per 
Child  
(Gh cedis) 
Total 
Number of 
children in 
class 
Number of 
children ever 
sent home 
for fees 
How many 
dropped out 
Fees  
owed by 
dropped 
out 
(Gh cedis) 
How many 
pupils are in 
fee arrears  
(Gh cedis)  
Expected 
fee revenue  
(Gh cedis) 
 
Total 
Amount in 
arrears 
Total in 
fee arrears 
as a % of 
total 
1 6.00 35 20 2 30.00 11.00 210.00 9.00 4.29 
2 6.00 20 20 3 15.00 6.00 120.00 10.00 8.33 
3 6.00 25 20 2 9.00 7.00 150.00 8.00 5.33 
4 7.00 23 23 2 7.00 6.00 161.00 25.00 15.53 
5 7.00 27 25 2 2.00 6.00 189.00 20.00 10.58 
6 7.00 17 10 1 - 5.00 119.00 20.00 11.66 
7 10.00 18 17 1 25.00 7.00 180.00 58.00 3.02 
8 10.00 9 9 1 4.00 2.00 90.00 18.00 10.92 
9 10.00 13 10 1 10.00 2.00 130.00 8.00 6.15 
Total  187 154 15 102.00 52.00 1,349 176.00 13.05 
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3. Table: Number of Pupils enrolled in Shamo Preparatory and Fee Payment (Ghana cedis), Last Term 2008/2009 
Class/ 
Grade 
Fee Per 
Child 
(Gh cedis) 
Total 
Number of 
children in 
class 
Number of 
children ever 
sent home 
for fees 
Number 
dropped out 
Fees 
owed by 
dropped 
out 
Number in fee 
arrears  
Expected 
fee revenue 
 
Total 
Amount in 
arrears 
Total in 
fee arrears 
as a % of 
total 
1 7.50 32 12 0 0 2 240.00 7.50 3.13 
2 7.50 21 4 1 7.50 1 157.50 7.50 4.76 
3 7.50 23 11 0 0 0 172.50 10.00 5.80 
4 8.50 24 6 0 0 4 204.00 36.00 17.65 
5 8.50 30 10 0 0 0 255.00 0 0 
6 8.50 25 8 0 0 0 212.50 0 0 
7 11.50 27 13 0 0 0 310.50 0 0 
8 11.50 33 20 0 0 0 379.50 0 0 
9 11.50 12 8 0 0 1 138.00 6.50 4.71 
Total  227 92 1 7.50 8 2,069.5 67.50 3.26 
*studies fees collected daily are not included in this table 
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Appendix  9: School Inputs of Public and Private schools 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School Type  
Name of school    
Input Variables    
        Teacher qualification 
Number ..................................... 
No. trained ................................ 
No. untrained ............................ 
   
         Teacher Monthly Salary  
Average trained 
Average untrained 
   
         Pupil Teacher Ratio 
Total enrolled Primary ............ 
 
PTR Primary ........................... 
 
Total enrolled JHS................... 
Total of teachers....................... 
PTR Junior High School ......... 
   
 Type of  school building 
 
Wooden structure................... 
 
Mud house............................ 
 
Cement/concrete building.... 
 
Other types (specify)............ 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Number of classrooms (cement 
Block) 
Primary School ........................ 
 
Junior High School JHS)......... 
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Appendix 10: A model of costs of a typical rural school  
Salary Cost  
 
Public Private 
Recurrent costs Recurrent costs 
 Monthly 
 
Other allowances 
Total 
  
Non-salary costs 
1. Administration 
       -Teacher notebooks ...................... 
       -Class registers.............................. 
       - Chalks.......................................... 
       - Pens ............................................ 
       -Card board.................................... 
       - Poster colours............................... 
       -water/ from bore hole ................. 
       -Photocopies ................................ 
       -refreshment for visitors .............. 
       -transport (meetings) ................... 
       - Photocopies ............................... 
       -First Aid (Drugs) ........................ 
       - Annual registration fee .............. 
2. Textbooks 
        -Social studies ........................... 
        -Science ..................................... 
        -Maths ........................................ 
        -English ...................................... 
        -other books ............................... 
3. Sporting activities............................ 
4. Other expenses ............................... 
  
Total   
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Appendix 11: Teacher qualification, salary and PTR 
 
 
School.......................................... 
        Teacher qualification 
Total number of teachers ........ 
 
No. trained............................... 
 
No. untrained .......................... 
 
................................................ 
 
................................................ 
 
................................................ 
     Gross Monthly Salary   
Trained 
1....................................... 
2....................................... 
3....................................... 
4....................................... 
5....................................... 
6...................................... 
7...................................... 
8....................................... 
9....................................... 
 
Average .......................... 
 
Untrained 
1....................................... 
2....................................... 
3....................................... 
4....................................... 
5....................................... 
6....................................... 
7....................................... 
8....................................... 
 
Average .......................... 
 
         Pupil Teacher Ratio 
 
Total enrolled Primary ........ 
PTR Primary ........................ 
 
Total enrolled JHS................. 
 
Total of teachers..................... 
 
 
PTR Junior High School ....... 
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Appendix 12: School Building 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
School .......................................................... 
 
Type of  school building 
 
Wooden structure 
 
Mud house 
 
Cement/concrete building 
 
Other types (specify) 
 
 
 
Number of classrooms (cement 
Block) 
 
Primary School ......................... 
 
Junior High School (JHS)......... 
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Appendix 13: Report on teacher contact time in LFPS and rural public school 
 
Teacher contact time in LFPS 
Primary/Grade 1 Primary/Grade 4 Primary/Grade 6 
Day 1 – Teacher gives exercises 
to children in the morning but no 
engagement with them. In the 
afternoon teacher spends the rest 
of the time teaching rhymes. 
Time lost: 27 minutes. 
Day 1 – Teacher spends 2 hours 
allocated to 2 subjects in 
teaching 1. Teacher is absent 
from class for 30 minutes. 
Excess time usage: 1 hour; 
teaching time lost: 30 minutes. 
Day1 – Teacher spends 2 hours 
on a subject instead of 1. Teacher 
spends 12 minutes writing out an 
exercise and 38 minutes writing 
notes on the board. Excessive 
time usage: 1 hour. 
Day 2 - Teacher spends 1 hour 
20 minutes checking books and 
25 minutes doing nothing. Time 
lost: 1 hour 45 minutes. 
Day 2 – Teacher sits in class 
doing nothing, losing 25 minutes. 
Teacher spends 45 minutes 
writing test questions on the 
board in the morning, and 
another 1 hour in the afternoon. 
Comes to class 10 minutes late. 
Time lost: 45 minutes. 
Day 2 – Teacher spends 1 hour 
20 minutes setting test questions; 
17 minutes writing questions on 
the board; 1 hour marking class 
test; 10 minutes praying; and 1 
hour mending a bamboo fence. 
Total time lost: 1 hour 10 
minutes, but also excessive time 
usage. 
Day 3 – Morning religious 
worship overruns by 1 hour, 
taking up 15 minutes of teaching 
time. Teacher is in class but no 
teaching or exercises given to 
pupils for 45 minutes. Time lost: 
1 hour. 
Day 3 – Religious worship 
overruns by 15 minutes. Teacher 
spends 24 minutes writing 
questions on the board and 40 
minutes marking a class test. 
Teacher utilises 2 periods for 1 
subject instead of 2 and spends 
17 minutes again writing a class 
test on the board. Total time lost: 
15 minutes. 
Day 3 – Teacher spends 2 hours 
and 15 minutes engaged in 
private reading, walking in and 
out of the classroom and talking 
to colleagues. Teacher utilises 2 
hours instead of the 1 hour 
allocated to a subject, and 10 
minutes writing a test on the 
board. Time lost: 2 hours and 15 
minutes. 
Day 4 – Teacher is 10 minutes 
late to class and spends 30 
minutes of teaching time outside 
the classroom. Total time lost: 40 
minutes. 
Day 4 - teacher utilises 2 periods 
for one subject, leading to excess 
time usage of 1 hour 25 minutes. 
Teacher chats with a colleague 
for 45 minutes and spends 17 
minutes writing notes on the 
board. Time lost: 45 minutes. 
Day 4 – Teacher spends 30 
minutes copying notes on the 
board, 10 minutes on prayer, and 
30 minutes marking a class 
exercise. Time lost: 10 minutes, 
but also excessive time usage. 
Day 5 – Teacher utilises time 
teaching and engaging with 
children. 
Day 5 – Teacher utilises 1 excess 
hour on a subject; 45 minutes 
marking a class exercise; and 
Day 5 – Teacher spends 12 
minutes doing nothing; 18 
minutes writing questions on the 
247 
ends lesson 15 minutes early; 
After break, teacher leaves class 
for 47 minutes. Time lost: 1 hour 
20 minutes.  
board; and 54 minutes marking 
exercises. Nothing is taught 
during the last 1-hour period. 
Time lost: 1 hour 12 minutes. 
 
 
Teacher contact time in public basic school in rural area 
Primary/Grade 1 Primary/Grade 4 Primary/Grade 6 
Day 1 – Teacher spends 13 
minutes explaining subtraction; 2 
minutes writing an exercise on 
the board; and then sits on the 
veranda. Children left alone in 
classroom to do an exercise, 
taking 2 hours 47 minutes 
instead of the allocated 1 hour. In 
the afternoon, teacher asks 
children to draw animals while 
teacher walks around chatting 
with colleagues. Time lost: 2 
hours. 
Day 1 – Teacher utilises 37 
minutes reading an English 
passage with pupils, who then 
spend 1 hour 27 minutes doing 
an English exercise while teacher 
reads a post-diploma course 
book. Children asked to go for 
P.E. – a 1-hour period – but end 
up spending the rest of the day 
playing outside. Total teaching 
time lost: 2 hours 56 minutes. 
Day 1 – Teacher spends 1 hour 
57 minutes on English reading, 
each pupil being made to read a 
portion of the text aloud. Teacher 
spends 45 minutes on a science 
lesson; gives pupils a class 
exercise; and then leaves to take 
something home, which uses up 
27 minutes of teaching time. 
Teacher marks class exercise 
while children play in the 
classroom. Time lost: 1 hour 51 
minutes. 
Day 2 – Teacher arrives 12 
minutes late; spends 34 minutes 
marking a Mathematics exercise 
from the previous day; and 
returns exercise books to 
children. Teacher leaves class, 
returns 25 minutes later to find 
children making a noise, and 
spends 13 minutes lecturing them 
about good behaviour. Children 
given English books to read 
while teacher sits under a tree 
chatting with a colleague. Time 
lost: approximately 3 hours 20 
minutes. 
Day 2 – Teacher allows pupils to 
spend 90 minutes on P.E. instead 
of 1 hour. Pupils made to read a 
Fante (Ghanaian Language) 
passage, while teacher leaves the 
classroom; returns after 1 hour 
56 minutes instead of the 1 hour 
allocated to Fante. Teacher 
spends 25 minutes teaching 
multiplication, and 4 minutes 
writing an exercise on the board. 
The rest of the day, children do 
the exercise while teacher reads a 
book. Time lost: 1 hour 13 
minutes. 
Day 2 – Children do P.E. for the 
first 2 periods, by the end of 
which teacher has still not 
arrived. Teacher enters the 
classroom after P.E. and teaches 
Mathematics, assigning an 
exercise, which utilises 2 hours 
30 minutes instead of the 
allocated 1 hour 30 minutes. 
Teacher leaves classroom, 
returns after 1 hour 10 minutes, 
and gives children English books 
to read, which they continue to 
do until home time. Time lost: 2 
hours 10 minutes. 
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Day 3 – Religious worship 
overruns into teaching time by 
25 minutes. Pupils take 5 
minutes to walk from assembly 
to their classrooms, by which 
time it is break time. Pupils do 3 
Mathematics exercises written on 
the board while teacher spends 1 
hour sitting on the veranda 
chatting with colleagues. The 
rest of the day, teacher sits 
outside chatting, losing 1 hour 45 
minutes of teaching time. Total 
time lost: 3 hours 15 minutes. 
 
Day 3 – Religious worship 
accounts for 30 minutes. After 
break, there is no teacher in the 
classroom for 50 minutes. 
Teacher spends 6 minutes 
writing an exercise on the board 
and then leaves for 54 minutes. 
The rest of the day (1 hour 30 
minutes), pupils are left alone 
making a noise and teacher is 
nowhere to be seen in school. 
Total time lost: 3 hours 14 
minutes. 
 
Day 3 – Religious worship 
accounts for 30 minutes. Teacher 
leaves the classroom for 1 hour 7 
minutes. In the last period, 
teacher spends 13 minutes 
teaching sources of energy and 5 
minutes writing notes on the 
board. Teacher leaves the 
classroom for 45 minutes, and 
spends the last 40 minutes caning 
pupils for leaving the classroom 
in her absence. Total time lost: 3 
hours 2 minutes. 
Day 4 – First 2 periods, teacher 
is in school but not teaching, 
losing 1 hour 30 minutes. After 
break, teacher sits on veranda for 
20 minutes; spends 6 minutes 
writing an exercise on the board; 
and then goes back to her seat on 
the veranda, losing 1 hour 54 
minutes. During the last period, 
teacher marks the exercise and 
chats with friends, losing 1 hour 
45 minutes. Total Time lost: 3 
hours 39 minutes 
Day 4 – First 2 periods, teacher 
in school but does not enter the 
classroom for 1 hour 7 minutes. 
Teacher distributes reading 
books and reads with children. 
Third and fourth periods, teacher 
not seen in the classroom for the 
rest of the day, losing 2 hours. 
Last period, pupils making a 
noise and 2 pupils fighting, 
losing 1 hour 45 minutes. Total 
time lost: 3 hours 45 minutes 
Day 4 – First 2 periods, teacher 
reads with the class and gives 
exercises to pupils. Teacher sits 
in class for 30 minutes engaged 
in private reading. Third and 
fourth periods, teacher spends 26 
minutes sitting under a tree 
chatting; returns to class and 
reads with pupils until break 
time. Last period, 50 minutes 
spent on an exercise; 1 hour 10 
minutes utilised in marking. 
Total time lost: 2 hours 6 
minutes 
Day 5 - Teacher 5 minutes late 
for class; writes exercise on the 
board for pupils; and sits outside 
preparing lesson plans, losing  36 
minutes. Third and fourth 
periods, teacher continues with 
lesson plans and chats on the 
veranda, losing 2 hours. Last 3 
periods, teacher collects exercise 
books and goes back to her seat 
on the veranda until home time, 
Day 5 – First 2 periods, teacher 
in school but not in class, losing 
1 hour 30 minutes of teaching 
time. Third and fourth periods, 
teacher in class talking with 
pupils but not teaching. Teacher 
leaves the classroom after just 47 
minutes with pupils, losing  hour 
39 minutes. Last 3 periods, 
teacher not seen in class at all, 
losing 1 hour 47 minutes. Total 
Day 5 – First 2 periods spent on 
one subject instead of 2, losing 
30 minutes. Third and fourth 
periods, pupils return to class 5 
minutes late but class teacher 
still out chatting, eventually 
losing 40 minutes. Teacher 
spends 10 minutes explaining 
fractions and gives exercise; 
spends 47 minutes of teaching 
time marking exercise; and 
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losing 1 hour 45 minutes. Total 
time lost: 4 hours 21 minutes 
time lost: 3 hours 56 minutes leaves classroom 13 minutes 
before the break, losing 1 hour 
27 minutes. Teacher not in 
classroom in last period, losing 1 
hour 41 minutes. Total time lost: 
2 hours 34 minutes 
